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The following critical appraisal presents eight interlinked works that apply and extend 
Michael Barkun’s (2003) concept of ‘improvisational millennialism’. This body of work 
demonstrates that, as Barkun suggests, the concept is widely applicable to the online 
communities in which stigmatized knowledge is widely accepted. Moreover, it extends the 
definition to consider how improvisational millennialism provides ill-defined or dispossessed 
communities a means of articulating a collective relationship to historical time as well as a 
crude means of shoring up basic assumptions of group membership. Mythical pasts and 
millennial expectation provide the opportunity for shared eschatological orientation whilst the 
dualism of conspiracy theories demarcates between the communities and their outsiders. This 
critical review demonstrates how the journal articles and book chapters collected in the 
appendices provide specific examples of the application and extension of improvisational 
millennialism. The examples chosen are varied but a persistent theme drawn out through 
analysis is the role that national cultures – official and official – are articulated through 
improvisational millennialism. The examples include consideration of how the depiction of 
millennial beliefs in the mass media contribute to national cultural constructs but more 
typically focus on the use of improvisational millennialism in online communities. Of the 
latter, the greater number of examples are concerned with improvisational millennialism 
within the neo-fascist milieu. Mobilised by conspiracy theories with apocalyptic subtexts, the 
far right reliance on improvisational millennialism demonstrates the implicit danger of the 
increased incursion of stigmatized knowledge into the cultural mainstream. This critical 
review serves to show that despite being typified by a syncretic bricolage of unconnected 
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This thesis will make the case, through this critical review and the published works 
submitted, that conspiracy theories and millennial beliefs are expressions of collective hopes 
and fears. This has been well established in the case of millennialism but the thesis will draw 
on the works of Michael Barkun to demonstrate that conspiracy theories are a related 
phenomenon and are similarly expressive of communities’ outlooks. Further, whilst these 
may take benign forms there are contained within them the potential for fuelling divisive and 
extreme views of society; in conspiracy theories’ division between ‘them’ (the conspirators) 
and ‘us’ (the conspired against) and in millennialism’s identification of ‘the chosen people’ 
and the ‘remnant’ (those outside the chosen community). 
The following critical review therefore presents the case for considering current conspiracy 
theories and millennialist narratives as reflections of developments in contemporary social 
and political discourse. Further, what is claimed here is that Michael Barkun’s concept of 
improvisational millennialism should be extended to consider the persistence of dominant 
ideologies within it and at the heart of its purposive syncretism is a symbolic renegotiation of 
membership of, and the terms of belonging to, regressive or emergent communities in an age 
of globalizing cultures. The flourishing of improvisational millennialism described here is 
aided, and characterised, by the emergence of digital communications networks that allow 
users to be active producers of cultural materials. The evidence for this thesis is presented in 
a collection of published works and is clarified in this accompanying commentary. The works 
are all peer reviewed journal articles or chapters included in edited collections and published 
by academic publishers. The titles are as follows:  
• ‘Beyond reason: The exotic millennium in English culture’ (Wilson 2011a) 
• ‘On the outskirts of the new global village: computer-mediated visions of the end’ 
(Wilson 2011b) 
• ‘From Apocalyptic Paranoia to the Mythic nation: Political extremity and myths of 
origin in the neo-fascist milieu’ (Wilson 2012) 
• ‘From Mushrooms to the stars: 2012 and the apocalyptic milieu’ (Wilson 2013) 
• ‘Postcards from the Cosmos: Cosmic Spaces in Alternative Religion and Conspiracy 




•  ‘The Bitter End: Apocalypse and conspiracy in white nationalist responses to the 
ISIL Paris Attacks’ (Wilson 2017b) 
• ‘#whitegenocide, the Alt-right and Conspiracy Theory: How Secrecy and Suspicion 
Contributed to the Mainstreaming of Hate’ (Wilson 2018) 
• ‘The Prism of Lyra: UFO Consciousness and Portals to Cosmic Awareness’ (Wilson 
2019).   
 
The work of Michael Barkun (1997, 2003, 2016) is drawn upon and developed throughout 
this critical review, as he drew attention to the interrelated way in which conspiracy theories 
and millennialist narratives feed and sustain one another. Barkun’s arguments are principally 
laid out in the book A Culture of Conspiracy: Apocalyptic Visions in Contemporary America. 
Published in 2003, and in a revised edition in 2006. This was one of three influential texts 
published at the turn of the millennium that discussed conspiracy theories and their place in 
modern culture. The others, Mark Fenster’s (1999) Conspiracy Theories and Peter Knight’s 
(2000) Conspiracy Culture: From Kennedy to The X-Files, both recognised the place of 
power and agency in engagement with the culture of conspiracy theories and made evident 
that conspiracy theories can be used to extreme political ends. Nonetheless, both celebrated 
the potential that the authors saw in conspiracy theories for fostering a healthy scepticism 
towards official accounts and in their capacity to wrest from hegemonic institutional 
monopolies the possibility of producing public knowledge.  
Barkun was more wary of conspiracy narratives and his argument is more clearly a 
development of the identification of conspiracy theories with belligerent, populist politics 
more aligned with Richard Hofstadter (Hofstadter 1963, 1964, 1965). Hofstadter is discussed 
further below and in Wilson (2018). Of key importance here is to note how this thesis extends 
Barkun’s concept of improvisational millennialism and shows how national cultures shape 
the formation of improvisational millennialism and, in that context, its value to nationalist 
discourse particularly in its most extreme forms of expression. 
Improvisational millennialism is, in Barkun’s words, ‘wildly eclectic. Its undisciplined 
borrowings from unrelated sources allow its proponents to build novel systems of belief’ 
(Barkun 2003, xi). He is clear that improvisational millennialism is distinct from earlier forms 
of millennial longing in that, as a whole, ‘they combine elements so disparate that it is often 
impossible to determine what if any influence predominates’ (Ibid, 23). Its multiple 




concept of Barkun’s and one he develops from Colin Campbell’s ‘cultic milieu’ (Campbell 
1972) and James Webb’s ‘rejected knowledge’ (Webb 1976). ‘Stigmatized knowledge’ is, in 
Barkun, forms of belief that are contradicted by, and marginalised by, established norms of 
belief, cultural orthodoxy, and scientific proof, ‘knowledge claims that run counter to 
generally accepted belief’ (Barkun 2003, 8). Aided by the ease of sharing knowledge and the 
lack of editorial control, the internet has aided the dissemination and sharing of stigmatized 
knowledge. Just as the ‘seeker’ was able to encounter a variety of divergent beliefs and 
practices during the new age fairs that comprised ‘the circuit’ of events through which 
Campbell suggested the cultic milieu was realised, so too can the modern web user encounter 
a dizzying array of forms of stigmatized knowledge through social media platforms, 
specialised forums, and ‘traditional’ web pages.  
It is due to this electronic context for the discussion and exchange of stigmatized knowledge 
that the majority of the works submitted as part of this critical review explore web-based 
expressions of improvisational millennialism (Wilson 2011b, 2012, 2013, 2017a, 2017b, 
2018, 2019). The online context becomes a key component for the extended understanding of 
improvisational millennialism that this critical review describes in the works submitted. This 
supplement to Barkun’s concept is described in the following. 
It is not only the internet that has increased the tendency for stigmatized knowledge to 
flourish. Echoing Lyotard’s (1984) diagnosis of a generalised incredulity towards 
metanarratives, Barkun suggests that in the context of a decline in the status of ‘existing 
authority structures’ (Barkun 2003, 20), stigmatized knowledge has gained ground in a search 
for mainstream penetration. Without providing a definitive periodization, Barkun describes 
examples that occur following the collapse of the nominal communist regimes in Europe and 
refers to Bell’s ‘end of ideology’ and Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ thesis as key moments in 
the decline of ideological authority. Exacerbated by the internet’s undermining of traditional 
media’s near monopoly on knowledge production, the loosening dominance of traditional 
sources of informational authority has provided an environment in which stigmatized 
knowledge has become increasingly widespread. Barkun’s position is that this increased 
dissemination of stigmatized knowledge allied with a broad rejection of authoritative 
knowledge sources and their representatives has led to a greater propensity for the production 
of improvisational millennialist beliefs among countercultural, radical, and other 
marginalised groups. He argues that, with their success exemplifying the decline of existing 




given that they are distinct from earlier forms of belief that were similarly stigmatised. For 
Barkun, where earlier structured forms of stigmatized knowledge reflected schismatic 
variations on established religious and secular forms, improvisational millennialism is 
characterised by its idiosyncratic nature in which no dominant tradition is evident, 
In the act of ignoring boundaries, improvisational millenarians implicitly challenge 
orthodox conceptions of belief and knowledge. By picking and choosing among a 
variety of beliefs, improvisationalists convey the message that no single belief system, 
whether religious or secular, is authoritative. By implication, only the idiosyncratic 
combination associated with a particular leader or group is deemed to be valid 
(Barkun 2003, 21). 
By restricting his supposition of dominant authority structures to those of religious or 
political traditions, Barkun underestimates the role of national cultures and similar deeply felt 
collective affinities in providing authority structures in which the wider appeal and cultural 
currency of improvisational millennialism is exerted. Barkun is not politically naïve; his 
earlier work, Religion and the Racist Right: Origins of the Christian Identity Movement 
(Barkun 1997) demonstrates the dangerous interplay between conspiracism, millennialism 
and far right ideology. Rather, it is suggested here that he wrote A Culture of Conspiracy at a 
moment in which the revitalisation of the kind of populist nationalism associated with the 
Twentieth Century appeared less likely given the (admittedly widely challenged) prognosis of 
the ‘end of history’ and the triumph of individualism. Instead, this thesis demonstrates the 
centrality of the collective voice in improvisational millennialism. 
 
 
Conceptual and Methodological Approaches 
 
The methods in evidence in the written pieces are varied and, frequently, in the published 
works themselves only implicit rather than being explicitly articulated but it is worth drawing 
attention to the way in which the approach taken has drawn upon a training in both the 
Cultural Studies and Sociology traditions. In part, this can be understood as a consequence of 
the author’s background and initial training in the humanities. Stuart Hall’s seminal 




1980, 1997); Linda Steiner makes a strong case for Hall’s ongoing influence (Steiner 2016). 
Steiner encapsulates Hall’s contribution to the crucial consideration of any text’s historical 
context – and its potential contribution to the dominant ideology of that context – in the 
following way, 
Hall thus denied that content, or producers of content, can make people behave in a 
certain way. But he retained the notion of the power of media in providing cultural 
categories and frameworks within which members of a group tend to operate. 
Institutions producing messages can set agendas and define issues. (Steiner 2016, 7) 
This is useful because it captures the complex interplay between the mass media, audiences, 
culture, and power. It recognises the potential for mass media products to shape the 
discursive framing implied and articulated through their content. This was certainly the 
approach taken in the earliest of the pieces presented here, Wilson (2011a). In this Hall’s 
influence is noted for its ability to help identify how texts can produce a unifying framework 
through which the text’s producers and their intended audience are drawn together into an 
ideological affinity that is the basis of a collective unity. Cited directly in ‘Beyond reason: 
The exotic millennium in English culture,’ Hall’s approach provides a consistent influence 
given all the submitted papers’ concern with communal and nationalist cultural expressions. 
For Hall, the mass media have “colonized the cultural and ideological sphere.” In 
essence, then, what he is suggesting is that it is through the mass media that a group 
or community knows itself and its others. They, therefore, can be understood to 
provide a visual-aural register of what Benedict Anderson calls the “imagined 
community” of the nation. (Wilson 2011a, 202) 
This early piece was concerned with the depiction of the apocalypse in ‘official’ British 
culture; the documentaries were both broadcast by national broadcasters (BBC and Channel 
5). The articles and chapters that followed this piece retain the core concern for the 
relationship between texts and audiences but instead focus on texts produced within, and 
contributing to the ideological position of, smaller communities. The interrelationship of text, 
discourse, audience, community continued to be of central importance but it becomes clear 
that the internet has made possible the bypassing of centralising mass media and made more 
readily available the channels through which groups can self-determine the ‘categories and 




Barkun’s analysis (2003, 2006) depends on an assumption of this relationship between 
producers, text, audience, discourse but his methodological approach is never clarified; it is 
largely concerned with the analysis of recurrent parallel themes across differing categories of 
stigmatized knowledge and demonstrating the shared rhetorical strategies within the milieu as 
a whole. However, the unstated nature of this approach has limited the methodological 
reflection available in each work presented here inasmuch as they draw on and apply 
Barkun’s implicit approach. Whilst this is no defence of the omission it is not unusual in the 
field, indicating, perhaps, the less overt methodological stance taken in the humanities. So, 
for instance, Fenster’s equally influential Conspiracy Theories: Secrecy and Power in 
American Culture (1999, 2008) takes a similar approach although he writes in a more or less 
recognisibly ‘Hall-ian’ cultural studies style. His concern is to explore the expressive agency 
that conspiracy theories afford their formulators and audiences and the interplay of 
intentionality and interpretations. Whilst he writes with reference to the semiotic chains that 
defer (and confirm) meaning in conspiracy theories he is never explicit about his method as 
such. He is careful, however, to make evident that he did not seek to uncover conspiracy 
theory’s wider causes but to explore them as interpretative narrative forms that give pleasure 
to their authors and audiences. Similarly, Peter Knight in Conspiracy Culture: From Kennedy 
to the X-Files (2000) offers a rhetorical analysis with an emphasis on exploring ‘the meaning 
of conspiracy culture for both those who produce it and those who consume it’ (Knight 2000, 
22). Whilst finding much to appreciate in Fenster, and also Jodi Dean’s (1998) Aliens in 
America: Conspiracy Cultures from Outerspace to Cyberspace, Knight is dismissive of what 
he refers to as, “The cultural studies wager [that] there are hidden utopian yearnings buried 
deep within popular culture, and which can be rearticulated to more productive political 
projects,” (Ibid, 21). This, he contends is a, “mistake,” which necessitates the analyst, “cast 
other people at whatever cost as the principal actors in one’s own revolutionary drama,” 
(Ibid, 22).  
To reject an analytic approach to stigmatized knowledge, though, is to undermine the 
potential for signalling warnings that academic analysis of – what was – the fringes of belief 
can offer. Indeed, it is difficult to see millennialism as anything other than a utopian yearning. 
Barkun offers a corrective to the depoliticization of conspiracy theories in Knight’s work. He 
wrote presciently of the dangers implicit in the unchecked spread of stigmatized knowledge 
into the cultural mainstream. Knight’s own position has shifted and in a co-authored 




value of the cultural studies approach in producing an academic approach to conspiracy 
theories that is critical but mindful of the sensitivities of dealing with people’s beliefs (Peter 
Knight and Michael Butter 2018).   
 
Researching online public culture: ethical considerations 
 
The majority of texts analysed in the pieces submitted (Wilson 2011b, 2012, 2013, 2017a, 
2017b, 2018, 2019) are digital texts from a range of sources. These include organisational 
homepages, discussion forums, personal blogs, and Twitter posts. These texts typify the 
criteria that Thelwall et al (2011) use to differentiate online communication from traditional 
communications media, ‘In contrast to typical face-to-face communication, online 
communication might be anonymous, textual, asynchronous, remote, permanent, and/or very 
public, although some online forms can be none of these.’ (Thelwall et al 2012, 617). What 
renders the question of ethics complex here is the extent to which users understand their posts 
as published texts in the same way as traditional media producers. Where film or television 
media workers, novelists, performers and others, with a clear intentionality, offer their work 
in the public domain as public there is no guarantee that posters on social media do so with 
the same level of informed intentionality. Clearly, this will vary from platform to platform.  
For instance, James Hudson and Amy Bruckman’s (2004) study of chat room users suggested 
that the users generally objected to having the text they were producing replicated or analysed 
in (especially) etic research. It has been cited as a case against the use of user-generated 
online content in academic research – whether or not consent had been sought. What is 
overlooked is the specificity of their study. They analysed chat rooms which are non-
permanent, textually created spaces that are typically shared over a short duration by 
contributing users. As such they do not have the enduring presence identified by Thelwall et 
al (2012) nor are they publicly accessible. It is therefore difficult to support Hudson and 
Bruckman’s claim that their findings can be extended to other forms of internet-based 
communication. They stated, ‘Based on this study, we can safely conclude that individuals in 
online environments such as chatrooms generally do not approve of being studied without 
their consent’ (Hudson & Bruckman 2004, 135). The elision of ‘chatrooms’ and ‘online 




public and private areas in forums such as Stormfront. Thus, Hudson and Bruckman’s 
conclusion is wholly applicable to private online cultures but overlooks the communicative 
intentionality of public online cultures.  
A key consideration in this ethical discussion is concern for the research subjects’ safety. 
This, in turn, implies a consideration of the extent to which any individual online producer or 
contributor may be safely anonymized. The decision to do so allows individuals a perceived 
freedom to post material of a more contentious or provocative nature than they might share in 
their offline lives (Thelwall et al 2012).  This takes on a nuanced complexity in online 
research as many participants on public platforms do so in a way that intentionally conceals 
their own identities in order to allow themselves this freedom. But this self-anonymization 
cannot be a guarantee of a successful bid to fully anonymize themselves. The sharing of 
personal information, location identifiers such as DNS addresses can render individuals’ 
anonymous status at risk. As Michael Zimmer (2010) makes clear, users of forums can on 
occasion be unsure of the public/private status of their posts particularly on forums with 
complex systems of public and private areas; having entered their username and password to 
gain access to private areas their own perception of public/private can become undermined 
having gained equal access to all areas.  
Smedley and Coulson (2018), whilst attentive to Zimmer’s directive, suggest that shifting 
statuses of public/private and producer/consumer access necessitate a more reflective and 
contingent approach than a prescriptive approach might demand. Instead, they argue for an 
ethical and methodological flexibility that adapts itself to each particular instance under 
investigation but which, nonetheless, is framed by an awareness of the ethical responsibility 
that researchers have to their subjects, ‘There are no clear-cut answers to untangle the 
dilemmas surrounding these issues, so researchers have a responsibility to make the best 
decision they can on a case-by-case basis’ (Smedley & Coulson 2018, 17).  
This is echoed by Lisa Sugiura, Rosemary Wiles, and Catherine Pope in their reflection on 
the ethics of online research in the human sciences (Sugiura et al 2017). They conclude that 
the potential value of internet research demands a careful but adaptive approach to ethical 
considerations and that the complexities and new challenges should not act as a deterrent 
from conducting web-based research. Moreover, public texts should be treated as public texts 




research participants should give full and free consent to participating in research is, in the 
online context, neither possible nor necessary’ (Sugiura et al 2017, 195).  
It is in this spirit, and in the case-by-case approach described by Smedley and Coulson, that 
the studies undertaken in the work submitted here have been approached. Participants’ 
identities have been protected as much as it makes sense to do so. In some instances public 
figures have posted materials as public figures and so these are treated as public texts that 
have been shared in order to be identified with the producer; in other instances producers of 
texts have had their identities protected, typically in cases in which private individuals have 
shared their views in public forums. In the following discussion, the rationale for these 
choices are made clear for each submitted work. A number offer analysis of comparable 
materials and so these are considered together. 
The chapter, ‘On the outskirts of the new global village: computer-mediated visions of the 
end’, offers an extended reflection on religious and new religious forms in a digital context 
but the online texts it analyses are what might be referred to as traditional authorial texts; they 
are published online but are intended as sole-authored pieces that rely on the centrality of 
authorial intention for their message. This is self-evident in Michael McClellan’s web-
published ‘book’ Nostradamus and the Final Age. The submitted article (Wilson 2011b) 
concentrated on two sections: one titled ‘The Diana Prophecy’ (McClellan 2001) and the 
other ‘Revelation’ (McClellan 2004); these are clearly intended as texts written for 
consumption by a general audience. On the welcome page of the website McClellan offers 
guidance on how best to navigate his website, directly addressing the reader and the sections 
relating to Diana and discussed in Wilson (2011b) continue this tone. Similarly, the message 
from Diana that Gillian MacBeth-Louthan claims to have channelled uses a similar direct 
address to an assumed mass audience. She writes, for instance, ‘Earth for many of you has oft 
times been a place of many hardships,’ (MacBeth-Louthan 2001, §2). As with McClellan, the 
intention is to communicate a direct message to an assumed but unknown audience. This is 
also the case for the message that Diane Tessman claimed to have received; this addressed 
‘seekers’ and gave guidance on finding their guardian angels whilst promising aid to ‘The 
Land, to protect, to bless, to heal, and then to help her evolve spiritually into a new Dawn’ 
(Tessman 1998, §27). 
In a similar vein, ‘The Invisible Empire: Political extremity and myths of origin in the 




aligned with what James Darsey saw as the negative potential in radical prophecy, e.g. Robert 
Welch and Joseph McCarthy (Darsey 1997). The chapter drew on works by white 
supremacist David Lane. These are avowedly political in content but are characterised by a 
millenarianism that has since fed the ‘white genocide’ conspiracy theory. These were not 
written for the internet but were preserved and disseminated through it. The political writing 
of Troy Southgate that is also considered in this chapter draws on a comparable rhetorical 
mytho-politics to Lane. Clearly, the tone is polemical and the texts are intended to promote 
Southgate’s ideological position. Unlike Lane’s writing, Southgate uses the internet as a 
means of disseminating his ideas and the pieces under analysis are written for the digital 
medium. The website Mourning the Ancient was also discussed here and as was noted in the 
published work it situates itself as a public information outlet that is in opposition to the 
‘mainstream media’ (MSM) but clearly reproduces its forms.  
Barkun (2006) emphasises the attraction of the medium to marginalized voices who are given 
access to the same audiences as the traditional, mainstream media outlets. This applies to the 
archiving of Lane’s writing, Southgate’s essays and the photographic material on Mourning 
the Ancient. Each seeks to disseminate the authors’ interventions in public culture and are, as 
such, publicly communicated texts. In each instance the author chooses to be identified with 
the message and for it to be a contribution to what is being termed here as public online 
culture. The substantive materials examined in 'From Mushrooms to the stars: 2012 and the 
apocalyptic milieu' (Wilson 2013) continues this focus on prophecy as part of public online 
culture. It surveys a range of millenarian voices who produced public websites to promote 
their prophetic message(s). These were varied in the theological frameworks that determined 
the content and tone of these messages but they were posted with the intention that the 
prophecy be publicly identified with the websites’ authors.  
‘Postcards from the Cosmos: Cosmic Spaces in Alternative Religion and Conspiracy 
Theories’ (Wilson 2017a) and 'The Prism of Lyra: UFO Consciousness and Portals to 
Cosmic Awareness’ (Wilson 2019) both explored the beliefs described through similar 
material to those examined in Wilson (2011b and 2013). Whereas the earlier works were 
singularly concerned with the prophetic rhetoric of individuals these later pieces are more 
concerned with the wider beliefs presented by individual channels and new religious 
movements. Nonetheless, the materials analysed are all public position statements publicly 




they also present no problematic ethical considerations being purposive contributions to 
public online culture. 
The white supremacist Stormfront forum was discussed above and the position was taken that 
there is a clear a demarcation between public and private posts, Zimmer’s (2010) 
observations notwithstanding. ‘The Bitter End: Apocalypse and conspiracy in white 
nationalist responses to the ISIL Paris Attacks’ (Wilson 2017b) drew extensively on 
Stormfront and relied on the public/private distinction in order to treat the posts as part of 
public culture. Nonetheless, a cautious approach to protecting authors’ identities was 
observed and no individual poster could be identified. The article drew out conspiracy and 
millenarian tropes from a specific corpus of posts that discussed the ISIS attack on Paris in 
November 2015. The work showed how these tropes inform white supremacist discourse in 
the day-to-day communications of white nationalists and thus extends beyond the notable 
figureheads and organic intellectuals – such as Lane and Southgate in Wilson (2012) – who 
are often cited as the ideologues of the movement.  
As the title suggests, the article ‘#whitegenocide, the Alt-right and Conspiracy Theory: How 
Secrecy and Suspicion Contributed to the Mainstreaming of Hate’, (Wilson 2018) examined 
the strategic use of a single Twitter hashtag by far-right communities. Although similar in 
form to online forums there are specific ethical complexities associated with using Twitter 
data especially the typically large corpus of textual data used in discourse studies. This is 
made problematic as there is little attention paid to ethical dimensions of big data Twitter 
research. In a study of research methods in Twitter research, Zimmer & Proferes (2014) 
found that of the corpus of projects they studied just, ‘4 percent of the corpus, made any 
mention of ethical  issues  or  considerations   in  relation   to  the   research   design   and   
data  collection methods,’ (Zimmer & Proferes 2014, 256). Hodson’s (2019) analysis of 
tweets discussing Canadian politics containing the hashtags #cdnpoli and #elxn42 did provide 
a rudimentary methodology but offered no ethical discussion.  
Elizabeth Buchanan (2017) makes clear the conflicting pressures facing the Twitter 
researcher. She acknowledges that big data analysis offers the promise of automatically 
anonymizing the identities of contributing subjects by reducing their presence to their writing 
alone but this can be deceptive. Tweets can include tagged contributors or retweeted private 
tweets. These cross ethical boundaries. In Wilson (2018) two individual Twitter users are 




of their public personas in their Tweets echoing Bethany Usher’s (2016) study of the 
construction of politician’s online personas during the 2015 UK election. Moreover, both 
figures are social media ‘personalities’ meaning that they are purposive producers of public 
online cultural content. No other individuals can be identified through the research. 
Buchanan’s observations are, nonetheless, crucial interventions because they draw attention 
to the challenges to human subject research that online communication has brought.  
The submitted works and their relation to the central themes 
 
What follows is a detailed exploration of this critical review with references to the submitted 
works providing insight into the presence of constituent elements of this thesis in the body of 
works as a whole. Prior to the extended statement of the critical review that follows, a brief 
summary of how each individual work contributes to this thesis will be made. The works 
represent an ongoing exploration of the key concepts and a reworking and refinement of the 
thesis as a whole. As such, they are described in the following summary in terms of their 
contribution to the development of the overall argument of the thesis rather than in 
chronological order. 
 
(Wilson 2011a) Beyond reason: The exotic millennium in English culture This 
delineates the working through of a notion of ‘Englishness’ in two television 
programmes that drew upon apocalyptic themes; it concluded that both made a case that 
suggested that millennialism was ‘other’ to English culture. In so doing, both presented 
‘England’ as eternal; sublimating the idea of ‘the end’ through the idea of ‘the nation’.  
As such it demonstrated how apocalyptic narratives, even in their negation, can be used 
to articulate collective belonging. It reads the televisual texts as reflective of Anthony 
Easthope’s suggestion of nationalism being born out of affiliation to a series of 
discursive tendencies (Easthope 1999). As such, nationalist affiliation can be 
understood as predicated on cultural affiliation as opposed to loyalty to a nation state. 
This becomes crucial in later pieces that reflect on the ‘virtual nation’ of white 
nationalists (i.e. Wilson 2017b, 2018). 
(Wilson 2019) The Prism of Lyra: UFO Consciousness and Portals to Cosmic 
Awareness In this, the possibility of identifying political content in the statements 




millenarian and conspiracy narratives within stigmatized knowledge (Barkun 2003) as 
well as work by Brian Gibbons (Gibbons 2001) among others (Ward and Voas 2011, 
Partridge 2005, Letcher 2001) to demonstrate a protean political content in the 
messages that channel Lyssa Royal claims to have received from extraterrestrial 
sources. In doing so it underlines the important point that superficially counter rational 
discourse is almost never unrelated to the social and political contexts in which it 
emerges. More particularly, this piece makes clear that even in narratives of ‘personal’ 
spiritual growth the endpoint of this development is a collective evolution in which 
humanity, in all its diversity, recognises its shared interests.  
(Wilson 2013) From Mushrooms to the stars: 2012 and the apocalyptic milieu offers 
further reflection on the rapid evolution of apocalyptic narratives when exposed to the 
syncretic tendencies that operate through stigmatized knowledge and within the cultic 
milieu. In providing a potted history of the development of the ‘2012 prophecy’ this 
piece demonstrates the way in which diverse cultural groupings within the US 
incorporated the 2012 ‘end of the world’ prophecy into their beliefs. It underlines a key 
principle in the overarching themes that characterize this body of work: that millenarian 
prophecy is still a vibrant popular form that reflects current social tensions. Far from 
being under siege from the rationalizing forces of secularization, it noted, ‘the 
surprising vitality of the apocalyptic milieu; of the readiness for significant sections of 
the Western population to hope for profound, indeed cataclysmic, change’ (Wilson 
2013, 268). 
Whilst the above explore the millennial destiny of various groups of believers, the next 
work examines how collective fears are expressed in apocalyptic discourse. (Wilson 
2017a) Postcards from the Cosmos: Cosmic Spaces in Alternative Religion and 
Conspiracy Theories considers this social rootedness of conspiratorial spirituality and 
in this is influenced strongly by Ward and Voas’ concept of ‘conspirituality’ (Ward and 
Voas 2011) as a means of expressing the passing of one cultural world and the 
otherwise unexpressed fear of an emerging one: in this case, of a spacefaring humanity 
from the perspective of an Earthbound population. This piece also recognised the drift 
toward the mainstream of stigmatized knowledge and questioned the sustainability of 
stigmatized knowledge’s depiction as marginal. Like the later Lyssa Royal piece 




(Wilson 2011b) On the outskirts of the new global village: computer-mediated visions 
of the end offers a dual consideration of the impact of the internet on the cultic milieu 
and the transformation of an iconic national symbol, Diana, Princess of Wales, into the 
source of claimed channelled messages from a realm of higher consciousness and, 
within these, prophecies. The piece suggested that the internet provides a new 
communal space in which the cultic milieu is revitalized and enlarged and, in so doing, 
provides a context in which forms of stigmatized knowledge can circulate more freely 
and contingent communities of believers can be built around shared beliefs. This idea is 
crucial here because the internet as a conduit through which marginal beliefs are able to 
flow into the mainstream of public cultures is a significant feature of the central 
arguments presented here.  So, too, is the idea that the kind of improvisational 
millennialism revealed in the channelled messages to Diana are not wholly free of 
discourses originating in existing authority structures. In the channelled prophecies 
Albion is renewed; for all their improvisational syncreticism and contra Barkun, the 
prophecies sustain the dominant notion of the ‘nation’.  
This combination of internet exposure and the presence and persistence of belligerent 
forms of nationalism within stigmatized knowledge informs (Wilson 2012) From 
apocalyptic Paranoia to the Mythic nation: Political extremity and myths of origin in 
the neo-fascist milieu. This piece marks a clear evolution of the ideas that emerge in, 
‘On the outskirts…’ and ‘Beyond Reason…’ and combined the idea of national identity, 
apocalyptic belief and internet-facilitated spirituality to assess the entryist techniques of 
far right groups to appropriate the symbolic forms of resurgent paganisms. Here, the 
porosity of the boundaries between nationalism, conspiracy theory and apocalyptic 
spirituality was foregrounded and this provides the basis for the article published in 
Patterns of Prejudice, ‘The Bitter End: Apocalypse and conspiracy in white nationalist 
responses to the ISIL Paris Attacks’ (Wilson 2017b) and that published in Secrecy in 
Society, ‘#whitegenocide, the Alt-right and Conspiracy Theory: How Secrecy and 
Suspicion Contributed to the Mainstreaming of Hate’ (Wilson 2018). This piece made 
evident the importance of the concept of ‘ethnonationalism’ and drew on the work of 
Walker Connor (Connor 1994) to demonstrate how the millennialism present in David 
Lane’s ‘Wotanism’ and other online neofascist spiritual formations inform the 




(Wilson 2018) #whitegenocide, the Alt-right and Conspiracy Theory: How Secrecy and 
Suspicion Contributed to the Mainstreaming of Hate and Wilson 2017b The Bitter End: 
Apocalypse and conspiracy in white nationalist responses to the ISIL Paris Attacks. 
These two pieces reflect a methodological variation on the other pieces and draw on 
simple text mining techniques to explore the conspiritual-apocalyptic axis in alt-right 
and white nationalist thought. It is here that the major themes of the thesis converge to 
demonstrate the danger implicit in underestimating the role of improvisational 
millennialism in sustaining existing authority structures such as nationalism albeit in its 
most extreme forms. This is evident in the conclusion to Wilson (2017b), 
What requires further scrutiny is the ease with which these values and beliefs are 
capable of extending into the more populist and less marginal aspects of apocalyptic 
belief. Racist improvisational millennialists with social media strategies and a 
degraded but partially familiar map of the current situation pose a threat to domestic 
and international order (Wilson 2017b, 429-30) 
The use of Barkun (2003) is evident from this quotation but the piece also makes more 
fundamental claims for the broadly political nature of millennialist groups and draws on 
Cohn (op cit), Daniel Wojick (1999), Catherine Wessinger (2001) among others to 
articulate this aspect of the thesis in the clearest terms. Wilson (2018) performs a 
similar function in the thesis by providing the clearest articulation of the links between 
current conspiracy theories and political populism. It, too, expands on Barkun (2003) 
but also provides a nuanced reading of Mark Fenster (2008), Fredric Jameson (1991), 
Peter Knight (2000), and Stef Aupers (2012). Again, the centrality of collective 
expression to improvisational millennialism is made clear but in these two pieces what 
is also made evident is the danger implicit in collective formations defined through 
divisive irrational discourses. 
Taken as a body of work they demonstrate the variety of ways that Barkun’s (2003) insights 
can be applied and, as the work has developed, extended. In each instance they reflect the 
secular concerns of specific communities. As such, they contain and articulate the political 
ends of that group; the social and cultural transformation necessary for their endpoint to be 
achieved. 
Together these pieces represent a systematic attempt to understand the relationship between 




question of each returns to common themes of belonging and difference, social change and 
cultural responses to imagined globalized futures. What is original in this is the suggestion 
that national identity is always a defining element of spiritual forms; the term ‘spiritual 
forms’ is used to indicate the inchoate and ill-defined field of spiritual life that is often 
associated with new religious movements (NRMs). Even in the most marginal or stigmatized 
forms of belief, expressions of collective belonging are present; in the most extreme iterations 
(such as white power Wotanism) the negotiation of national belonging is self-evident but in 
the syncretic setting of the New Age 2012 prophecy or UFO/space oriented NRMs this 
discourse of belonging and community in the wider sense is also crucial in the relationship 




Ward and Voas (2011) offer an analysis of specific forms of conspiracy theory and 
spirituality what they draw attention to is the implicit conflationary pressures that undo the 
distinction between the political and religious milieu within stigmatized knowledge. Barkun’s 
improvisational millennialism drew attention to this tendency but in ‘conspirituality’ Ward 
and Voas provide a flexible concept that draws specific attention to the phenomenon. The 
value of the concept here is a means of highlighting how the stylised realpolitik of conspiracy 
theories is, in some instances, dependent upon unstructured forms of spiritual expression. 
This, in turn, makes clear the shared discursive fields that ally conspiracy theory and 
millenarian movements. Thus, apocalyptic prophecy can at once speak to a community’s 
spiritual ends (destiny) and material concerns (politics). It is around this thematic 
interrelationship and discursive slippage that the works submitted are organised; where they 
seek to draw out the themes of ‘(a) common sense nationalism’ inherent in representations of 
apocalyptic beliefs (Wilson 2011a, 2011b). 
From Cohn’s (1970) The Pursuit of the Millennium: Revolutionary Millenarians and 
Mystical Anarchists of the Middle Ages onwards the apocalyptic has been understood in 
academic analysis as a compensating mechanism through which communities can consolidate 
their ongoing identities and claim to existential certainty through the projection of their 
existence into a knowable and utopian future. In ‘Beyond Reason: The Exotic Millennium in 




production of apocalypticism as other was productive of the idea of the persistence of 
England as eternal. Apocalyptic belief was constructed in the television programmes 
discussed as being either something allied to fanaticism and ‘the Orient’ (very much aligned 
to Said’s (1978) reading of Orientalism in nineteenth and twentieth century Western 
discourse) in the crime drama Messiah or harmless exotica in the case of the documentary A 
Very British Apocalypse. In order to preserve the principle of the nation in the face of 
‘foreign’ eschatological threats the nation must become transcendent itself and be depicted as 
a world without end for its people. This reconfirms Easthope’s (1999) insight that the chapter 
drew on: that at the heart of the discursive construct of ‘Englishness’ is a dualism that 
depends upon a stolid, rational pragmatism at the core of the supposed English character 
contra a tendency to emotive abstraction in the character of England’s Others. Easthope 
points to an English empiricist tradition that is expressed culturally as well as in English 
philosophy.  
As Wilson (2011a) makes evident, in order to maintain the idea of England, threats to the 
purity of its empiricist discourse must be made exterior to the cultural mainstream, 
‘Apocalyptic belief can only ever find a voice within English culture at its margins or within 
its underground, in the cultic milieu,’ (Wilson 2011a, 214). The implications of this are 
twofold, and this body of work underlines these points, that (i) the commingling of 
apocalypticism with other forms of stigmatised knowledge through improvisational 
millennialism provides fertile ground for exposure to radical forms of expression and (ii) the 
nation is a transcendent form and is the rendering of space, people and culture into a project 
in sacrality. Similarly, Wilson (2011b) presents the idealised ‘Albion’ of the new Dianic 
prophets. The key point here is the convergence of ‘conspirituality’ and improvisational 
millennialism within an imagined space that provides a territory, either a reinvented ‘real’ or 
wholly virtual one for a community that imagines itself to be under threat.  
There is much work that draws attention to the extent to which conspiracy theory depends 
upon an eschatological dimension to maintain the internal logic of the threat contained within 
the malevolent intentions of identified conspirators. For instance, Wilson (2018) cites 
Richard Hofstadter’s classic essay identifying ‘the paranoid style’ in U.S. political rhetoric. 
In this he refers to the paranoid spokesman trafficking ‘in the birth and death of whole 
worlds, whole political orders, whole systems of human values. He is always manning the 




central texts in conspiracy theory scholarship make similar points (Barkun 2003, Fenster 
2008, Knight 2000). To a large extent they reject the terminology of Hofstadter’s essay 
(although Wilson (2018) argues that this is due to an overly literal reading of Hofstadter) but 
retain the cosmological dimension within it.  
This is crucial because it makes evident the case that the conspiracy theorist is claiming 
agency within a material battle against an overwhelming force, the outcome of which will 
determine the eschatological predictions present within the conspiracy theorists’ system of 
thought. Through the thematic development present in the works submitted there is a 
persistent reiteration of the secular basis of the improvisational millennialism described and 
that this is tied to communities, real or virtual.  
 
The ‘places’ of improvisational millennialism in the submitted works 
 
The expressions of community described here are wholly expressed in spatial terms. Each 
community articulated through improvisational millennialism does so with reference to a 
homeland be it a nation state (Wilson 2011a, 2011b), an imagined ethnonation (Wilson 2012, 
2017b, 2018), a new Earth (Wilson 2013, 2017a), or another dimension (Wilson 2017a, 
2019). Wilson (2011a) was concerned with the construction of ‘England’ in distinction from 
its ’Others’ through the negation of apocalyptic belief (and its stigmatization as an irrational 
‘foreign’ threat). Wilson (2011b) sought to demonstrate how the afterlife of Diana, Princess 
of Wales in messages that spirit mediums claimed to have channelled produced an ideal 
‘Albion’, a kind of spiritual [sic] home for seekers. Whilst the virtual nation that is discerned 
in Wilson (2011b) expresses what is, perhaps, a vague utopic longing, the virtual nation in 
Wilson (2012) is more threatening and foreshadows the concerns of later works (Wilson 
2017b, 2018).  
In this chapter (Wilson 2012), the improvisational millennialism of David Lane and the visual 
archive of Mourning the Ancient are discussed in terms of the symbolic forms that they draw 
on and seek to associate with their politics of race hate. These are typically appropriated 
‘Nordic’ and European pagan mythic symbols. It is here that the intentional bricolage that can 




retroactively infect relatively unfixed1 symbolic forms with modern political formations. 
Wilson (2012) concluded,  
The building of a deterritorialized neo-fascist nation is a project that draws upon and 
colonises existing cultural constructs, forcing them to be re-read within the terms set 
by the virtual nationalists. (Wilson 2012, 212)  
It was argued that this was dependent upon the potential for mythic forms to sacralise the 
imagined community (pace Anderson) appealed to by nationalists. Thus, it becomes vital to 
engage in the struggle to retain the mythic past as an open and unfolding story, 
[M]yth is always an ongoing project, it is re-visited, reworked, and revised and, 
crucially, must be contested and re-won when attempts are made to appropriate it in 
ways that would crush its polysemous pleasures into a solitary, bleak, vision. (Wilson 
2012, 213) 
Wilson (2013) addressed the particularities of national apocalyptic cultures. It showed that 
despite spanning time and space from ‘the ancient Maya’ to aliens from Zeta Reticula by way 
of the Revelation of John, the ‘Mayan 2012 apocalypse’ was largely a North American 
phenomenon, derived from the thought and work of two key figures in the U.S. 
counterculture, Terence McKenna and José Argüelles. The chapter argues that it is the 
national cultural context in which it developed that gave the ‘Mayan’ apocalypse a distinctly 
North American inflexion. 
Wilson (2017b) showed how the community of white nationalists gathered on the forum 
Stormfront responded to the 2015 ISIS attacks on Paris through a conspiracy hermeneutic 
characterised by antisemitism and racism. But, moreover and important here, it also 
demonstrated how the disparate community used posters’ commitment to its improvisational 
millennialism to maintain itself as a community. The article, for instance, highlights the 
targeting of a poster who cast doubt on the idea that the ISIS attack was part of an unfolding 
Jewish plot, ‘the community quickly rounded on this poster and ridiculed their suggestion’, 
(Wilson 2017b, 430). It is in this way that adherence to stigmatized knowledge becomes a 
marker of belonging, of determining the community’s epistemic borders. In its discussion of 
 
1 ‘Unfixed’ in the sense that many historical pagan beliefs are relatively unknown and in their modern forms are 
contested and subject to ongoing revision. Ronald Hutton’s (2010) ‘Writing the History of Witchcraft: A 




the convergence of apocalypticsm and conspiracy theory present within the Stormfront 
community’s posts, the article also noted the purposeful use of Twitter and the hashtag 
‘whitegenocide’; this millenialist, racist conspiracy theory was explored more fully in the 
following year’s article, ‘#whitegenocide, the Alt-right and Conspiracy Theory: How Secrecy 
and Suspicion Contributed to the Mainstreaming of Hate’ (Wilson 2018). 
In Wilson (2018) the use of the ‘white genocide’ conspiracy theory is understood in relation 
to David Lane’s ’14 words’ discussed in Wilson (2012). The search for a virtual – and 
utopian – nation in which Lane’s imperative ‘we must secure the existence of our people and 
a future for white children’ is realised, and is continually renewed through the use of the 
hashtag, betokening the, ‘fragile desperation with which the alt-right seeks a consistent, 
communal “white” identity’, (Wilson 2018, 38). It is thus the case that the territoriality of the 
virtual white nationalist community can be understood to be territory ‘in formation’. The case 
being presented here is that the spatial dimension present within improvisational 
millennialism lends itself to an extremist cause that defines itself in spatial-cultural terms 
(‘white Europeans’) and that, lacking a consistent or agreed nation state due to its stigmatized 
status in modern civic nations, maintains a loosely-defined virtual nation through the 





Conspiracy theories and apocalyptic beliefs are the lingua franca of the far right. They 
articulate and justify the Manichean divide of their hate-filled world into a chosen ‘us’ and a 
dangerous, subversive ‘them’. Although unreasonable in their claims they provide a warped 
logic to the politics of the far right. Nonetheless, in their apocalyptic dimension – the 
revelation of the plot against ‘the people’ – they provide an eschatological narrative to the 
‘the struggle’: the people will prevail and achieve a paradise for ‘the pure’ or the conspiracy 
will succeed and eradicate them. They become articles of faith as much as ideologies. On this 
basis, then, engagement with far-right groups and individuals would be well-placed to 
approach them as members of potentially violent new religious movements with catastrophic 




Wessinger (2000) and Walliss (2004) identify. Given this, in addition to existing approaches 
to countering far right radicalisation it is necessary to consider the spiritual pull factors 
implicit in the metapolitical cultures of far-right conspiracy culture.  
This, then, is at the heart of this project: To show how ‘irrational’ beliefs are shaped by their 
times; that they are a response to the world around them and are therefore concerned with the 
political in the widest sense. Additionally, that the flexibility of beliefs that circulate as 
stigmatized knowledge make them polyvalent resources in the syncreticism that typifies the 
circuits of improvisational millennialism. Further, to demonstrate that they have a communal 
‘locality’ that may become blurred by transnational digital networks but which make these 
ideas particularly appealing in the context of extreme forms of nationalism.  
In a very particular way, we can understand the improvisational millennialism of the virtual 
nations described here as fulfilling this role through a sacralised form of collective belonging. 
In this, a future oriented battle of an elect against the machinations of otherwise 
overwhelmingly powerful foe is played out through conspiracy theory and apocalyptic 
prophecy. Thus, this critical review contends that improvisational millennialism describes the 
syncretic tendency within online cultures characterised by a belief in stigmatized knowledge 
but they, in turn, reflect broader social and cultural hopes and fears. In doing so, it suggests 
that Barkun correctly identified the improvisational proclivities in groups of stigmatized 
knowledge believers but, in emphasising their novelty, underplayed the continuities of 
thought they appealed to and the communities whose beliefs they encapsulate.  
This critical review thus shows that improvisational millennialism maintains one of the 
characteristic features of millennialist belief, that millennialism represents a collective 
longing. Rather than the purview of individual ‘millenarian entrepreneurs’ (Barkun 2003, 21), 
this thesis shows that improvisational millennialism can be understood as a resource drawn 
upon by a specific community and used to affirm their claim to their continued existence in 
the present and (implicitly and explicitly in millennialism’s eschatological content) in the 
future. Moreover, it gives cosmological (or political) significance to the actions of those 
members of the community who apply millennialism’s hermeneutic strategies to the world 
around them: by seeing signs of the ‘coming of the end’, the everyday becomes reenchanted 
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Beyond Reason: The Exotic Millennium in English Culture 
Andrew Fergus Wilson 
 
Abstract: Using two contrasting television programs made and broadcast in the United 
Kingdom, this article will explore how representations of apocalyptic themes and belief 
contribute to an idea of ‘nation.’ Drawing upon Benedict Anderson’s analysis of the interplay 
between ‘reason’ and ‘unreason’ in English culture, this analysis will reveal the innate 
‘foreignness’ of the coming of the end within mainstream English mass culture. 
Keywords: Anthony Easthope, Messiah 5: The Rapture, A Very British Apocalypse, Werner 
Herzog, English culture, apocalyptic belief 
 
The Untranslatable Difference 
Werner Herzog’s film Where the Green Ants Dream (1984) details cultural and legal conflict 
over the ownership of Aboriginal land in Australia. The film centres on the struggle for 
ownership of uranium and mineral-rich land between a mining company and the local 
Aborigines who own the land. The land is also rich in ant hills. In the beliefs of the local 
Aboriginal tribe, the green ants dream within these hills and disturbing their dreaming will 
lead to the end of the ‘universe-world.’ In a discussion of the film, Bill Readings recognizes 
the incommensurability of the two narratives that claim the land: the Aboriginal voices and 
Ayers Mining, the company that seeks to mine the land. In Readings’ reading of the film, the 
Aboriginal case is always already destined to fail – its terms of reference and structures of 
meaning are utterly remote from the assumptions of the court and the national culture that the 
court speaks from and of. The Aboriginal apocalyptic beliefs are untranslatable, not simply in 
linguistic terms but are also unable to be translated into the conceptual frameworks of the 




Translation would be possible, in principle, between these languages. Injustice in the 
proceedings of translation comes not from the fact of simply speaking a different language 
but from the fact that the language of the Aborigines is untranslatable into the language of the 
court, heterogeneous to the language of common law, of common humanity.1 
The universality of judgment assumed by the modern state is found wanting when its sought-
after inclusiveness ultimately excludes the Aborigines from the ‘universal’ state of assumed 
modern, rational subjects. In revealing themselves as beyond the frame of reference relied 
upon by court and state the Aborigines’ externality is compounded. 
The questions raised by Readings in his discussion of Herzog’s film direct us to consider the 
problem of representing any (apocalyptic) unorthodox belief within a rationalist and 
rationalizing modern state. The context of Herzog’s film is a court case and, as such, it draws 
its audience along the associative chain that leads from the court to the state to the nation to 
the national culture. This problematic, of the representation of radically different beliefs 
within national cultures, lies at the heart of the following paper and points to the way in 
which the structured opposition of difference to orthodoxy lies at the heart of representations 
of apocalyptic belief in British television productions.2 
It has been argued that British society is now predominantly secular and that at least part of 
the process of secularization was marked by a diminishment of the nation state’s dependence 
upon the dominant religious force within its territories for the legitimation of its own power.3 
In addition, Britain has been used as an exemplar for the idea that modern societies have 
become indifferent to religious belief and, further, it has been suggested that from the early 
1960s women’s changing roles undermined a traditional bedrock of support for institutional 
Christianity in Britain.4 In this context any depiction of religious practice or belief that 
marginalized it or offered criticism of it would be viewed as keeping with national cultural 
trends. However, it should be noted that counter-arguments stress the diversification of 
religious practice and an increased non-aligned syncretic spirituality as being typical of belief 
 
1 Bill Readings, ‘Pagans, Perverts or Primitives? Experimental Justice in the Empire of Capital’ in Andrew 
Benjamin, ed. Judging Lyotard (London: Routledge, 1992), 183. 
2 It should be noted that the description ‘British television’ is moot. As will be shown, the national culture 
invoked most frequently is a particular rehearsal of Englishness. 
3 Bryan R. Wilson, Religion in Secular Society: A Sociological Comment (London: C.A. Watts, 1966). 
4 Steve Bruce, God is Dead: Secularization in the West (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002) suggests that Britain has seen 
a waning of the relevance of religious affiliation while Callum G. Brown, The Death of Christian Britain: 
Understanding Secularisation 1800–2000, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2009) links the erosion of institutional 




in modern Britain.5 Against this backdrop, the viewer might expect some degree of sympathy 
to the depiction of non-conventional religious beliefs, but this is not the case. As will be 
discussed, in each instance the depiction of apocalyptic beliefs stresses their ‘foreignness.’ 
This is not simply the sense that they originate beyond Britain’s borders, but that they are 
shown to be inadmissible to British thought. At the heart of these representations, then, is not 
a consideration of religiosity or of apocalyptic thought, but instead the latter serves as a 
vehicle for rehearsing narratives of ‘Britishness.’ 
 
Television and Reality 
As part of the mass media, television can be understood to perform, in part, the functions 
described by Stuart Hall in the following: 
the mass media are more and more responsible (a) for providing the basis on which 
groups and classes construct an ‘image’ of the lives, meanings, practices and values of 
other groups and classes; (b) for providing the images, representations and ideas 
around which the social totality, composed of all these separate and fragmented 
pieces, can be grasped as a whole.6 
For Hall, the mass media have ‘colonized the cultural and ideological sphere.’ In essence, 
then, what he is suggesting is that it is through the mass media that a group or community 
knows itself and its others. They, therefore, can be understood to provide a visual-aural 
register of what Benedict Anderson calls the ‘imagined community’ of the nation.7 
For Anderson, the nation as cultural entity is produced within the imagination of its people—
it is this imagined and imagining community that dreams a nation into being. This imagined 
community, like any ‘real’ community polices its borders, maintaining the integrity of the 
 
5 See, for instance, Christopher H. Partridge, The Re-enchantment of the West: Understanding Popular 
Occulture Volume 1 (London: T&T Clark, 2005); Paul Heelas, The New Age Movement: Religion, Culture and 
Society in the Age of Postmodernity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), and Grace Davie, Religion in Britain Since 
1945: Believing Without Belonging (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004). 
6 Stuart Hall, ‘Culture, the Media and the ‘Ideological Effect’,’ in J. Curran, M. Gurevitch, and J. Woollacott, 
ed., Mass Communication and Society (London: Edward Arnold, 1977), 340. 
7 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 2nd ed. 




‘social totality’ and thus conferring reality to the ‘imagined community.’ This semblance of 
reality of the national culture is what is at stake in its representation. 
Discussed here are two examples of British television productions with apocalyptic belief at 
their heart. They each belong to identifiably different television genres: Messiah 5: The 
Rapture, a police drama and A Very British Apocalypse, a documentary. Despite the 
differences in genre each seeks to convey a relationship with the real. John Fiske suggests the 
documentary is intended to reflect reality with mimetic precision so that the viewer feels that, 
‘the camera has happened upon a piece of unpremeditated reality which it shows to us 
objectively,’ while the dramatic presentation seeks to, ‘give the impression that we are 
watching a piece of unmediated reality directly, that the camera does not exist.’8 
The apparent objective naturalism of the television camera, when turned upon reality, extends 
the promise of verisimilitude further; while television fiction(s) are staged according to the 
demands of the narrative and produced as artifice, they still promise a reliable and consistent 
representation of objective reality—we can trust what we see to correspond to a designated 
fictional reality be it Coronation Street or The West Wing—the promise of documentary was 
always that it was not a mere re-presentation but was, instead, a mirror held up to reality, that 
it corresponded to the real. Leaving aside Baudrillardian fears of the demise of the real of 
representation, this notion of an objective mediated ‘reality’ is still appealed to by the 
premise of documentary—there is an expectation that we are being shown something tangibly 
‘real’ that is, relatively, untouched by the presence of the television cameras and can be 
experienced as real by viewers even though the advent of so-called reality TV has 
problematized this expectation.9 The contract of the real that exists between broadcasters and 
viewers is that there is an agreement upon the direct relationship between the genre of 
documentary and an observable and experienced reality. 
Television drama tends, for the most part, toward realism in its representative strategies. The 
extent to which it does so and the manner in which realism is used to progressive or 
reactionary political ends is much contested, as is the term itself,10 but what is crucial here is 
 
8 John Fiske, Television Culture (London: Routledge, 1987), 24. 
9 Richard Kilborn, Staging the Real: Factual TV Programming in the Age of Big Brother (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2003). 
10 See, for instance, John Caughie, Television Drama Realism, Modernism, and British Culture (Oxford: OUP, 




that television drama is read as having continuity with reality and of intervening in the 
production of the ‘social totality’ that Hall refers to above.11 
It is argued here that the programs discussed appeal to a particular discourse of the ‘national 
real’ and, in doing so, employ a rationalist realism. This relationship to the real is crucial to 
both Messiah 5: The Rapture and A Very British Apocalypse because they both seek to 
defend a particular discourse of the real from external threats. A Very British Apocalypse 
stakes its claim to the real as documentary while Messiah 5 draws upon the realist 
conventions of television drama. Messiah 5’s appeal to the real is amplified by its subgenre; 
Alan Clarke, for example, argues that the police drama has a heightened relationship with the 
real for the viewer. In his account, the police and police procedures are made unusually 
available through the genre. Its artifice is rendered partially obscure by the sudden proximity 
to the known but unfamiliar world of the police: ‘For many people their only contact with a 
speaking policeman is on the television and this reinforces the aura of reality which police 
series strive so hard to construct.’12 
Thus the two programs under discussion here can be understood to seek to reflect or give 
insight into ‘the real’ and are watched by their audience(s) with that understanding. In each 
case what is at stake is the location of apocalyptic belief within the ‘national real’ or, more 
particularly, interactions between mainstream culture and apocalyptic culture. In the case of 
Messiah 5: The Rapture this interaction is marked by failed integration and violence while for 
A Very British Apocalypse the interaction is less confrontational, but still founded on the 
radical difference of apocalyptic belief from the perspective of dominant English culture. 
As has been described, it is understood that there is a structuring effect at work within the 
mass media. Hall’s above passage points to the way in which groups learn affinity and 
difference through the mass media. Fiske also provides useful insight into this and shows that 
these affinities and differences need not be hegemonic, citing Aboriginal affinities with 
‘American Indians and American black children.’13 Borrowing from Barthes’ ‘Myth Today’ 
he further suggests that, despite this, there is still an endeavour to conceal the constructedness 
of culture through naturalism’s appeal to the real: ‘.. . those groups with authority [.. .] try to 
 
11 Glen Creeber, Serial Television: Big Drama on the Small Screen (London: BFI, 2004). 
12 Alan Clarke, ‘You’re nicked! Television Police Series and the Fictional Representation of Law and Order,’ in 
Dominic Strinati and Stephen Wagg, ed. Come on Down? Popular Media Culture in Post-War Britain (London: 
Routledge, 1992), 232. 




prevent a struggle over meaning by naturalizing their meaning—their economic, and social 
power is mobilized discursively, ideologically, and culturally to exnominate itself beyond the 
realm of potential opposition.14 
It is the argument here that both Messiah 5: The Rapture and A Very British Apocalypse are 
framed with a normative discourse of national identity that seeks to exclude apocalyptic 
belief from the visual-aural register of the nation and thus to shore up the dominant form of 
English identity, or ‘exnominate itself beyond the realm of potential opposition.’ 
 
Making Sense of the English 
The dedicated tradition of appealing to and seeking to reproduce the real in both documentary 
and dramatic television production can also be understood in light of the ‘empiricist tradition’ 
in English culture that we find delineated by Anthony Easthope in Englishness and National 
Culture.15 Easthope’s concerns are primarily literary but, as will be seen, the English 
empiricist discourse is mobilized through television also. 
Drawing on the self’s reliance upon the existence of others in demarcating itself as self, 
Easthope points to the indeterminacy of identity that this produces: the self is always already 
‘other’ to those others. We can thus understand the desire described by Hall to ‘grasp’ social 
totality ‘as a whole’ through the mass media as a paranoid reaction to the threat to distinctive 
self-identity posed by ‘others’; they threaten to reveal the otherness that exists within self and 
must, thus, be kept at bay: ‘The subject would preserve its coherence by denying what 
undermines it and projecting internal threat on to the outside.’16 It is with national identity 
and the culture that mobilizes it. Easthope puts forward the idea of a peculiarly English mode 
of cultural production, a discourse of Englishness that provides the basis for the semblance of 
a unified national subjectivity. It can be understood as underpinning how we perceive the 
world and guarantees that (in cultural terms), 
a notion of Englishness can be seen to preside over ‘the English language’ and 
English ‘way of talking’, a canon of literature established as English, English 
 
14 Ibid., 35. 
15 Anthony Easthope, Englishness and National Culture (London: Routledge, 1999). 




landscape, a certain sense of humour felt to be English, English common sense, and so 
on and so on.17 
This formulation of a cultural Englishness is unified with the English state, embodied in its 
institutions, through English empiricist discourse: through English culture English subjects 
are led to identify with the nation as state. 
For Easthope, English discourse is characterized by a straightforward empiricism that 
foregrounds a ‘matter of fact’ understanding of the apprehension of reality and the 
communication of that apprehension. In other words, we perceive the world through our 
senses, and through the application of reason, are able to ‘get to the heart of the matter’ and 
fully perceive an indivisible and true reality. Easthope is thus in a position to put forward 
examples of the ‘transparent style’ used in the recording of facts which, ‘delivers things into 
words’ and thus preserve the real.18 We might, at this point pause to consider that the reality 
effect of the television documentary and police drama described above can be seen to 
conform to this discourse: their promise is an access to reality or an accurate reflection of it. 
The English empiricist discourse is thus marked by a seeming lack of artificiality, of a clarity 
of expression and a distinct correspondence with reality. It is akin to the Barthian account of 
naturalized dominant ideology that Fiske provides; akin but separate for where Fiske’s 
primary interests are the reproduction of, and contestation within, the discourses of class, 
gender, and race. Easthope seeks to demonstrate that the subject seeks in dominant national 
culture an identity that transcends and simultaneously gives meaning to the otherwise 
threatened self within modernity. 
This English empiricism is defined in relation to an oppositional Other which takes a variety 
of guises, each of which define an exteriority and interiority to Englishness. At the heart of 
‘Englishness,’ contends Easthope, rests a binary opposition that informs and predicates an 
English mode of thinking, writing, and organizing the world. It recreates the world in a 
particularly English idiom: Easthope’s English empiricist discourse: 
 
17 Ibid., 56. 




English empiricist discourse, I propose, maintains itself on the back of a binary 
opposition between the real and the apparent, an opposition reproduced and reworked 





















This discourse structures English culture with the former positive terms repeatedly competing 
against the latter in order to maintain the apparent wholeness of English national identity. 
The nation is thus not simply imagined but is, rather, protected, defended, contested and 
continually won from external threats, those others marked by the negative terms in the 
oppositions that Easthope catalogues. As we shall see, apocalyptic belief is constructed from 
within the English empiricist discourse and defined through the negative, right hand terms; it 
is represented as ‘other’ and thus alien to English culture – inadmissible. 
 
An Apocalyptic Gore-fest 
Messiah is an ongoing series of crime dramas made by BBC Northern Ireland and shown on 
BBC Television. Despite its origins the series is entirely set in England with brief overseas 
sequences in the fifth installment set in the Middle East. The series is composed of two part 
stories which make up each installment of the series. The constituent parts of each installment 
 




are roughly an hour long. The first installment was simply called Messiah and was broadcast 
in 2001, featuring the murders of eleven men who shared their first names with the apostles 
and who met their deaths in the manner of the apostles. This was followed by Messiah 2: 
Vengeance is Mine (2003); Messiah III: The Promise (2004); and Messiah IV: The 
Harrowing (2005). 
Broadcast over two consecutive nights in January 2008 (Sunday, January 20th and Monday, 
January 21st), Messiah 5: The Rapture (2008) continued its reputation for gruesome and 
bloody murders which led Scottish newspaper The Herald to describe it as an ‘inventive and 
involving two-part gore-fest.’20 The motivation for the murders in this installment is gradually 
revealed to have its basis in apocalyptic beliefs and these beliefs are constructed throughout 
the production as being beyond the boundaries of a carefully policed Englishness. Messiah 5: 
The Rapture (2008) depicts belief in the apocalypse as existing in the hinterlands between 
reason and unreason and originating beyond reason and, in the context of Easthope’s reading 
of the terms in which English culture is reproduced, apocalyptic belief here is understood to 
be something that is inadmissible to the English mind. 
The program opens in Palestine, with DCI Joseph Walker (Marc Warren), his girlfriend 
Salma Al-Fulani (Sasha Behar) and her brother Khalid (Daud Shah) in a car passing through 
a checkpoint into Israeli territories. Walker and Saima wave goodbye to her brother. Seconds 
later there is an explosion with Saima’s brother at the centre of it. This scene establishes a 
narrative framed within a discourse of religious extremism and, potently, foreign religious 
extremism. The second scene emphasizes the alien nature of what has preceded it—the 
camera cuts to the mundanity of the corridors of an English court and its attendant 
bureaucracy. Here, two of the first murder victims, Alex Iqbal (Tamin Mobayed) and his 
father, Fareed (Aftab Sachak) are initially introduced to the viewers. Alex Iqbal is a 
prosecution witness in a case of the rape of a daughter by her father—the girl being Alex’s 
girlfriend. Tensions within the Iqbal family are evident and Fareed is seen to slap his son; 
these tensions are the result of Alex’s relationship with Leah and the shame that it is 
perceived as bringing upon the family. The alleged victim in the case, Leah Wallace (Laura 
Greenwood) is revealed to be a member of the ‘New Advent Church’ (NAC). 
 




The NAC is cast as a dangerous cult—using the term in the populist manner that Messiah 5: 
The Rapture is drawing on. A series of signifiers of unorthodox Christian beliefs and negative 
stereotypes are drawn upon to establish the exteriority of the NAC. For instance, it is 
described as practicing ‘personal exorcism or casting out of demons,’ they hold a 
‘fundamentalist belief in the word of God, strict belief in the Bible,’21 here a belief in the 
inerrancy of the Bible again marks the group out as ‘alien,’ cultic. It is further revealed that 
Alex Iqbal was going to speak for defence rather than the prosecution and suggest that he 
believed that that Leah was being ‘brainwashed,’ predominantly by the charismatic leader of 
the NAC, Daniel Hughes (Ciarán McMenamin). The NAC is lead by a Daniel Hughes—with 
a soft Northern Irish accent he is at once tied by an signifying chain that leads the viewer to 
the Celtic fringe and the troubled history of the region; it is a history understood to be 
founded as much through religious difference, intolerance and extremism as national identity. 
This cultural difference from the English setting of the program is reflected at a personal 
level; he is later described as having locked a pregnant follower into a basement for three 
days so that she might ‘seek atonement.’ In this act his personal extremism and intolerance is 
revealed. 
In this way the beliefs of the church take up a position on the problematized ‘other’ side of 
the self/other duality and further cement the equivalency of difference and danger that we 
encounter in the opening scenes. We might also consider the outcome of Leah and Alex’s 
cross-cultural relationship—she, brainwashed, in a cult, he and his family brutally murdered. 
We soon visit the crime scene of this murder. All members of the Iqbal family have been 
killed: Alex, his mother and father, and his sister. They have been arranged, postmortem, 
around their dining table with their hands bound, as if in prayer. The father’s throat has been 
cut so that his blood has drained from his face, whitening his skin. There is sand on the floor. 
The sand is focused upon by DCI Walker (who has experienced flashbacks of Khalid’s 
suicide bombing while waiting to enter the murder scene) and it transpires that it came from 
the Jezreel Valley in Israel, better known as the location of the plain of Megiddo. The murder 
scene is marked by the ongoing current of ‘the foreign’ and this refers us back to the framing 
device of extremism encountered in the opening scene. 
 





Two sisters are then killed, the first victim mistaken for her promiscuous sister who, we learn, 
was the intended victim. Sand features again at the murder scene, but here it is seen to 
contain a design based upon the figure of the eye in the pyramid design with the letters of the 
Tetragrammaton inscribed around it. Here we can be in no doubt that the killer is conversant 
in what Barkun typifies as ‘stigmatized knowledge.’22 The police initially believe it to be a 
cryptic message to them but the lead, DCI Walker, comes to doubt this, declaring the killer 
isn’t communicating with them, ‘[it’s] not a message for us, he’s talking to God.’ Hughes, the 
leader of the NAC becomes the main suspect at this point. He has been constructed under 
multiple signs of religious fanaticism: cult activity, brainwashing, physical punishment, and 
charismatic leadership. At this point in the narrative these coalesce into the metalanguage of 
myth and he becomes a ‘cult killer.’23 Repeated throughout this first half-hour of the program 
is this tying together of unorthodox religious belief, extremism, and violence. 
A third murder occurs, a mother whose daughter is dying of cancer is tied up and has acid 
poured into her eyes. Hughes is quickly arrested, led off mid-sermon; he is taken away 
shouting scripture. The episode cuts to an interrogation scene with the central investigating 
team of DCI Walker, DI Terry Hedges (Daniel Ryan) and DS Mel Palmer (Marsha 
Thomason) questioning Hughes. 
During the interrogation Hughes interprets the murders as linked by scripture to the ‘seven 
signs’ of the apocalypse. As he quotes scriptural passages, DCI Walker continually pursues 
his seemingly gnomic utterances where Hedges suspected Hughes of ‘playing games’; at one 
point Hedges angrily exclaims, ‘He’s getting off on it, the sick bastard!’ Instead DCI Walker 
asks, ‘What is that?’24 Reason penetrates, finding sense in madness— as Easthope continually 
reminds us, there must always be the trace of fact beneath all irruptions of the irrational—
reason prevails, English reason doubly so. 
Faced with further scriptural quotation from Hughes, Walker is energized. He demands, 
‘what does that mean?’ His question not stemming from exasperated disbelief but borne out 
of a desire ‘to know’ and to ‘understand’ and thus to colonize the irrational with reason, to 
 
22 Michael Barkun, A Culture of Conspiracy: Apocalyptic Visions in Contemporary America (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2003). 
23 My choice of this phrase is directly influenced by the Channel 4 documentary Cutting Edge: Cult Killer: The 
Rick Rodriguez Story (originally broadcast 21 August 2006), typifying the populist depiction of deviancy 
associated with NRMs. 




make it speak to him on his terms so that his rationale as an investigator is consolidated—the 
murderer no longer leading them but, instead, the murderer pursued by the knowing police. 
Hughes brings back news from the other side of reason. Walker may have understood that 
there was method in the madness that confronted his colleagues and him but only Hughes, the 
cultist, could speak of it. Walker’s rationalizing instincts led him to the brink but he required 
Hughes to speak from beyond it. Hughes details the signs that he perceives within the murder 
scenes: 
Hughes: Breakdown in family relations, hedonism, a society in despair [.. .] there are 
seven common signs of the end; these are first three. 
Walker: The end of what? 
Hughes: You, me, all of this, everything we know. It’s right here on your map. 
Megiddo is another name for Armageddon. 
With equal gravity and disbelief, Walker proclaims, ‘Our killer thinks it’s the end of the 
world.’25 What is crucial here is that only Hughes is able to provide this information. As 
stated, the knowledge that he carries is stigmatized knowledge, a communication from 
beyond the pale of reason and, crucially here, a knowledge that becomes loaded with danger 
in its shared use by the cult leader and the psychopathic killer. Here we see a dramatization of 
the threat to English empiricist discourse from external discourses, framed by an opening shot 
of a suicide bomber, the program unfolds around the relationship between the sureties of 
English rationalism and its others. 
The second part opens with a consolidation of the Apocalyptic belief of the killer. DCI 
Walker opens this section, addressing the assembled investigative team, ‘History has a 
beginning and an end. That end is signaled by seven signs.’ He is supported in his 
presentation by the NAC leader, Hughes, who adds, ‘Common to the Abrahamic religions, 
Christianity, Judaism and Islam—they each trace their roots back to Abraham—the signs will 
act as a guide, as a signal. They will act as a warning.’26 Walker adds further detail by 
showing how the murders embody the first three of the seven signs. The scene opens with the 
camera positioned within the assembled team, listening to the presentation by Walker and 
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Hughes. We, as an audience, are being instructed in the seven signs of the end in which the 
killer believes; we are positioned in opposition to this knowledge and thus it is constructed as 
external to the ‘we’ that is implied through the perspectival unity between ourselves and the 
national state, embodied by the police in Walker and Hughes’ audience. 
Throughout this scene the dualism described by Easthope is personified by Walker and 
Hughes: Hughes, doubly marked as the exotic other through the connotative response to his 
Northern Irishness by an English audience and his leadership of the evangelist ‘exorcism 
cult’ while Walker characterizes the left-hand side of the binary of English/other. The police, 
then, are too English to conceive of the obscure and dogmatic theory that drives the murderer 
and they rely upon the stigmatized alterity of Hughes who must act as a native guide to the 
police, leading them through the unfamiliar lands of millennial belief. It is clear that the 
investigating police, typified by the ‘average copper’ character of DCI Terry Hedges, could 
not navigate these lands alone; their dedication to the facts alone being both their downfall 
and their blessing—for them all dangers are external—their rationality affirming their 
normative status. 
As the interplay between Walker and Hughes continues, Hughes is asked by Hedges, ‘So 
what’s next?’ 
Hughes: ‘Violence and lawlessness. Seven out of the nine shall be killed, the innocent 
among them.’ 
Hedges: ‘Oh for Christ’s sake…’27 
Hedges’ invocation of Christ signals a threshold—a leap beyond what is, for him, reasonable. 
From here only Hughes can continue, 
‘It’s called the Rapture. A time of judgment. When those who shall be saved will 
vanish from the face of the Earth and go to an eternal dwelling place in Heaven and 








This could only have come from Hughes—he is an intermediary between reason and 
unreason. The eschatological theory he outlines being utterly removed from the common 
sense world of the ‘coppers.’ Hedges, for example, dismisses the clue of the sands of 
Armageddon at the scene of the first murder as having come from builders, working on a 
swimming pool for the Iqbals. This is a prosaic explanation providing the viewer with a 
common sense approach that is at once familiar and believable. Only Walker, touched by the 
seeming madness of extreme belief while in Palestine intuitively senses that the sand is more 
than that— he has, after all, walked upon this foreign sand and is consistently tied to Israel 
and Palestine by flashbacks of his final moments with his lover and her brother. Hedges 
provides a normative position to the viewers, reminding them of the real but Walker—in his 
encounters with that which is other—demonstrates the advantages of faith in the real, that the 
solidity of facts may still be found beneath the most obfuscating theories held within the 
wider world. His is an eternal return to English empiricism, a belief founded upon a faith in 
the facts. In a sense it is inevitable that he be a policeman—and here we find a bridging of the 
divide between the nation as state and the nation as culture. Walker embodies English 
empiricism as cultural practice in the service of the state. 
Despite Walker’s faith in English empiricism allowing him to walk upon foreign sands, he 
can only journey so far before his inevitable return ‘home.’ Again, Hughes is a necessary 
guide—Walker may realize that the facts point beyond the everyday experiences of the 
average ‘British bobby,’ but he still requires a native to show him the way: apocalyptic 
thought is too foreign, too distant for him to fully ‘know’; to remain within English empiricist 
discourse, the English police must rely upon a representative of the irrational to make clear to 
them the madness that they can never truly ‘know.’ For the police—representatives of the 
state and, as subjects, bearers of the culture of the nation and thus the idealized unification of 
the impossible ‘whole nation’ that Easthope describes—cannot wholly understand the killer’s 
misinterpretation of ‘the facts,’ for that would reveal the killer’s epistemological framework 
to be reasonable (and it must be maintained as exotic). 
It is the killer’s obsession with his theoretical construct that leads to his downfall at the hands 
of the pragmatic agents of reason; it is, ultimately a remembered conversation that reveals the 
killer’s identity to Walker and in this we find the triumph of practicality over theory and 
common sense over dogma, confirming the competing terms of Easthope’s oppositions and 




killer offers Walker a shared role in his apocalyptic quest but this is turned down and the 
killer meets an end, albeit a more individuated one than he had hoped for. In thwarting the 
apocalyptic killer, the English police save the name of reason and redeem the empiricist 
discourse. But it comes at a cost—Walker’s love interest, Salma, with whom he had been 
reunited is the final victim and in this his status of ‘insider’ is clarified. That which marked 
him as not wholly located within the home culture is erased and his Englishness recuperated 
at a personal level. 
Even here the drama cannot end because it has mobilized a narrative that is more than simply 
the delusions of an individuated psychotic killer. The killer’s world is a shared one— more 
than one potential suspect is questioned—and a native guide is required to lead the 
investigating police through it. The killer may have been dispatched but the apocalyptic 
discourse he shared with Hughes and the cultic milieu that the NAC suggested is still an 
unresolved threat to the dominant empiricist discourse; indeed here the cultic milieu fulfills 
the ideational threat implied in Colin Campbell’s description of it as, ‘the cultural 
underground.’29 Thus the full closure of the drama is guaranteed only through the final 
interchange between Hughes and Hedges. 
The covered body of Salma, Walker’s lover, is seen being wheeled past the three central 
police characters, DCI Walker, DI Hedges, and DS Mel Palmer. DS Palmer says to Walker, 
‘I’m so sorry . . .’ To which Walker curtly replies, ‘Thanks.’ With that, Palmer drops back 
and Walker and Hedges walk closer together, filling the space briefly occupied by Palmer, 
she is obscured from view. With her, the feminine is also excluded. Palmer had carried two 
plotlines, both of which revolved around her emotional relationships. Again, here, her role is 
to fulfill the exclusion of the emotional from the empiricist discourse. A curt thank you and 
she disappears from view so that the men can talk and address the apocalyptic discourse 
raised through Hughes and the killer. And so Hedges and Walker close the piece, 
Hedges: It will happen one day. 
Walker: What will? 
 
29 Colin Campbell, ‘The Cult, the Cultic Milieu and Secularization’ in J. Kaplan and H. Lööw, ed., The Cultic 




Hedges: The end of the world. Five billion years from now, give or take. The sun 
implodes, boiling away the oceans and us with them. 
Walker: If you believe in science . .. 
Hedges: I’ll take it over religion any day. 
Walker: [. . .] See you tomorrow.30 
And so Walker walks away while Hedges remains still. The certainty of the real is established 
as their shared anchor. Walker’s tomorrows are guaranteed in his parting comment to 
Hedges. 
This muted, mutual celebration of the real is the program’s full closure; just as the murder 
case had a false ending and the real killer still eluded the police, the drama also had a false 
ending in which the demise of the killer signaled the completion of the story but not the 
closure of the production as text. After the case was solved and the killer dispatched, the 
apocalyptic discourse inhabited by the killer still remained—indeed the police were exposed 
to it most fully not by the murders but by their being guided through it by ‘cult leader’ 
Hughes, who, we are warned in the first part of the drama, is capable of ‘brainwashing.’ The 
killer was transformed through exposure to the same stigmatized knowledge and here the 
perceived threat of the irrational to empiricist discourse is exposed and the need for it to be 
counteracted is made evident. 
The paranoid fear of the other that exists within the self (referred to by Easthope) is exposed 
and must be eradicated so that the ‘whole self’ may be maintained. And so the pragmatic 
Hedges reminds the viewers of the orthodox explanation of the end of the world while 
Walker’s ‘See you tomorrow,’ acts to point to the unimaginable distance between our 
tomorrow and the tomorrow some five billion years hence that will signal the end. Messiah 
reveals to us the impossibility of an English apocalypse—it is something that is always going 
to happen to ‘them’: foreigners, the insane, or the misguided and which can always be 
defused through common sense and transparent facts. 
 
 




Warm Beer and Honey for Tea Versus Cataclysm 
While Englishness may reveal itself through a dogged and determined adherence to material 
reality it is also experienced as distinctly eccentric and it is in this mode of Englishness that 
the documentary A Very British Apocalypse depicts a range of apocalyptic beliefs. Easthope 
draws attention to the manner in which English culture is prepared to use its others as a 
means of shoring up its sense of certainty in itself. He gives examples of self-conscious 
‘silliness’ which depend upon a shared common sense view of the world in order to make 
their ‘silliness’ apparent: Monty Python’s Flying Circus, Alice in Wonderland, Edward 
Lear’s works, Edwardian children’s literature (The Wind in the Willows, Peter Pan) and so 
on. By purposefully deviating from the norm, they recognize and underline the prevalence of 
the empiricist, ‘common sensical’ norm. As Easthope has it, in a commentary on Alice’s 
concern for her increasingly distant feet as she grows after eating the small cake at the bottom 
of the rabbit hole, 
But of course, all of this is a joke, deliberate absurdity, pleasurable and playful 
exaggeration and impossibility, fantasy known to be fantasy when seen from the 
viewpoint of common sense [. . .] English silly discourse recognises the norm of 
empiricist discourse by departing from it.31 
It is in the silliness of English culture that ‘the homegrown apocalypse’ is constructed by A 
Very British Apocalypse. The difference here being that Lewis Carroll’s protagonist was, as 
narrator of the speech cited by Easthope, aware of her absurdity whereas the subjects of the 
documentary, shown to have long since departed from ‘the viewpoint of common sense’ and 
are unwitting exponents of ‘English silly discourse.’ A Very British Apocalypse does not 
seek to overcome the incommensurability of an English apocalyptic narrative or even to 
attempt to address it as a serious belief but to confine it to ‘English silly culture’ and thus to 
underscore the seriousness, empirical basis of Englishness. 
Originally broadcast on March 21, 2007 on Channel 5, the program is framed by the opening 
statement from the authoritative—even paternal—voiceover provided by Laurie Taylor, a 
former professor of Sociology who is also known in Britain for his media work. During a 
 




short excerpt of film featuring the channeling of ‘Aetherius’ by Dr. George King, Taylor 
asks, 
Puzzled? Well, let me help. This weird piece of historic film shows the Cosmic 
Master, Aetherius talking through the body of George King.32 
The film cuts to show Taylor looking unsure, his eyes flicking from side to side among a 
groups of people with their eyes closed and chanting, ‘Om Mane Padme Om’. Taylor 
continues, 
This is me fifty years later standing amongst Dr. King’s devout followers as they 
endeavour, with their prayers to protect us all from some of the disasters that will, 
allegedly, precede the end of the world. Now I don’t normally hang around with 
prophets of doom. Like, like most other solid British people I’m pretty sure the sun’s 
going to rise tomorrow, there’ll be sufficient honey for tea and, er, quite enough warm 
beer to last my lifetime.33 
Taylor’s ‘let me help’ evidences the audience’s need for guidance through the bewildering 
world he is about to present. He suggests that although he is a non-believer he hopes to 
approach believers in the apocalypse in an open minded way. His opening statement belies 
this hope and clearly places himself on the side of the ‘puzzled [. ..] solid British people.’ It 
should also be noted that his use of ‘warm beer’ as a signifier of Britishness points to a 
somewhat colonial vision of Britain understood in English terms. His ‘warm beer’ calls to 
mind then Prime Minister John Major’s 1993 vision of the future, ‘Fifty years on from now, 
Britain will still be the country of long shadows on cricket grounds, warm beer, invincible 
green suburbs, dog lovers and pools fillers and, as George Orwell said, “Old maids bicycling 
to holy communion through the morning mist”.’34 The cricket grounds and ‘invincible green 
suburbs,’ here speak resolutely of England as opposed to Scotland, Wales, or Northern 
Ireland. 
Taylor first meets Father Dom Benedict Heron, the author of Our Call to Holiness: The 
Reflections of a Sinner (2005), a Catholic apocalyptic awaiting the Parousia; Taylor 
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expresses surprise that this ‘gentle’ Benedictine monk holds such a belief and so he goes to 
meet Abi Freeman, a member of The Family International. 
Taylor: ‘What’s a nice girl like this believing a myth like that?’34 
Taylor expresses some disappointment that Abi is unable to provide a date for the End but 
with little detail provided of the Family or their beliefs the audience is whisked along to a 
discussion of numerology. Taylor mentions Newton’s obsession with geomatria which led 
him to the belief that the world was going to end on 15th July 2060 and then he further asks 
of Dr. Peter Lee, ‘Mathematician,’ ‘What is the fascination with numerology? Is any of it 
credible?’35 
The interview begins with an anecdote from Lee mentioning that he knew someone who 
divined the date of the apocalypse through numerology— ‘Unfortunately for him it was 
during 1989.’36 The bulk already dismissed as incredible, there seems little hope for the 
remainder, it is summarized, with a tip of the hat to Jeremy Bentham, that champion of 
objectivist English rationalism, as, ‘nonsense on stilts.’ Taylor’s desire to be as objective as 
possible has rapidly been reduced to a survey of the silliness that exists beyond the cultural 
boundaries of Englishness. Taylor’s tone here plays on a jokey tone that undermines his 
career as a professional academic and broadcaster; it situates him as the interested amateur 
whose dismissal of numerology should not, in any way, be perceived as being based upon 
intellectual snobbery; to the ‘solid’ Briton this, no doubt, would smack of a yearning for the 
abstractions of theory over ‘common sense.’ Again, Easthope’s distinctive English empirical 
discourse can be seen to shape both the rhetoric of the presenter, the tone of the production 
and the response to apocalyptic beliefs. Solidly fixed to the right hand column of Easthope’s 
binary oppositions, numerology’s heightened silliness is cast as just one more fantasy by 
which England’s others live. 
Taylor’s search for accounts of the end then touches upon geopolitical fears of the end and 
the fear of ‘missing’ Soviet nuclear devices. He then returns to the religiously based 
apocalypse and cites work by Bruce Lincoln that shows that the Biblical language that 
underpins many of Bush II’s more bellicose speeches and describes his ‘apparent religious 
 






justification for [bringing about the end of the world].’ While apocalyptic belief is hived off 
as ‘nonsense,’37 the potential for creating apocalyptic scenarios is manifestly foreign— 
missing Soviet nuclear devices in the hands of terrorists and a US president guided by divine 
revelation. This sense of the apocalypse as an imported, foreign phenomenon is further 
compounded when Taylor turns to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the Iranian president and his 
belief in the return of the Mahdi. The transition from Bush to Ahmadinejad is achieved via a 
cross-fade from Bush’s face to Ahmadinejad. At the midpoint they merge, made the same in 
their dogmatic beliefs and utterly other to the rationalism inherent in the ‘solid’ British folk 
that Taylor speaks to and for. 
Having seemingly depicted the source and potential actualization of these beliefs overseas, 
Taylor turns to adherents of Islamic understandings of the apocalypse in Britain (England). 
He prefaces the segment in the following way: 
Ahmadinejad reminds us that alongside the apocalyptic Christians in this country we 
have also become dramatically aware of another large group of people who take their 
holy book literally.38 
The Christians are marked as being, ‘apocalyptic Christians,’ exterior to mainstream 
Christianity. Indeed we might take note that Taylor’s first apocalyptic Christians are Catholic 
or cultists. 
There is not the same demarcation for Muslims; the apocalyptic Christians are seen to be 
apart from orthodox Anglicanism and for the Muslim community less demarcation is 
necessary. Their beliefs are always exterior to the kind of England that Taylor is speaking to: 
John Major and George Orwell’s vision of warm beer, honey for tea, and the eternal sunrise. 
Indeed, the signifier that Taylor employs to preface the segment on British Muslims is 
Ahmadinejad who he has already characterized as a dangerous extremist driven by 
apocalyptic beliefs. 
From here we return to the Aetherius Society and their views are interspersed with shots of 
clearly faked ‘UFO’ photographs. With its headquarters set in the, ‘tidy terraced streets,’ and 







a strong sense of the homegrown nature of the Aetherius society. This is at odds with the 
sense of the ‘right-hand side’ nature of the apocalypse that Taylor has hitherto presented and 
it is, in fact, the Englishness of the Aetherius Society that is stressed in the program. 
Taylor finds himself ‘Strangely reassured by the Aetherius Society, like a kind of cosmic 
Home Guard.’39 Amidst the apocalyptic rhetoric of George Bush and Ahmadinejad the 
Aetherians are presented as a very parochial set of believers in the apocalypse; with the 
associative chain between the Home Guard and the eccentric and bumbling cast of Dad’s 
Army40 their apocalypse seems to resonate with a shoddy amateurism in comparison with the 
‘professional’ pursuits of the numerologists, of political rhetoric. This then is the ‘silly 
English discourse,’ version of the apocalypse, far removed from the aggressive extremism of 
global apocalyptics, it reassures because, just as Fraser’s panic-stricken Caledonian 
intonation of ‘We’re doomed!’ in Dad’s Army were always undone by the accidental 
successes of the Home Guard, we are led to believe that the Aetherius Society serve a similar 
function— they confirm the eternal fact of England by the ludicrousness with which Taylor 
presents their alternative. 
Having met the seemingly very British, even very English Aetherians (for Taylor’s vision of 
‘Britain,’ as stated, is one more strongly associated with England), Laurie Taylor is moved to 
comment that, ‘Some apocalypsts do seem nicer than others, not that I can believe a word 
they say.’ He then asks if we are too complacent toward scientific predictions of the end 
because failed religious predictions had lulled us into a false sense of security, 
You can’t beat the Americans when it comes to announcing the end so why don’t the 
British take such matters equally seriously?41 
To Taylor the long history of failed predictions means that we are unable to take these 
predictions seriously. What Taylor fails to address is that American apocalyptic culture has a 
comparable history of failed predictions of the end; indeed, Britain has little to compare to the 
Millerite Great Disappointment nor the subsequent expansion of millennial belief in its wake. 
 
39 Ibid. 
40 Dad’s Army was a television comedy produced by the BBC between 1968 and 1977. It centred on the 
amateur soldiers of the Home Guard (civilian volunteers ineligible for active duty) during the Second World 
War. The war seldom intruded upon the fictional coastal town of Walmington-on-Sea and the ill-preparedness 
of the Home Guard was the source of much of the programme’s humour. 




Taylor goes on to visit the Mill Hill Synagogue in order to gauge apocalyptic belief among 
Britain’s orthodox Jews and finds its Rabbi counting the days until the Jewish Messianic 
Redemption, citing the, ‘master cabbalists,’ divinatory proclamation that we are in the end 
times. With little comment Taylor goes on to talk to Ras Keambiroiro, a Rastafarian, and 
‘devout follower,’ of Christ returned, Haile Selassie. Taylor finds him, ‘a long way from the 
African sun on the fifth floor of a grey,’ scarred BNP-graffiti’d housing estate in South 
London42 his alterity underscored in multiple ways by Taylor’s introduction. 
Keambiroiro is marked as at once alien (‘a log way from the African sun,’ and rejected by the 
indigenous population, (the ‘BNP-graffiti’d housing estate’). Indeed Taylor seems to suggest 
that the poverty of Keambiroiro’s surroundings discounts the fullness of his vision and in 
doing so demonstrates little attempt to understand the perspective of his interviewee. The 
short interview focuses on Haile Selassie’s continued presence on Earth despite his apparent 
bodily death and the strict views of Keambiroiro regarding our living in judgment times. 
Having declared ‘lucky Rastas’ for their lives within ‘their’ end times, his informalism 
betraying his patronizing rejection of them, Taylor discusses the Rapture Index, returning to 
the mathematician, Peter Lee. Swiftly dismissed in laughter, the Rapture Index does not last 
long. There is no precedence for Lee, and so there can be no significance attached to the 
‘signs’ thus indexed. 
Once again Taylor returns to scientific apocalypticism from impact events to ‘synchronous 
failure’ of Earth systems with a focus upon human activity. Scientific believers are labeled as 
‘too extreme,’ other apocalyptics as ‘silly,’ while Taylor continues, 
There is one other apocalyptic impediment, the well-known British inability to get 
things to run on time and that can really make a mess of an apocalypse.42 
We end with the idea that the apocalypse is something that is incompatible with 
Englishness— it is something that will happen overseas. More than this, it is the very 
amateurish nature of Englishness, identified by Easthope, which will safeguard us from 
apocalyptic belief. This is the repeated refrain of the program: apocalyptic belief is something 






communities. The program never asks, for instance, if mainstream British Protestantism 
currently interprets the Book of Revelation. 
 
Conclusion 
In both documentary and fictional forms the English apocalypse is rendered unthinkable 
within mainstream culture because that culture is founded on principles that cannot allow the 
recognition of apocalyptic thought. Just as the Aborigines in Where the Green Ants Dream 
are condemned by being given a voice within a discourse that rejects the claims made in that 
voice, so too do believers in the apocalypse face a similar fate within mainstream English 
culture. It is a culture that is based around a discourse that is at odds with the epistemic bases 
of apocalyptic culture and thus apocalyptic belief is characterized as, at best, ‘silly,’ or, at 
worst, murderous and mad. It is something best left to dangerous extremists, the insane, and 
Americans. Apocalyptic belief can only ever find a voice within English culture at its 
margins or within its underground, in the cultic milieu. DCI Walker’s England will always be 
guaranteed in its eternal tomorrow, while the apocalypse must remain other, excluded from 
the social totality but always with it in the shadows. This is the implication that neither 
program fully confronts, that despite the inadmissibility of apocalypticism, for all its alterity, 
it is, nonetheless, the inadmissible exteriority that dwells within. Although shunned by 
mainstream British media culture these narratives are still present within the weft and warp of 
popular discourse, albeit at the margins. Therein lies the danger of ridicule and contempt for 
apocalypticism as has been shown.43 It is in these circumstances of misrepresentation and 
perceived persecution that apocalyptic fevers burn brightest. 
  
 
43 See, for instance, John Walliss, Apocalyptic Trajectories: Millenarianism and Violence in the Contemporary 
World (Bern: Peter Lang, 1994) and Catherine Wessinger, How the Millennium Comes Violently: From 
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On The Outskirts Of The New Global Village: Computer-mediated prophecy and the 
digital afterlife 
Andrew Fergus Wilson 
 
Abstract 
This chapter will argue that cyberspace, as a medium, offers a unique opportunity for the 
spiritual seeker to explore the syncretism that lies at the heart of the cultic milieu. The 
interlinked pages that constitute Webspace extend the ‘circuit’ shared by seekers into a 
global context and, further, provide an enhanced sense of community. In this context 
individual apocalyptic prophecies can flourish and become sedimented within the cultic 
milieu, strengthened by this extended circuit and enhanced communal potential. 
 
The Light behind the Network 
In Children of the New Age, Steven Sutcliffe describes adoption of a ‘Network of Light’ by 
Peter Caddy, the British spiritualist and cofounder of the Findhorn Foundation. Caddy, along 
with his wife Eileen, integrated the idea of a Network of Light (or ‘spiritual energies’) into 
the already syncretistic spiritual practices and beliefs of the Foundation during the 1950s and 
1960s (Sutcliffe 2003). The concept, in the lineage borrowed by the Caddys, was an apparent 
amalgamation of ideas present in the writings of proto– New Age practitioner Alice Bailey 
during the 1940s and a similar concept referred to by a psychic worker called ‘Naomi’/Anne 
Edwards, whom Peter Caddy encountered in the early 1950s. These Networks of Light were 
believed to resonate outward and downward through loosely defined but hierarchical spiritual 
networks with groups of psychic practitioners regulating and controlling the flow of ‘light 




of Light was also capable of receiving messages and inspiration from higher divine powers 
including ‘Christ Forces’, ‘Masters of Ra’ and the ‘space brothers’. Thus, it acted as a 
communications network in addition to a grid through which psychic energies could flow; or, 
rather, the energies transferred through the network were also capable of carrying 
information. These messages might have borne inspiration, instruction, or (occasionally) 
warnings. Sutcliffe cites a message warning of a potential forthcoming apocalyptic 
conflagration received by the third cofounder of the Findhorn Foundation, Dorothy Maclean, 
during the early 1960s. 
Although certain narratives embraced by the Findhorn Foundation reflected the rise and fall 
in fortune of popular discourses within the cultic milieu (Sutcliffe cites the passing influence 
of the UFO craze during the early years of the second half of the twentieth century), the 
concept of the Network of Light has remained a central pillar of the foundation’s beliefs. 
Gordon Lynch is right to relate Janice Dolley’s suggestion that, ‘since the 1970s, progressive 
organizations (such as Findhorn) [have] often developed clearer and more specific goals as 
they come to recognize the unlikeliness of achieving broad, and undifferentiated, aims for 
global spiritual transformation’ (Lynch 2007: 190). In the case of the Findhorn Foundation, 
one might point to their engagement with the United Nations as an official NGO 
(nongovernmental organization); the development of New Findhorn Directions, a trading 
subsidiary; or, Ekopia, a local community investment scheme with its own currency, the Eko.  
Nonetheless, to focus on these material ventures would be to overlook the continued 
importance and centrality of the spiritual dimension in the foundation’s work. Thus, the 
Network of Light is the cynosure and subject of a daily group meditation held at the 
foundation’s communal ‘ecovillage’ in Scotland; it is invoked through meditation with the 
specific purpose of creating a ‘vessel to contain the energies of love, light and goodwill’ 
(http:// www.findhorn.org/about_us/meditation_new.php). Once this has been achieved and 
after a suitable period of contemplation, the group then proceeds to the Great Invocation, 
which has at its heart the figure of channels of love and light that characterize the Great 
Network: 




From the point of light within the mind of God Let light 
stream forth into the minds of men Let light descend on 
earth. 
From the point of love within the heart of God Let love 
stream forth into the hearts of men May Christ return to 
earth. 
From the centre where the will of God is known 
Let purpose guide the little wills of men 
The purpose which the masters know and serve. 
[...] 
Let light, and love and power restore the plan on earth. 
Close with three Oms (http://www.findhorn.org/about_us/meditation_new.php). 
In addition to the diverse points of engagement with the secular world in a variety of material 
efforts, the Findhorn Foundation is shaped by an ongoing spiritual model provided by and 
enacted through the Network of Light. It is the mechanism through which the foundation 
hopes to transmit the love and light required to transform the world in preparation for their 
idiosyncratic syncretized millennialism. The Network provides a useful model for 
considering how the Internet is understood and experienced by a number of individual 
spiritual seekers within the contemporary cultural milieu. 
 
Belief and the Internet 
In New Media: A Critical Introduction, Martin Lister suggests that there is little separation 
between our offline and online lives: 
As, over time, some new media have become unremarkable due to their 




see not a Narnia or Matrix-like division of virtual and actual worlds, but rather a 
complicated interweaving of mediated, lived, time and space (Lister et al. 2009: 
237). 
This is difficult to argue against, but the sense of wonder that earlier writers had in their 
engagement with cyberspace has not dissipated entirely. For some there is a real sense that 
they are, indeed, stepping into Narnia, for all the familiarity that the enabling technology may 
have acquired.  
In Give Me That Online Religion, Brenda Brasher sketches a variety of ways in which 
religious groups have integrated computer-mediated communication (CMC) technologies into 
their practices. Frequently the integration amounts to little more than that; she points to the 
way in which traditional institutionalized religions have used digital technology’s capacity to 
store information as a means of establishing openly accessible online repositories of 
documents and texts. She also points to the way in which the shared communicative spaces 
that the Internet has opened have been adopted by religious communities as communal 
meeting spaces. She cites the use of the Internet as a space of reflection and discussion by 
attendees at the Toronto Blessing following the event. Crucially, here, however, Brasher also 
points to the importance of interconnectedness for understanding the Internet as a medium 
with its own effects. For instance, she cites the way in which the use of links produces fresh 
affinities and alliances—however embryonic and fragile 
As an increasingly diverse collection of religious groups move into cyberspace, one 
significant effect is the incidence of new convergences and cooperation amongst 
them. It is not at all rare for the Website of a Christian group espousing strong 
millennial beliefs to be linked to a Jewish Zionist Website (2004: 29). 
For many users, these connections are the sine qua non of the experience of Internet usage; 
while there may be a lack of clarity regarding the origins of the phrase ‘surfing the net’,1 the 
intention behind it is clear: users browse the Internet, following links to one page and then the 
next. As will be addressed below, this dynamic pseudo-spatial engagement with cyberspace 
can produce a sense of an immaterial experiential dimension that is visited when online. 
Further, this mode of interconnected virtual experience has been credited with an extension of 
 





humanity’s spiritual being. Brasher cites the earlier work of Jennifer Cobb and finds in 
Cobb’s work the ‘fascinating if unprovable theory’ that ‘[i]n building these communications 
technologies, we have merely hardwired our pre-existing interconnectedness . . . in 
cyberspace we have externally actualized our evolving psycho-spiritual ties with one another’ 
(cited in Brasher 2004: 40). It is here that the use of the Findhorn Foundation’s Network of 
Light as a metaphor for the extension of the spiritual milieu into cyberspace becomes 
apparent. Thus, we can see how, in certain spiritual understandings, particularly those 
inflected by the ceaseless syncretism of New Age thought, the Internet becomes the primary 
bearer of ‘the Message’ in an electronically mediated age rather than simply a digitized 
repository. Naturally, there are limitations to this. The embodied self cannot maintain its 
virtual presence without recourse to physical needs— Douglas Cowan points to this near the 
end of Cyberhenge: Modern Pagans on the Internet and reminds the cybertopian, ‘everyone 
of us returns to the reality of the off-line world that is defined at least in part by our bodies’ 
(2005: 201). Nonetheless, Cowan makes earlier reference to pagans whose paganism is 
almost wholly virtual. While these ‘exclusively online modern Pagans’ are described as being 
less invested in the participatory elements of offline paganism and thus less invested in the 
day-to-day practices that are typically held to define being pagan (2005: 160), what is crucial 
here is the recognition that the Internet provides the setting in which a semblance of pagan 
identity can be performed. Indeed, it can be suggested that rather than an incomplete form of 
real pagan identity, what is developing is a mode of engaging with religious identities that 
allows an ongoing ‘project of the spiritual self’ in which the formal trappings of offline 
paganism are being elided by the kind of contingent and informal online religiosity described 
by Morten Højsgaard: ‘“Cyber-religion”, at its basis, is mediated or located primarily in 
cyberspace, its contents reflect the main features of the postmodern cyber culture, and it is 
only sparingly organized as well’ (2005: 62). 
Whereas, on the one hand, Cowan allows us to consider cyberspatial religious life as being 
related to and developed by ‘authentic’ offline religious practices, Højsgaard, on the other, 
presents a model of a religiosity that is particular to cyberspace. Both, however, contain the 
assumption that there is a ‘there’ that is mobilized by CMC technologies, that cyber-
worshippers engage with a location—or, at least, a space—when they log on. It is being 
argued here that this space, this ‘network of virtual light’, encourages particular modes of 
knowledge acquisition that serve to make more likely the dissemination of, among other 




psychogeography of cyberspace and in part due to the way in which knowledge is sought on 
the Internet.  
 
The Space in Cyberspace 
Terms used to describe the Internet during its initial phase of mass adoption in North America 
and Western Europe relied heavily on the spatial metaphor, a metaphor that has remained 
dominant. The short-lived sobriquet ‘information superhighway’ (or, depending on one’s 
real-world location, Infobahn) spoke of high-speed travel toward a destination, of movement 
from a ‘here’ to a ‘there’. ‘Cyberspace’, a term borrowed from the fiction of William 
Gibson,2 captures in its evocative vagueness the digitization of space that seems to occur 
when we log on to the Internet: the ‘there’ beyond the screen.  
Gibson’s neologism originates within the ‘cyberpunk’ subgenre of science fiction that 
characterizes much of Gibson’s early work. Tied to the birth of ‘cyberspace’ as a concept, 
cyberpunk can be thought of as the fiction of a historical moment (while also being the 
product of previous works of science fiction such as those of John Brunner or the New Wave 
science fiction authors of the late 1960s). By mapping out the ‘psychogeography’ of a new 
sociocultural frontier, cyberpunk performs the role that Raymond Williams refers to as a 
‘structure of feeling’: ‘a mode of social formation, explicit and recognizable in specific kinds 
of art, which is distinguishable from social and semantic formations by its articulation of 
presence’ (1977: 135). 
Thus, cyberpunk as a structure of feeling uses ‘new semantic figures’ to map out an emergent 
social formation. It is the emergent generation of which they write—a technologically literate 
generation with the capacity to treat technology equally as a means of social being and a 
means of intervention and disruption—which inhabited the conceptual spaces and identities 
that cyberspace narrated (Williams 1977: 135). Equally, the virtual environment in which 
CMC transactions occur is provided with a signifier in William Gibson’s 1984 novel 
Neuromancer: 
 
2 See the short story ‘Burning Chrome’ (Omni, 1982) collected in Burning Chrome (London: Gollancz, 1986) 




The matrix has its roots in primitive arcade games … in early graphics programs 
and military experimentation with cranial jacks … Cyberspace. A consensual 
hallucination experienced daily by billions of legitimate operators, in every 
nation, by children being taught mathematical concepts…A graphic 
representation of data abstracted from the banks of every computer in the human 
system. Unthinkable complexity. Lines of light ranged in the nonspace of the 
mind, clusters and constellations of data. Like city lights, receding … (1984: 67). 
The concept thus draws within it the presumed infinitude of knowledge that the human mind 
is capable of reckoning (the ‘clusters’ and ‘constellations’ of data, stretching outward, 
‘receding’) in addition to the experientially familiar mystery of ‘the nonspace of the human 
mind’. The tension between the knowable ‘city lights’ and their outward explosion into the 
infinity of the cosmic void characterizes early attempts to consider the spatial form of 
cyberspace, for instance, William Mitchell’s use of the figure of the city to ‘map’ cyberspace 
or Marcus Novak’s evocative call for an architecture of poetic dimensions as a means of 
understanding the apprehension of cyberspatial dimensions. 
Tautologically, cyberspace is considered in spatial terms. We have an idea of there being a 
space beyond the screen through which we travel. Whether that movement is from Web page 
to Web page, the movement of an avatar within a MMORPG (Massively Multiplayer Online 
Role-playing Game), a programme, movie, or song downloaded via a P2P (peer-to-peer) 
application, or a virus or worm spreading out and burrowing through the electronic ether, 
cyberspace is considered to be a space through which movement is achieved. It is not, 
however, spatial organization as we are accustomed to it.  
Gillian Skirrow points to its entrancing qualities in ‘Hellivision: An analysis of video games’; 
she goes on to suggest that young male gamers explore unconscious projections in the virtual 
worlds they engage with (1986). Cyberspace is something that is constituted not only through 
linked networks but also through the users of these networks and the content they produce—
Sherry Turkle finds depth to the screen and projects her work across multiple points of 
interface with it; thought becomes disseminated and spread out into multiple points of 
engagement with an unidentified but palpable entity behind the screen: 
Why is it so hard for me to turn away from the screen? The windows on my 




access … When I write at the computer, all of these are present and my thinking 
space seems somehow enlarged. The dynamic, layered display gives me the 
comforting sense that I write in conversation with my computer. After years of 
such encounters, a blank piece of paper can make me feel strangely alone (1996: 
29). 
Further, these users and contents change with great rapidity. It would be possible to map 
servers around the world, but this does not give an indication of the use being made of them 
at any one time. It would, for example, be possible to describe the physical location of the 
BBC News Online server as being in London. It is, however, simultaneously ‘serving’ pages 
around the globe. It is at once local and global. 
That globality is not, however, static: the specific locations around the world from which 
information is being requested change by the second. This suggests that we cannot record the 
topography of cyberspace by conventional means: we cannot simply draw a map of it. To 
begin to understand how cyberspace can be considered in spatial terms, we must employ 
metaphors that draw upon conventional and familiar reckonings of space. One of the more 
successful attempts to produce a familiar spatial reckoning of cyberspace can be found in 
William J. Mitchell’s City of Bits: Space, Place, and the Infobahn. As the title suggests, 
Mitchell employs the city as a figure by which we can understand the spatial (non)presence 
of cyberspace. Mitchell uses the metaphor of the city as a means of familiarizing those 
unacquainted with cyberspace with the various forms it took at that time. In many ways, City 
of Bits is concerned with fixing the spatial organization of cyberspace in terms that 
domesticate its unfamiliar spaces while retaining something of the adventure of roaming the 
city. Indeed, early on in the book Mitchell claims, ‘My name is wjm@mit.edu (though I have 
many aliases), and I am an electronic flâneur. I hang out on the network. . . . The keyboard is 
my café’ (1995: 8). In evoking Baudelaire’s flâneur, Mitchell is suggesting the pleasure of 
cyberspace as a space for roaming, exploring, seeing and being seen: it is a realm in which 
alternative versions of the self can be presented in virtual anonymity. Mitchell is 
‘wjm@mit.edu’, among other aliases, and from his café keyboard he can watch the virtual 
world go by, participating as he pleases. Also worth commenting on here is that Baudelaire 
was the observer of profound social change as Paris was redesigned and the lives of the 




Despite reincarnating Baudelaire’s definitive city-dweller within an electronic plane, Mitchell 
is quick to stress that fundamental differences exist between spatial reckonings of the city and 
of cyberspace. He suggests that it is ‘profoundly antispatial’: it is ‘there’ but it is not possible 
to describe ‘there’ or point someone in its direction; in his words, ‘You do not go to it; you 
log in’ (1995: 8). So, rather than a place that one visits, it is a space that one enters: it is 
ambience rather than location.  
Throughout City of Bits, Mitchell continues to employ the metaphor of the city for 
cyberspace and of the flâneur for its users. He recognizes the global nature of it and the 
further production of time–space compression but insists on reproducing the local within the 
global or on providing examples of its iterations such as in the structure of the Cleveland 
FreeNet, which was identifiably organized around the institutions of the physical city. 
Mitchell also speaks of the ability to ‘condense’ scattered rural communities and draw their 
inhabitants together into a shared, electronic, public space. In these examples Mitchell is 
accurate in his description of cyberspace as a city but his analysis is weaker when he attempts 
to argue the same case for the World Wide Web, MUDs (Multi-User Dungeons or Domains) 
and their variants. 
The Web is identified primarily through the use of a particular protocol for the transmission 
of information (‘http’ or Hypertext Transfer Protocol). In this sense it is a medium that is 
conceived of in spatial terms, but not one that corresponds well with the anthropomorphic 
organization of city space. The planar shifts from Web page to Web page suggest movement 
not within a city but upon a vast and chaotic plane that is, it is arguable, experienced purely 
through the imagination. However, what is of value here is the ability to ‘condense’ not 
scattered rural communities but scattered communities of believers; this theme shall be 
returned to later.  
The second point of interest that can be found in Mitchell’s work—like much writing on 
cyberspace during the 1990s—is an eagerness to understand human interaction with the new 
medium. Later work can tend to concentrate on human interaction within the medium, its 
integration into daily life,3 or the impact of the medium on social structures.4 This is, of 
 
3 For instance, Barry Wellman and Caroline Haythornthwaite (eds.), The Internet in Everyday Life (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2002). 
4 See Armand Mattelart, The Information Society: An Introduction (London:Sage, 2003) or Manuel Castells, The 




course, valuable work, but there is still a need to understand how the medium in itself is used 
and engaged with, and at the heart of this is a need to explore the multiple ways in which its 
unique spatiality is understood. 
Rather than attempt to project current understandings of social space(s) onto cyberspace, it is 
more appropriate to reconsider our understanding of space. Marcus Novak does this in the 
essay ‘Liquid Architectures in Cyberspace’ (1991). He does consider the figure of the city as 
a means of understanding cyberspace, but he sees as it as limiting insofar as cyberspace can 
be considered an extension of the city form, a para-city if you will. Fundamental to Novak’s 
position is the idea that cyberspace allows us to extend subjectivity into virtual form. His 
argument is that the mind and the body are thoroughly linked, that the Cartesian split was a 
convenient thought tool only. Novak follows the idea that knowledge is embodied and that 
the mind affects our bodily presence and experience of physical reality: what we perceive as 
real is real, with objective reality being little more than ‘a construct of our mind’.  
In a sense, then, our reality can be seen as a series of fictions, fluid and open to change. This 
becomes evident in cyberspace and what we choose to take of ourselves into it. Our ‘self’ is 
defined through pure representation rather than perception, and it is representation over 
which we have complete control. Novak suggests that the architecture of cyberspace (that is, 
the organization of space within cyberspace) is anthropomorphic but that the human figure at 
the heart of anthropomorphism has become fluid and subject to change. 
With a ‘liquid’ body around which to build the architecture of cyberspace, the self becomes, 
for Novak, liquid. This liquidity of self and space is akin to poetry and magic for Novak, for 
they exemplify ‘the promise of control over the world by the power of the will’. Novak 
comments, ‘Cyberspace is poetry inhabited, and to navigate through it is to become a leaf on 
the wind of a dream’ (1991: 229). For Novak, cyberspace is a series of dream cities built and 
explored by their inhabitants. These are not merely the bringing to bear of our meanings onto 
the cities surrounding us (something akin to the psychogeographies of the Situationists) but 
the production of our own multiple and tidal spaces.  
From Turkle’s presence behind the screen to Novak’s inhabited poetic spaces via Mitchell’s 
wandering electronic flâneur, the extra-human experience of cyberspace offers glimpses of a 
world beyond, in which technologies of communication seem to hold out the promise of 




this kind of reading of cyberspace, the act of logging on to the Internet can be understood of 
as a form of active sacralization if we accept Bobby C. Alexander’s (admittedly general) 
definition of ritual: ‘Ritual . . . is a performance, planned or improvised, that effects a 
transition from everyday life to an alternative context within which the everyday is 
transformed’ (1997: 139). We are close, here, to the cosmological encounter with technology 
that can be found in Marshall McLuhan’s work. He is better known for his suggestion that 
new media are capable of transforming perception; nonetheless, McLuhan’s Catholicism is 
evident in the expansive and ultimately redemptive role that his depiction of technology 
offers. His is a viewpoint of technology united with the poetic spirit of humanity, itself an 
immanent realization of that which is divine in nature and in humanity.  
Thus, McLuhan is highly conscious of the amorality of technology but simultaneously aware 
of the possibility for it to be used in conjunction with the best impulses of humanity. As much 
as technology might be an extension into an external world, it is also, for McLuhan, an 
extension into the human world of the external. In this exchange of being, the presence of 
divine Being in the external world is revealed in the inner workings of humankind: an 
epiphany through technology. 
In ordinary human perception, men perform the miracle of recreating within 
themselves—in their interior faculties—the exterior world. This miracle is the work 
of the nous poietikos or of the agent intellect—that is the poetic or creative process. 
The exterior world in every instant of perception is interiorized and recreated in a new 
manner. Ourselves. And in this creative work that is perception and cognition, we 
experience immediately that dance of Being within our faculties which provides the 
incessant intuition of Being (2002: 80). 
Following Arthur Kroker’s reading of this aspect of McLuhan’s work, we can understand that 
McLuhan’s idea of a united and spiritually replenished humanity, freed from the imperial 
tendencies of the world of print and the visual register (nationalism), bonded in a true 
democracy of spirit, and full mutual recognition is realized in the mediated global village 
(2005). Thus, technology is a key component in humanity’s spiritual development. As our 
technology advances, we become more adept at knowing ourselves; we are advancing our 
potential for discovering ourselves. It is not without risks, in an atomizing world in which we 
each become a nodal point of a globalized utopia; the very freedom offered to self-realize 




tyrannical visual give way to a tribalized global oneness, in which meaning must create itself 
anew in each of us, the fear of an infirmity of meaning reveals itself. It is, ultimately, 
McLuhan’s Catholicism that allows him a transcendent truth from which to circumvent the 
falling away of the reassuring empiricism of the visual range; the epiphany of the senses is at 
once personal and spiritual, a union of internal and external worlds. 
Although McLuhan’s account is part of a broad thesis, the figure of the potentially lone figure 
overcoming the existential loneliness in the awareness of a constant globalized electronic 
presence is a compelling one. It evokes, again, Mitchell’s electronic flâneur, Turkle’s 
presence, or simply the shared informational spaces of Gibson’s cyberspace. It is here that the 
use of the Findhorn Foundation’s Network of Light becomes a working metaphor for the 
environment into which some users of cyberspace may conceive themselves to be entering. 
This emergent mode of worship is alluded to by Gwilym Beckerlegge in the essay, 
‘Computer-mediated Religion: Religion on the Internet at the Turn of the Twenty-first 
Century’. He writes:  
The relatively new concept of cyberspace now exists alongside traditional 
religious views of the cosmos, in which hierarchies of beings have been placed 
in different realms or levels … technology offers the prospect of an increasingly 
intimate relationship between human beings and their computers, which may 
appear to realize some of the goals traditionally held out by religious systems 
(2001: 257). 
In what follows, a narrow selection of Web pages that integrate the late Diana, Princess of 
Wales, into prophesied apocalyptic scenarios, will be explored as markers of an invigorated 
and extended cultic milieu. As will be discussed, the concept of the cultic milieu relies on the 
figure of the ‘seeker’, and it is in this figure that we encounter a model of information 
consumption that is ideally suited to the engagement with cyberspace that is outlined above. 
 
The Digital Afterlife of Diana, Princess of Wales 
Century 10, Quatrain 35 of the prophecies of Nostradamus reads: 




Going to be murdered by the unknown one from Marne. 
According to Michael McClellan, author of Nostradamus and the Final Age (which is in the 
process of being published through his Web site, ‘Nostradamus and the New Prophecy 
Almanacs’),5 this foretells the transformation of Diana, Princess of Wales, into a goddess. 
The page dedicated to Diana by McClellan is a simple hypertext page with purple text on a 
black background interspersed with McClellan’s collages of Diana—these are mostly stock 
images of Diana superimposed on classical Grecian backgrounds. McClellan explains the 
first line cited (the third of the full quatrain) as a reference to a room given over to ‘Style and 
Fashion’ at the permanent exhibition ‘Diana: A Celebration’, held in six rooms at Althorp 
House.  
For McClellan, Althorp and, clearly, its gardens represent the ‘temple of Diana’ and the 
‘women’s apparel’, 28 of Diana’s outfits housed in the ‘Style and Fashion’ room. The second 
(fourth) line of the quatrain indicates to McClellan the unknown driver of the white Fiat 
described at the crash scene, while he notes that the Marne is a tributary of the Seine— the 
Seine being the river under which Pont d’Alma tunnel passes. Leaving aside his 
transformation of the more frequently cited Greek Artemis into the Roman Diana, it is worth 
noting the emphasis that McClellan places on the apotheosis of Diana. He asks, ‘Are you 
ready for the return of the goddess Diana?’ (http://www.newprophecy.net/diana.htm). 
His question is more than rhetorical and is linked to an overarching series of related 
prophecies that have, ultimately, an eschatological significance: 
Nostradamus prophesied the death of Princess Diana, her ‘temple’ at Althorp, 
and her reappearance to the world as a miraculous apparition. This final event 
may take place in October near the eve of World War III 
(http://web.archive.org/web/20080821232336/http://newprophecy.net/). 
This failed prophecy has become consigned to archive.org and the relevant passage on the 
home page of prophecy.net now reads: 
 
5 On McClellan’s Web site, the almanacs are divided by year. The years noted in parentheses in the following 




Nostradamus prophesied the death of Princess Diana, her ‘temple’ at Althorp, and her 
reappearance to the world as a miraculous apparition. This final event may have been 
presaged by a strange, pink glow in the sky above London in October 2008 and will 
ultimately occur near the eve of World War III (http://www.newprophecy.net). 
Diana’s return is detailed more fully on the subpage ‘Revelation’, which draws on the work 
of psychic medium Jeanne Dixon and numerologist/ astrologer Cheiro (born William John 
Warner) in addition to McClellan’s own interpretive initiatives. For McClellan, the death of 
Diana and Dodi takes on biblical significance, with their deaths being the work of satanic 
forces set on thwarting the immanentization of the Christian eschaton as foretold in 
Revelation. He understands them as figures from the 1962 prophecy of American psychic 
Jeanne Dixon (1904–1997), which predicted the coming of a child born to Nefertiti and a 
pharaoh; after Nefertiti is betrayed (literally, stabbed in the back in the prophetic dream), the 
child is adored by all peoples of the Earth. 
For McClellan, it is clear that this refers to Diana and Dodi: ‘Is it not clear who Princess 
Diana and Dodi al-Fayed are and were? They were none other than Nefertiti and Ahknaten’ 
(http://www.newprophecy.net/queenson .htm). Not only were they reincarnations of Nefertiti 
(and Diana alone had already ‘passed through’ Marie Antoinette, Isadora Duncan and 
Marilyn Monroe) but Diana was pregnant with Dodi’s (Ahknaten) child, a child that was due 
to be the new messiah. In a further biblical flourish, McClellan turns to Revelation 12 and the 
woman of heaven whose child will rule with a rod of iron; the woman, of course, is Diana 
and the child the son she was due to have with Dodi Al-Fayed. In the biblical exegesis, we 
are told that Diana’s Merovingian blood links her to the twelve tribes of Israel just as her 
spirit is linked with Nefertiti. Not only that, but we are also informed by McClellan: 
Now, because of the murder of Diana and Dodi, he must be born from different 
parents and will be born, I believe, around the year 2040. Satan and his 
principalities interfered with God’s plan in 1997 (Revelation 12 is part of God’s 
plan), but he will not succeed next time (http://www.new 
prophecy.net/queenson.htm). 
The site is largely the work of Michael McClellan, author of Nostradamus and the Final Age 
(which is published for free through New Prophecy Web site, www.newprophecy.net). The 




other Web sites linking to it. Figures vary from ten (Google) through 121 ‘inlinks’ (Yahoo 
Site Explorer) to 2,420 (Bing)6 separate links to New Prophecy; it is also a highly popular 
site, with an estimated forty-three thousand US citizens visiting it per month.  
These US visitors are ethnically diverse (73% Caucasian, 9% African American, 6% Asian, 
10% Hispanic), from a range of income groups (24% earning less than $30,000 per year, 27% 
between $30,000 and $60,000, 27% between $60,000 and $100,000 and 22% over $100,000), 
male (54%), and adult (18–34, 31%; 35–49, 33%).7 It exemplifies a prophetic strand in the 
cultic milieu, as described by Colin Campbell, and demonstrates the syncretism at its heart. 
The prophetic sources cited by McClellan include but are not restricted to: Srila Prabhupada 
(1896–1977), best known for founding the International Society for Krishna Consciousness; 
the Boer Christian-patriotic seer Nicolaas Van Rensburg (1862–1926); apocalyptic Native 
American Hopi prophecies; Ursula Southiel, or Mother Shipton (1488–1561); the US 
evangelist healer A.A. Allen (1911–1970); Sumerian cosmology and modern prophecies of 
the return of the planet Nibiru; and other individuals and Judeo-Christian tradition. The 
otherwise conflicting sources of prophecy are unified in their being drawn together as strands 
in McClellan’s belief system, and this unity of diverse mystic traditions and belief systems is 
typical of the cultic milieu. Campbell describes the cultic milieu as ‘the cultural underground 
of society . . . it includes the worlds of the occult and the magical, of spiritualism and psychic 
phenomena, of mysticism and new thought, of alien intelligences and lost civilizations, of 
faith healing and nature cure’ (2002: 14). 
The syncretization of these diverse beliefs and practices is achieved in part through a shared 
recognition of their mutual stigmatization by mainstream culture; indeed, in the field of 
conspiracy research, Michael Barkun has reconceptualized the cultic milieu as ‘stigmatized 
knowledge’ (2003). This shared ‘outsider  status’ not only underlines the perceived threat that 
the cultic milieu is to ‘the Establishment’ but also underlines a coincidence of interests and 
experience between cultic movements and their adherents.  
 
6 These figures were accessed through http://www.linkpopularity.com—Google and Bing’s figures can be 
generated via appropriate manipulation of their search syntax. Although Yahoo’s Site Explorer is normally 
available only to Web site owners, this requirement can be overcome by using linkpopularity.com. 
7 7. The estimates of visitor statistics were generated by http://www.quantcast.com/ newprophecy.net/. The 
figures for low-income visitors and African American, Asian and Hispanic visitors were all above the 




Campbell identifies the sharing of a ‘circuit’ through openly available published materials 
and public lectures, which are inclusive and mutually supportive, as a further contributor to 
the syncretizing pressure within the cultic milieu. The final means by which the cultic milieu 
is drawn together is through the ideational trajectories of its participants; here Campbell uses 
the idea of seekership. Seekers are typically marked by a full or partial rejection of 
mainstream religious beliefs and institutions and, instead, they adopt an eclectic approach in 
their search for the spiritual ‘truth’ that traditional sources have failed to provide. Campbell 
points to the tendency among seekers, in their progression through the cultic milieu, to ‘come 
to accept seeking itself as the primary end’ (2002: 18). 
Seekership is something that is evidenced in the multiplicity of what might be termed the 
‘healers and spiritual advisors’ who surrounded Diana throughout her public life. Paul Heelas 
helpfully catalogues those mentioned by Andrew Morton in Diana, Her New Life: ‘Advisor, 
astrologer, business motivator guru, clairvoyant, confidant, counsellor, exercise trainer, 
fitness teacher, gym trainer, homeopathic doctor, hypnotherapist, osteopath, psychotherapist, 
sleep therapist, soothsayer, spiritual advisor, tarot-card reader, therapist, and voice coach’ 
(cited in Heelas 1999: 99). This list was published in 1995, and it does not necessarily 
provide a full picture of the healers and advisors drawn upon by Diana. It does however give 
the impression of a desire for guidance on matters mundane and spiritual, physical and 
mental, the past, present and future. It is Heelas’s contention that Diana was undergoing a 
‘conversion career’ and growing increasingly engaged in New Age beliefs and practices. 
Although an uncomfortable term, Heelas’s use of ‘New Age’ is broadly analogous to 
Campbell’s concept of the cultic milieu— it is capable of incorporating conflicting spiritual 
beliefs and outlooks—the world-affirming and the world-rejecting.8 Drawing on Heelas’s 
argument but recontextualizing it within Campbell’s conceptual terrain, we can thus describe 
Diana as an active seeker within the cultic milieu. This seekership was and continues to be 
important; it is a crucial part of Diana’s appeal within the cultic milieu itself. There is a 
recognition of shared experience within the cultural (if not material) capital particular to the 
cultic milieu. In an e-mail to the author on 23 June 2008, spiritual medium Sylvia Moon 
wrote: 
 





As a medium I was aware of other mediums helping and teaching her [Diana] to 
grow, and using her light and energy to help others. She became much stronger 
and left light where she went. I didn’t look on her as a divine being more as a co 
worker who I sometimes feel with me when I’m working or when I’m talking to 
other mediums, yes, even on the Internet. I support anyone who is from any 
spiritual background as long as they do it with love and light. 
Thus, for Sylvia at least, Diana was not simply a potential seeker within the cultic milieu but 
was also a practitioner, drawing on knowledge and skills gained within the cultic milieu and 
applying them ‘with love and light’. Sylvia may well be described as a typical seeker herself 
and describes her spiritual beliefs as ‘ever growing’, and it is in this and as a ‘light worker’ 
that she finds commonality with Diana. This commonality continues to be shared after 
Diana’s death, and it should be noted here that Sylvia is identifying Internet use as a sphere of 
activity in which her perception of her abilities is undiminished and in which Diana’s spirit 
may become manifest. 
For many within the cultic milieu, Diana lives on; she has not died but has simply ‘moved on’ 
to another sphere of existence, as is attested by the number of accounts of her spirit being 
channelled. There is, for example, a Web site dedicated to recording her channelled 
messages, Diana Speaks (http://www. dianaspeaks.com/). The Diana of dianaspeaks.com has 
completed Heelas’s ‘conversion career’ and speaks as an enlightened being, extolling New 
Age platitudes focused on self-improvement. There are also conventionally published books 
such as Rita Eide’s Celestial Voice of Diana and Hazel Courteney’s Divine Intervention, 
which feature similar iterations of Diana’s ascended spirit: she is presented as an insightful 
being with an enabling message of spiritual growth. Other channelled messages from Diana 
reveal as cultic tropes some of the themes raised by Michael McClellan: Diana as a 
reincarnated avatar of a particular formation of ‘spirit energy’. The message, ‘Wake Up to the 
Fact that Every One of your Choices are [sic] Divine’, channelled by Gillian Macbeth-
Louthan, for example, begins: 
I am she that is known as Mary. I have worn many veils, many names, many 
lives, but ultimately I am One Light and One frequency. My essence has 
incarnated as many, the latest being the Mother Teresa who has passed back into 





Not only do we see the repeated refrain of Diana-as-avatar, but we also find a syncretistic 
gesture that unifies Diana and Mother Teresa as aspects of ‘Mother Mary’. The coincidence 
of the death dates of Diana and Teresa and their association with charitable works resonated 
strongly both at a folk level and within popular culture. It was, by and large, primarily the 
academic community that expressed the greatest doubt at this equivalence or, indeed, the 
straightforwardly moral impulse behind the charitable gestures of either woman. Arvind 
RajaGopal, for instance, delineates the problematic presence of Mother Teresa and the 
Missionaries of Charity upon the Indian political landscape and their apparent self-promotion 
while indicating how ‘media images’ serve to draw Teresa and Diana together despite their 
evident differences. He suggests that their ‘merging . . . in one trope of charity [may have 
been] a sentimental response to the problem of poverty . . . in one global regime of 
representation’ (1999: 138). While Linda Woodhead highlights the religious differences 
between the pious, doctrinaire nun and the spiritual, heterodox princess, she also points to the 
extent to which institutionalized religion had failed to keep pace with popular conceptions of 
sanctity.9 
Indeed, the cultic milieu has had little problem in reconciling the two; we can see how Diana 
and Teresa have been conjoined and re-embodied (and, let us not overlook, commodified) in 
a wand sold through www.crescentmoongoddess.com that is described as follows: 
DIANA-TERESA Crystal Wand 
Pink glass staff with rose quartz beads & a Goddess symbol, with rose quartz ends. 10 
inches long. Includes a velvet bag. 
This wand was created in the memory of Princess Diana & Mother Teresa who 
inspired us globally to reveal our own hidden abilities to make a difference on 
our planet. Use this wand to see the beauty & strength within yourself. $90 
(http://www.crescentmoongoddess.com/p121.htm). 
As is becoming apparent, within the cultic milieu Diana was as much subject to the syncretic 
impulse as she was syncretizing seeker. In the Diana–Teresa crystal wand we see both 
women united and marked with ‘a Goddess symbol’, a further strand of the cultic milieu 
woven into the object. The wand reverberates across the fields of celebrity, Catholicism, and 
 




a generalized paganism (something we could read into the Marian Diana prophecy above). 
There are also overtones of nature worship in the following message channelled from Diana’s 
spirit by medium Diane Tessman: 
Regardless of the cause of my passing on Earth, it was time on the cosmic clock, 
for me, The Angel, Diana Luminatis, to become fully empowered. I have 
awakened once again right as Earth needs me most. . . . Angel Diana is linked 
closely with the living spirit of Mother Earth. I, Diana Luminatis, am infinitely 
and proudly connected to Mother Earth (http://www. 
hammerwood.mistral.co.uk/tragic.htm). 
Tessman now channels Tibus, a star person who communicates from ‘future human 
consciousness’, but her message from Diana Luminatis further emphasizes the polysemic 
nature of Diana within the cultic milieu: she is capable of sustaining multiple readings, and 
repeatedly we find her assuming a messianic or eschatological role, awakening or appearing, 
‘when we need her most’. Rather than her polysemy being emblematic of an unresolved and 
ill-formed spirituality—both hers and those who have found spiritual meaning in her life and 
subsequent existence—this multiplicity of potential ‘meanings’ maps the multinodal journey 
of the typical seeker within the cultic milieu.  
For some, Diana is one stopping point on a complex personal journey through the cultural 
underground, a stopping point whose coordinates may be different for each visitor; and yet, to 
others, she is a guide on that journey. She has become, within the cultic milieu, emblematic 
of its heterodox and syncretic nature and part of the milieu itself. We should not however 
overlook the broader spiritual impact of Diana. Chris Rojek is keen to explore the idea that, in 
keeping with the secularization thesis, the presence and power of religious thought in 
everyday life have declined and that, in our secular age, celebrity has usurped the worship of 
the saints, divine beings and deities. While casting his response to this problematic as partial, 
Rojek is prepared to state, ‘To the extent that organized religion has declined in the West, 
celebrity culture has emerged as one of the replacement strategies that promote new orders of 
meaning and solidarity’ (2001: 98). 
This allows Rojek the opportunity to thus see celebrity culture as being cast in the 
Durkheimian role as ‘a significant institution in the normative achievement of social 




instance of religious behaviour that is mediated through the institutions of organized orthodox 
religious beliefs; the cultic milieu seems to offer a model of religious practice that is 
countercultural and, in certain instances, world-rejecting. Although Rojek recognizes that 
aspects of our integration of celebrities into our cultural life worlds are modelled on 
rudimentary religious forms such as ascent, descent and redemption, there are further 
examples that the secular world has, in fact, been partially (re) enchanted through folk and 
popular responses to celebrity deaths. 
Rojek comes close to this in passages dealing with what he refers to as celebrity reliquaries, 
for instance: photographs signed by celebrities, napkins, cigarette butts, or hotel sheets used 
by them—the ephemera of daily life transformed into sacred objects. These reliquaries are 
complemented by the use of their former homes or their final resting places as shrines: 
Elvis’s Graceland home or Jim Morrison’s Parisian grave, for example. Jeffrey Richards 
noted a similar sacralization process in the case of Diana.10 He describes the manner in which 
Diana evoked echoes of the curative powers ascribed to the monarchy during the late 
medieval and early modern period and their ability to cure scrofula, ‘The King’s Evil’, by 
means of the laying on of hands. Like Rojek, Richards describes the memorabilia and 
merchandise that emerged following Diana’s death and casts it in the light of holy relics and 
their reliquaries. Also, like Rojek, he points to the emergence of shrines to Diana, particularly 
outside Kensington Palace, describing how it ‘became an instant shrine, almost engulfed in 
flowers, candles, and simple childlike poems attesting to love felt for the dead Princess’ 
(1999: 61). 
Unlike Rojek, Richards describes this as being akin to medieval mourning for the passing of 
popular local holy persons, with the Catholic Church tending to canonize these figures in an 
effort to incorporate the popular feeling for them within its orthodoxy. This is, if you like, a 
recuperation of the cultic milieu in its most nascent form—‘the popular mystical’—in which 
an acephalous cultic movement is contained within the orthodoxy through the institutional 
mechanisms of that orthodoxy. In the medieval period, the harnessing of folk cult movements 
for the assured maintenance of solidarity and social integration does not seem out of place, 
but to our ears it sounds distant—of that time and place alone. 
 




Michael Taussig’s The Magic of the State, a work of ‘fictocriticism’, narrates the complexity 
of national identities and rituals of spirit possession in modern Venezuela. In one emblematic 
passage he describes a scene in a shed behind a house in a lower-middle-class barrio: 
All of one wall was taken up by a huge portal or shrine. To the left there was a 
three-foot-high statue of El Indio Guaicaipuro. On the right was a similarly large 
statue of El Negro Primero, while in the center was a massive statue of the spirit 
queen. On the extreme right was a bronzecolored statue of the Liberator, about a 
foot in height. Densely occupying all remaining space were scores of candles, 
portraits, and figurines of spirits (1997: 59). 
The national hero, the Liberator—symbol of the political enablement of the nation—thus 
takes up a position amid the oppressed and exploited peoples of the nation and, to map the 
cultural underground onto the spirit queen, the cultic milieu. Coupled to them through his 
simultaneous invocation with the spirit queen and the oppressed and exploited masses, the 
national hero is afforded a sacred destiny.  
Taussig, through metaphor and details from the life, death and symbolic afterlife of Simon 
Bolivar, demonstrates how the national hero as a quasimythical-magical figure is a key 
element in the assurance of the nation-state as eternal and transcendent. Throughout the 
literature on Diana within the cultic milieu, she is repeatedly tied to the nation, and this motif 
is repeated in the online material within this literature. It is, of course, paradoxical that in a 
global and globalizing medium, the reproduction of a localized national mythos should be 
reproduced. It might be suggested that Diana’s link to the nation was determined by her role 
within the British monarchy. This drawing together of Diana and the nation is, however, 
rarely done by the de facto means of her aristocratic background and her marriage into the 
British royal family; instead it is achieved through what Taussig calls ‘the spirit queen’—the 
elusive idea of the nation as it exists in myth and legend. The Web page ‘Deathwalking with 
Diana’, which seeks to interpret a series of the author’s dreams about her, suggests, ‘It would 
seem, on reflection, that the old Arthurian myth of the Grail King, who is wounded because 
of the illness of the land, which has become the Wasteland, is being superseded by a Grail 
Queen myth, personified as Diana’ (http://www.greatdreams .com/diana.html). The page is 
one of several that are featured on the ‘Great Dreams’ Web site 




reproduces a wide variety of materials originating on other Web sites that constitute the 
digital cultic milieu. 
This motif is oft repeated and, indeed, forms the basis of a number of conspiracy theories that 
have surfaced regarding Diana. Perhaps the most striking is ‘Antichrist Conspiracy 
Revealed’,11 which seeks to demonstrate that Prince William is King Arthur reborn and is 
also the Antichrist foretold in the book of Revelation. To achieve these ends, ‘a Merovingian 
Virgin was sought and found in the young and perfectly naive, Diana Spencer, the rest is 
history’. Diane Tessman’s channelling of Diana’s spirit revealed: 
I am much pleased that the song ‘Goodbye, England’s Rose’ was written in such 
a way as to link Princess Diana with The Land, which is in this particular 
incidence, England. It is reminiscent of King Arthur’s magical connection to The 
Land. As Princess Diana, I loved the land of England very much, and I still am a 
loving presence there (http://www.hammer wood.mistral.co.uk/tragic.htm). 
Repeatedly the national hero is linked to the land and to the spirit queen; in fact we might 
suggest here that Diana represents the coalescence of the national hero into the spirit queen. 
Certainly we find her, like Taussig’s statue of the Liberator, forever associated with 
marginalized groups and communities within the UK and yet always defined through her 
absence from the Royal Family. She is also always a princess, a royal sleeping beauty on an 
Avalonian island forever connected to the nation. The lyrics of ‘Goodbye, England’s Rose’ 
bind together the national Diana and the mythic Diana. In borrowing from William Blake’s 
‘Jerusalem’, Elton John cast Diana in a messianic light: 
And your footsteps will always fall here, 
Along England’s greenest hills; Your candle’s burned 
out long before Your legend ever will. 
In this Diana has legendary status conferred on her and, more pertinently here, while a large 
amount of material cited above may be considered cultural marginalia, we find in the hugely 
popular song performed at her funeral in Westminster Abbey an intimation of the eternal 
 
11 ‘Antichrist Conspiracy Revealed’, http://web.archive.org/web/20070323005548; 




presence within England of her immortal soul. Diana the seeker in the cultic milieu is thus 
recuperated, and her heterodox spirituality provides the basis for her immortalization as 
England’s spirit queen.  
 
A New Home for the Spirit Queen 
The Internet, as a medium, offers a realm of experience in which the immaterial self is 
projected into a setting that offers, via hypertext links and the endless crossroads of the search 
engines, infinite travel without movement. The philosopher Jean François Lyotard saw in the 
Internet the possibility for the production of a blueprint for humanity. He wrote: 
The electronic and information network spread over the earth gives rise to a 
global capacity for memorising which must be estimated at the cosmic scale, 
without common measure with that of traditional cultures. The paradox implied 
by this memory resides in the fact that in the last analysis it is nobody’s memory. 
But ‘nobody’ here means that the body supporting the memory is no longer an 
earth bound body. Computers never stop being able to synthesize more and more 
‘times,’ so that Liebniz could have said of this process that it is on the way to 
producing a monad much more ‘complete’ than humanity itself has ever been 
able to (1993: 64). 
Facebook and other social networking sites record the disembodied self, preserving it within 
this near-complete monad. In offering the promise of a means to free the soul from living 
body and a digitized immortality, we can see the manner in which conceptual experiences of 
the Internet converge with those offered by traditional religions, as hinted at by Beckerlegge. 
The inhabitation of the Internet as described by Novak approaches the kind of mystical and 
spiritual forms that Ernst Troeltsch suggests that intellectuals and artists who are 
disenfranchised from institutionalized religions would find appealing (1976). Cyberspace is 
at once creatively enacted through engagement while simultaneously offering the potential 




It is, for some users, further charged with a spiritual vitality through its technological 
realization of the interconnectedness of humanity.12 
This mode of experiencing cyberspace and the promise of entering a technologically novel 
realm of being in which stigmatized knowledge is freely disseminated without the editorial or 
productive limitations  associated with traditional publishing allows the rapid, globalized, 
multiplication of the cultic milieu. It is a rich ground for the spiritual seeker. The quest for 
knowledge of the spirit, self, or deistic presence is greatly aided by linkedness and easily 
searched, thus bringing Campbell’s ‘cultural underground of society’ far closer to the surface. 
Despite attempts to locate it in the everyday (see reference to Lister et al. above), it does, 
nonetheless, provide an imaginative setting for an Other world that is rife with mythological 
tropes, a world yet to come that, nonetheless, is among us. The Matrix does, still, take its cues 
from the technological separateness that we sense within the Web—that world of light on the 
other side of the screen (pace  McLuhan) or Novak’s architectures of the human imagination. 
Coupled with the seekership described by Campbell, we have a living cultic milieu in which 
seekership can be enacted and extended into an opportunity for expression. It is therefore an 
ideal context within which the apocalyptic imagination can flourish and in which prophecies 
can be shared, reformulated and re-presented in the way that 2008 became a transitional 
moment rather than the expected cataclysmic one for Michael McClellan. 
This is the terrain in which Diana, Princess of Wales, is afforded a virtual immortality as a 
digitally prophesied redeemer, iconic object-level dream messenger, or particularly, an aspect 
of an enlightened being. The audience are seekers, and it is Web searches and links from 
other Web sites that lead them through the tangled web of the cultic milieu. With movement 
(the leaf on the wind of Novak’s dreamer) directed by the seeker’s range of interest, the 
hypertextuality of the Web traces the topography of individualized and syncretic pathways 
through the cultic milieu. In this sense, Google acts as a host for unending New Age ‘fairs’ 
with stall-holders never needing to pack up and go home unless they fail to pay their hosting 
fees. The search engines, then, become intermediaries through which like-minded fellows can 
discover shared narrative spaces. This is, of course, heightened by the advent of Web 2.0 and 
 
12 We might also consider the case put forward by Erik Davis in Techgnosis: Myth, Magic and Mysticism in the 




the widespread assumption of Web sites with interactive features, particularly message 
forums and the ability to leave comments. 
Against this backdrop, the invigoration of dead Diana and her online transformation attest to 
the powerful capability of the digitized Network of Light to maintain an active afterlife for 
(the celebrity) dead. The forty-three thousand monthly visitors to the New Prophecy Web site 
—whatever their level of engagement—confirm its rationale as a disseminating node within 
the global village and contribute to the virtual apotheosis of Diana. To a global audience, 
Albion is an idealized homeland within the Virtual, and her renewal of it vouchsafes their 
shared replenishment through the networks of light and of wires. The end may be always 
imminent, but it is at least deferred until the next Web page and the next prophecy; the 
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14. From Apocalyptic Paranoia to the Mythic nation: Political extremity and myths of 
origin in the neo-fascist milieu  
Andrew Fergus Wilson 
 
Introduction 
As the nation-state undergoes a continuous and complex unravelling by the forces of global 
politics, culture and capital, there is an increased tendency for communities to become 
mobilised around ideas of ‘the nation’ which are less reliant upon the structuring effect of 
‘the state’. The nation becomes increasingly, consciously, experienced in forms of cultural 
practice and tradition and it is these knots of solidarity that maintain the bonds that exist 
between the constituent members of national communities. Celtic nationalism can be 
considered in this way, the establishment of national assemblies in Wales, Northern Ireland 
and Scotland notwithstanding. From Yeats’ aims in The Celtic Twilight to the resurgence of 
the Cornish and Breton languages, there has been a clear and conscious movement towards 
realising self-determining national identities which draw upon predominantly cultural 
resources to produce, in part, the particularities which circumscribe the resurgent national 
forms. Nonetheless, whilst such ‘nations without states’, to borrow Guibernau’s 
conceptualisation (Guibernau 1999), may point to an increasingly common mode of 
transnational identity, they are also replete with the dangers of any form of nationalism. 
Indeed, to speak of any kind of European nationalism is to run the risk of calling to mind the 
belligerent strains of nationalism unleashed by the collapse of the Soviet Union and its 
satellite states or endemic in the emergence of neo-nationalist groups such as the English 
Defence League. 
Whilst there are many examples of progressive uses of mystical or legendary ‘pasts’ within 




or the appropriation of ‘witch’ identities and practices by feminist women and men there are 
also a significant number of instances of the use of mythic national or communal pasts for 
less progressive political or ideological ends. This chapter will explore the presence of 
themes of mythical or legendary cultural and communal origins within contemporary 
nationalist discourse as they are used on internet websites dedicated to extremist nationalism. 
White nationalist discourse typically draws upon a range of cultural markers which 
incorporate Celtic identities and others into a syncretic ‘Northern European’ heritage. The 
aim is to demonstrate the manner in which these sites draw upon the polyvalency of mythic 
symbols and how the syncretic tendency within the contemporary cultic milieu uncritically 
absorbs paranoid nationalist rhetoric thus problematising commonly-held national myths and 
legends. The opportunities for networking amongst and between nationalist groups afforded 
by the internet mean that white nationalism is, paradoxically, increasingly transnational; it is 
in this context that Northern European cultural traditions have become key in the attempt by 
these groups to formulate a shared identity. 
 
Racialist Apocalyptic Paranoia 
Today, in the year 2005, approximately two percent of earth’s population is White 
female of child bearing age or younger. The White race is dead!!! Murdered by a 
coalition of Jews, Christian universalists, anti-nature dupes, opportunistic political 
whores, media moguls, over educated intellectuals, dogmatic nationalists, feminist 
fools, assorted misfits and cowards. 
The remaining whites are hopelessly integrated, terrorized, brain washed, 
miscegenated and are rapidly being overrun by six billion coloreds. As a viable entity 
with a means to survive, the white race is extinct. The few of us who resisted 
genocide are analogous to a few living cells within a corpse. (Lane 2005, §1–2) 
The quotation above comes from David Lane, a figure whose status amongst white 
supremacists borders on that of a holy martyr. Lane died in jail whilst serving consecutive 
sentences totalling some 190 years for a variety of offences committed as part of the Brüder 
Schweigen (also known as The Order, or the Silent Brotherhood). In jail he produced a 




and nationalist circles. The extract above comes from a text entitled, ‘Open Letter to a Dead 
Race,’ in which Lane calls upon white males to throw off their inhibitions and to partake of a 
racial revolution with the aim of creating a new white homeland. The possible outcomes, he 
suggests, are total: glory or a glorious death. The enemies that he describes are non-whites, 
led by a Jewish/Zionist conspiracy which has pacified and shaped the coalition described 
above: ‘Zionist control of the media, as well as of all essential power points of industry, 
finance, law and politics in the once White nations is simply fact’ (Lane 1999, 3). He sees his 
home country, the United States of America, at the heart of this conspiracy, describing its 
state symbols as coded manifestations of the conspiracy: 
Over the eagle on the Great Seal are 13 pentagonal stars which form the Star of 
David, the clear symbolism being that the United States would finalize the World 
Zionist Empire. So we see that the Pentagon is the home of the police department for 
a World Zionist government of those who use the six-pointed star. (Lane 1999, 330) 
What becomes evident in this is the rejection of the USA as the vehicle by which Lane’s 
fantasies of a racially-segregated white homeland might be reached. While, say, the Southern 
Poverty Law Center, a leading US civil rights organisation, described Lane as a ‘White 
Nationalist’ (SPLC 2010) there is little consideration of what constitutes the ‘nation’ for a 
nationalist who forswore the nation. What, then, is the white supremacist nation? It is varied 
and contested. 
Lane’s separatist outlook typifies a strand of American white supremacism which marked a 
turning away from the patriotism of traditional U.S. far right white nationalist discourse. The 
strong strand of separatism was exemplified by the establishment of the Aryan Nations 
communities during the mid 1990s. Even so, in these self-defined redoubts of Aryan folk 
there were sufficient grounds for ideological conflict between the predominantly Christian 
Identity organisers and white supremacists of other beliefs. Lane’s own spiritual history was 
one notably marked by a trajectory which shifted from the Christian Identity movement to a 
racist paganism. Lane is described as an Odinist (Gardell 2003; Kaplan 1997), or follower of 
Asatru, but he is quite precise in delineating between Odinism and his variant, Wotanism. 





So, I first chose the name Wotanism over Odinism. First because W.O.T.A.N. makes 
a perfect acronym for Will Of The Aryan Nation. Secondly because he was called 
Wotan on the European continent and only called Odin in Scandinavia. (Lane n.d.a, 
§24–25) 
Thus Lane demarcates the broad, international but ethnically discrete boundaries and beliefs 
of the ‘nation, culture, and way of life,’ that underlines his ideological outlook. The ‘racial 
imaginary’ Lane’s religious formation draws upon becomes vital in providing an historical 
re-tension for the ‘people’ he sought to defend. The tradition that is alluded to must be 
established in order to make possible the validity of the racial-cultural complex. The Northern 
European sagas, myths and religious constructs that Lane draws upon provide a geographic, 
ethnic and historical origin story for him. Many of the elements that are drawn upon are well-
established tropes of white supremacist and neo-Nazi discourse with Lane’s pan-Aryan 
mysticism a synthesis of a pre-existing racist mythos. Nicholas Goodrick-Clarke’s work on 
esoteric Nazism attests to a continuity at work within the fascist milieu (Goodrick-Clarke 
2003, 2004). 
 
Myths of Nation 
Myths of nation become crucial in this. National myths (as opposed to, say, legend or sacred 
history) are often overlooked in considerations of the ‘lore’ of a nation but it is argued by 
Misāne and Predīte that myths are ‘authorized by traditions and by their specific relation to 
sacred time and space,’ and thus are also active in the process by which ‘the nation’ is 
sacralised. In this way: 
Myths develop a sense of togetherness, they are the means by which human beings tie 
themselves to the world, feel at home there, and become the heirs of their ancestors. 
(Misāne and Predīte 1997, 160) 
The collective conscience which this implies, however, in addition to organising itself around 
shared myths (and legends and a sacred history) also draws upon the religiosity of myth as a 




aware of the pressures involved in maintaining a unity amongst a dispersed and 
(perceptually) disenfranchised community: 
24. No race of People can indefinitely continue their existence without territorial 
imperatives in which to propagate, protect, and promote their own kind. 
25. A People without a culture exclusively their own will perish. [...] 
The folk, namely the members of the Race, are the Nation. Racial loyalties must 
always supersede geographical and national boundaries. If this is taught and 
understood, it will end fratricidal wars. Wars must not be fought for the benefit of 
another race. (Lane n.d.b) 
Although ‘the Nation’ is to be territorially defined, the actual location is not of great 
consequence because the Nation, here, is founded entirely through ‘the folk’. But, again, even 
here, what is the nation that Lane and other white ‘nationalists’ appeal to? Clearly there is a 
strong sense of a shared Aryan/ Amanist destiny but the nation in which the race is realised is 
an imagined one, reliant upon a fantasy of blood purity and a ‘race-soul’. Given the 
rootedness of Lane’s ‘nationalism’ in images of Germanic heritage and spirituality and yet re-
membered in a North American context and with the express purpose of becoming a ‘Folk 
preserving religion,’ (Lane 1999, 171) the nation is imagined at once as the awakening of a 
‘Folk’ to their current and future racial destiny, but also legitimated through the appropriation 
of heathen forms as a means of providing a ‘traditional’ spiritualised ethnic identity to Lane’s 
fellow racists. Simultaneously Northern European and Northern American, it provides a 
bridge to culturally disparate white nationalists. 
Despite the emphasis that Lane places on blood and faith, his stark vision of an Aryan warrior 
race, ‘fighting to save the future’ is also one of a nation which seeks a territory, as the 24th 
precept, cited above, suggests. This search for a nation, couched in the fear-filled rhetoric of 
the paranoid spokesman, is one which is evident in much of the literature of the far right. 
English ‘national anarchist’ Troy Southgate evidences much the same paranoid nationalism 
as David Lane: 
The task we have set ourselves is a great one. The fight for race and nation – the 
renewal of the bond between blood and soil – is a cause that gives us a great sense of 




future, we can only offer a long and difficult road which is often characterised by 
disappointment and pain. (Southgate 2003b, §1) 
The terms used by Southgate are strikingly similar to those employed by Lane: ‘race’, 
‘blood’, ‘purpose’, ‘destiny’ and, indeed, the threat (or promise) of a potentially cataclysmic 
fight forever looming on the horizon of history. For all that Southgate espouses a broadly 
leftist ‘anarchist’ position, his politics are clearly racial and even in delineating his belief in 
the possibility of an anarchism that is informed by nationalism, the similarities with 
secessionist U.S. racial groups becomes increasingly evident: 
Q. Why ‘national’ anarchism? Surely nationalism is incompatible with anarchic 
principles? 
A. National-Anarchists do not support nationalism in the sense that we look to 
artificial nation-states or borders and boundaries [...] When we speak of nationhood 
we are referring to its tribal and organic implications. Therefore our concept of the 
word ‘national’ relates not to territory but to the racial identity which is a natural facet 
of all peoples. (Southgate 2006, §1) 
The cultural tolerance which is implied in the recognition of the ‘naturalness’ of ‘all peoples’ 
is negated by the racial boundaries which are suggested to have supplanted the ‘artificial 
boundaries’ of the nation-state. Again, Southgate is writing in terms recognisable to 
participants in the white racist milieu because this image of racially-defined communal 
groupings living alongside but separate from each other is one that was common to racist 
ideologues and groups in the U.K. and U.S. during the latter half of the twentieth century. For 
Southgate, just as for Lane, the central purpose appears to be to sound a call to arms in 
defence of a threatened racially-defined but territorially diverse ‘nation’. 
 
The Virtual Pan-Aryan Nation 
Who constitutes this nation is not as simple as might first be thought. For sure, there are clear 
racial boundaries but the commitment invested in a racist identity will vary enormously 
between self-identifying ‘citizens’. In Online Belongings: Fantasy, Affect and Web 




subjectivity and the role of fantasy for the cyber-subject (Ferreday 2009). This may well 
explain to some extent the ‘play’ of internet occult fascists who revel in the theatricality and 
transgression of the role whilst also being afforded the comfort of a supportive community in 
which to do so. Thus the ‘not-real’ status of virtuality provides an excuse for indulging in 
what would be ‘rejected knowledge’ (to borrow from Barkun) in any other form of mass 
communication. This gives a nebulous spectrality to the internationally dispersed but racially 
focussed white nationalist nations; around a hard core of ‘permanent nationals’ there flickers 
into and out of existence a tertiary nation of online-only self-identified members of the 
nation(s) who log on and log off from the nation. These ‘virtual nationalists’ are drawn to the 
discursivelyconstructed national ‘space’ which is constructed through the symbolically 
created and linked network of nationalist sites and signifiers. Speaking of web communities 
in general, Ferreday writes: 
By reading websites as texts, it is possible to track the precise means by which a 
‘sense of community’ is constructed: through intonation, through explicit or implicit 
addresses to an ‘ideal’ reader, through intertextual references and hypertextual links, 
to name but a few. (Ferreday 2009, 54) 
It is clear from both Lane and Southgate that the ‘ideal reader’ is white (and predominantly 
male) and the white Aryan nation is repeatedly explicitly addressed en masse and 
individually, whilst less overtly racist discourse relies upon the implicit intertextualities to 
which the myths of the Aryan nation are able to allude. Simi and Futrell describe the 
importance of internet communities to individual white supremacists for it is here that many 
geographically isolated racists coalesce into an indefinable social group (Simi and Futrell 
2010). What is of key pertinence here is that they note that ‘embracing the Aryan aesthetic 
and conveying the commitment to others online sustains members’ identification with the 
collective “we” of the movement’ (Simi and Futrell 2010, 89). Thus, the aesthetic realm 
becomes crucial in maintaining the idea of a shared (national/ racial) collectivity. Of course, 
the cultural dimension is a key informant of national identity and one of the means by which 
the idea of any nation is mobilised and maintained. For the disparate ‘nationalists without a 
nation’, however, it may become the sole means by which they are able to construct an 
identity out of affiliation as opposed to (racial) difference. In a different context, Douglas 
Cowan describes the possibilities that the internet offers for exploring the cultic milieu and 




particular benefits [...] are the potential for community represented by the Internet and the 
stage for the experimental performance of identity that it provides’ (Cowan 2005, 199). Thus, 
it is here that the appropriation of Northern European spirituality and myth become active in 
the construction of the tertiary virtual nationalist community. It is argued that the use of 
polyvalent myths of ‘tradition’ and ‘spirit’ are purposefully drawn upon by a primary core of 
Aryan nationalists to act as lures and fetishes for tertiary virtual nationalists and for potential 
converts. Before examining an example of how mythic archetypes of an Aryan nation are 
rehearsed within the paratext of white nationalist discourse, it is useful to explore further the 
intangible but always present ‘spirit’ of the nation. 
 
The Spirit of The Nation 
In The Magic of the State, Michael Taussig captures the irreducibility of the role of the 
‘spirit’ of the nation in the popular imagination of a people (Taussig 1997). Based upon 
fieldwork in Venezuela, The Magic of The State is written from an intellectual space that sits 
between the academy and ethnography, documentary and fiction. The magic that the state 
draws upon to maintain the national ‘whole’ is conveyed well in the interplay between the 
nation’s ‘spirit queen’, its other national archetypes, and its subjects. The spirit queen is 
appealed to by, and possesses, willing worshippers; she invests the landscape with meaning 
and power whilst revealing occult secrets of the nation, illuminating memory, ‘the spirit 
queen, enigmatically smiling in her mountain with the spirits of the dead’ (Taussig 1997, 
147). 
Taussig explores the use of the power of the dead by the nation-state and by its subjects in 
drawing upon the state’s invocation of that power. He suggests that it is the reified mythos of 
the nation of the dead that underpins a nation state’s claim to power. In an interview he 
makes evident this relationship: 
People today gain magical power not from the dead, but from the state’s 
embellishment of them. And the state, authoritarian and spooky, is as much possessed 




The Aryan nation-without-a-state does not have a dead-nation publicly preserved in war 
memorials, statues and the like; instead its shrines are frequently virtual, dispersed and 
largely hidden to all but the nation itself. Lane himself survives predominantly through 
repositories of his writing. Indeed, the sidebar menu of the main online resource for Lane’s 
writings (David Lane’s Pyramid Prophecy and Der Bruder Schweigen Archives) is headed by 
RIP notices for Lane and other key white supremacists, Bruce Carroll Pierce and Robert J. 
Matthews. The pages dedicated to them feature eulogies, personal memories and photographs 
of commemorative occasions (in some instances the term ‘rituals’ might be applied but in 
general would be too suggestive of a uniformity of event). In each instance the dead are 
described as heroes, martyrs; in Lane’s writings similar epithets are used about earlier white 
supremacists and, of course, his appropriation of Wotanism borrows from long-dead (albeit 
recently revived) traditions. And so the Aryan nation to which Lane and others appealed and 
belonged becomes sedimented in these layers of death, of the dead Lane referring to yet more 
dead and, through them, the embellished dead provide the ‘magical’ centripetal forces that 
hold the virtual nation together. In these myths of dead heroes and Gods, the neo-fascist 
Aryan nationalists re-imagine a lost nation which is bequeathed a (borrowed, stolen) past that 
predates historical memory. 
Taussig’s work allows us to consider the ephemeral plane upon which the popular 
performance of the nation is sometimes staged. As such he is supplementing rationalist 
accounts of the nation with one that considers the mystic-spiritual dimension of ‘belonging’. 
In a similar vein, so too does the work of Walker Connor, except he disassociates that sense 
of belonging from any consideration of the state and concentrates instead on the intangible 
bonds between the individual and the greater national community. So, rather than the bonds 
between a subject and the institutions and infrastructures that constitute the state, Connor’s 
work places its emphasis upon the bonds between the people that constitute a nation. 
Connor’s concept of ‘ethnonationalism’ is useful in that it foregrounds the ‘deep emotional 
thrust’ that unites a people in ‘the irrational belief that, descending from common ancestors, 
we are all related and form part of the same “extended family”’ (Conversi 2002, 2). Connor 
offers an account of nationalism as it is produced and maintained subjectively, that is to say 
that he demonstrates the emotional and imaginative work that is done to mobilise national 
identity. It is here that the role of myths of national belonging and destiny are at their most 
fecund. Further, by emphasising the centrality of ethnicity to nationalism, he underscores the 




fabric of national identity and he points to its use in successive phases of American history 
(independence and union – the failure of the English to recognise their consanguinous ties 
and the ancestral blood shared by the ‘people’ of the union; Connor 1994, 200–1). 
Whilst being an important if unrecognised element in established nations, the emphasis upon 
ties of kin loyalty is evidently more keenly felt in racialist discourses of nation and comes to 
the fore in the narratives in which the nation is invoked or theorised. Lane’s renown within 
the racist underground was founded upon his actions as part of the Der Bruder Schweigen; 
the kin affinity that lay behind their nationalist identities made evident through their 
nomenclature. The far right, in diverse ways, are actively constructing a mythic past from 
which destiny has borne them. The process is not unique to the current generation of mystic 
racialists as Nicholas Goodrick-Clarke’s work attests. Nonetheless, it is an endeavour that is 
currently augmented by the huge expansion of the individual subject’s capacity to 
disseminate their views and materials pertaining to them on the internet. 
It is here that we see the setting in which the subcultural drift of signifiers of the far-right 
milieu may occur. Increasingly, websites promoting the ideologies of the Aryan mystics are 
multi-faceted and incorporate elements that are bereft of overt ideological content. Although 
inactive since ‘Walpurgis Night’ 2009, Troy Southgate’s ‘SYNTHESIS: Journal du cercle de 
la rose noire’ (http:// www.rosenoire.org/) is emblematic of this trend1. The site is presented 
as an ‘irregularly-published intellectual and cultural journal devoted to Anarchy [...]  
Occulture [...] and Metapolitics’ (Southgate 2003a) and features a RomanticGothic design 
ethic that is maintained throughout the site’s various sections. These are given over to 
reviews, articles, essays, interviews and two sections of hyperlinks, one dedicated to links to 
individual books on amazon.com and the other to a range of subject material. In all sections 
there is a diversity of content that would belie the site’s nature were it not that the 
preponderance of texts are by figures associated with the mystical fascist milieu such as 
Miguel Serrano and Julius Evola. On the surface, the choices of text might appear to be the 
accidental cultural drifting of a blogger with European New Right tendencies were it not for 
Southgate’s active espousal of ‘national anarchism’ and a stated strategy of entryism: 
This new way is entryism, working within society’s institutions and organisations 
with committed revolutionaries. At this stage in our development, it is the only logical 





Thus familiar cultural texts become lures by which active seekers become immersed in an 
intertext that is predominantly formed from neo-Nazi cultural obsessions and icons. As will 
be discussed below, a semiotic drift from the cultural underground to the neo-fascist 
underworld occurs and, on the grounds of Southgate’s statement above, it would appear to be 
a purposeful misdirecting of the seekers’ curiosity. Despite competing visions of a racially 
‘correct’ religious belief, Betty Dobratz indicates the manner in which perceived ideological 
alignment between religious identity and racialism can be used as a bridging technique by 
racist groups (Dobratz 2001); Southgate’s aims affirm her analysis. 
Of course, it can be suggested that neo-fascism is subject to the same cultural tides and 
patterns as other formations within a culture; that its intertext is formed from a syncretic 
tendency within its national source. In a discussion of a suggested predilection for violence in 
American culture, Denis Dudos makes the case that festivals of the dead with a strong Nordic 
origin (such as Halloween, Alfablot, and Yuletide) have embedded within the broader host 
culture an obsession with their themes and, ultimately, the deeply encoded remnants of 
Odinist warrior cultures. He states that: 
If the neo-Nazis and their ‘intellectual’ supporters have espoused a ‘traditional’ 
interpretation of these holidays, this should not hide the fact this secret obsession with 
death has arisen – to the point of permeating international culture – from the Gothic 
British novel and later from American syncretism and its fictional film versions. It 
was not by ‘purist’ Nordic-culture enthusiasts selling earthenware incense burners 
decorated with swastikas that this myth was introduced, but, more trivially, by the sale 
of Halloween gadgets and the international toy industry. (Dudos 1998, 150) 
Leaving aside the ease with which Dudos equates ‘neo-Nazis’ with ‘Nordic-culture 
enthusiasts’, it should be noted that if Dudos is correct in this assertion then the semantic 
pathways which Southgate and his allies seek to exploit are already well-travelled and easily 
mapped. It will be suggested below that the heavy metal webzine Mourning The Ancient 
(http://www.mourningtheancient. com) exploits this shared semantic space to generate an 
association between neo-fascism, a David Lane-inspired Odinism, ‘magick’2 and heavy 
metal. To be sure, these associations are not unique, nor is Mourning the Ancient seminal, but 
what the webzine does attempt to do is to produce a visual manifestation of the neo-fascist 




to heavily stylised erotic images of (white) women in a variety of mythically-inspired 
scenarios. 
 
Imagining the Mythic Homeland 
The ‘extreme metal’ website Mourning the Ancient is divided into three sections. The main 
section, certainly the one with the most content, is dedicated to an eponymous webzine which 
features interviews with bands, music reviews, poetry, articles and other related documents; 
the second is primarily a collection of images of women in what might best be described as 
‘white nationalist archetypal scenarios’; the third section is dedicated to a band named 
‘Primitive Supremacy’ which initially provided backing music to CD-based slideshows of 
images that visited the same themes as those featured in the second section of the website 
before recording a music-only CD. 
The index page of the site presents visitors with a choice between the three sections with each 
one represented by a banner logo. 3 These banners offer pictorial and linguistic devices which 
reflect the website’s repeated concerns: the colour palette is simplistic, echoing the colours of 
the Nazi swastika flag design: red, black and white; a slogan proclaims, ‘Tomorrow belongs 
to us!’ The webzine section is indicated by a blonde woman wearing an iconic German 
WWII Stahlhelm helmet emblazoned with the site’s logo. The logo is repeated throughout the 
website and is described in suitable self-mythologizing terms as being the product of a 
‘vision’: 
As the vision unfolded the coming winter, the symbol of our doings, the ‘Expansion 
Rune’ (the five pointed star with four points reaching outward) was born. We 
designed this using two ancient runes. The ‘pentagram’ and the ‘expansion points.’ 
While both can be found in a number of ancient cultures, the five pointed star was 
known in some as a ‘symbol of truth.’ The two runes combined can be defined as ‘the 
expansion of truth.’ (Mourning the Ancient 2001, §2) 
The banner for the photography section features two images of a blonde woman, one with 
blood dripping from her mouth whilst in the other she looks more serene, wearing a tiara of 




Barbarity Meet...’ The third section, the band’s area, has the slogan ‘Melody and Madness’ 
and is decorated with images of a mud-encrusted woman clutching a skull. These visual 
themes abound on the website and all of the images are taken from the photography section. 
Throughout the site there is an emphasis on loss, decline and a championing of a mythic past; 
this past is a syncretic amalgamation of Germanic, pagan, heathen, martial, magickal and 
Gothic visual tropes. This combination of themes provides a register of elements from which 
the aesthetic of a racially-defined, geographically-dispersed, neo-fascist nation is realised. 
That this register is composed mostly of polysemic signs which are not exclusive to the neo-
fascist community points to the scope for the entryism that Southgate described. It must be 
said that this may well be one of the inherent dangers of a past unfixed from common 
knowledge; as possible readings of poorly understood beliefs proliferate and what is firmly 
known of them becomes overwhelmed by speculation, they then become increasingly 
available for appropriation and reductionist perversion by disparate groupings within the 
fascist milieu. 
In the photography section of Mourning the Ancient a variety of images of nude and semi-
nude female models are offered. It is within these images that the website produces an 
imagined iconography for their particular rendering of the mythical neo-fascist nation. With 
the over-riding theme of ‘beauty’ and ‘barbarity’, fifty galleries are filled with photographs of 
heavy breasted women in, for want of a better phrase, ‘cultic tableaux’. The images are a 
curious meeting between ‘glamour modelling’ and atavistic primitivism with neofascist 
mystic overtones: gallery six (‘Krieg’) contains the original of the image used for the webzine 
banner, a topless model in Stalhelm and ‘Expansion Rune’ armband; gallery eleven (‘Fallen’) 
has the same model naked barring thickly encrusted mud, in this set she sports a set of wings, 
nipple rings and a sword and cavorts with skulls; unlike six and eleven, gallery sixteen 
(‘Blut’) is in colour and features a blonde, blue-eyed woman who is naked and smeared in 
what appears to be blood; gallery fourteen (‘Magick’) features, once more, a topless blonde 
model. In this set she poses with a sword and large book of antiquarian appearance within a 
two circles marked out on the floor and containing candles at the cardinal points, she also 
wears a pair of deer antlers. The images border on camp but the intent is clear: to invoke a 
mythical past which is marked by a primal simplicity in addition to tokens of the cultic and 




Our photography, to us, represents many different thoughts and emotions, but 
primarily, anger and sorrow. It is those two emotions that have fueled us since day 
one. An anger and burning contempt for the lies paraded as truth in this tired world, 
and a bitter sorrow for the seemingly powerless position all of us stand. [...] ‘Light’ 
has always been seen as symbolic of truth, life and guidance. In this reckless age all 
three are reaching their points of extinction. [...] We long for the simple truths and 
freedoms of yesterday. Which is why our photography usually centers on more 
natural, antique themes. (Mourning the Ancient 2001, §5–6) 
Their sense of loss carries the same melancholic apocalypticism that is found the writings of 
David Lane. Mourning the Ancient has clear sympathies with Lane’s position and the 
repeated use of Aryan women in the website’s imagery can be understood as representing the 
fertile vessels through which Lane’s future, as demanded in ‘the fourteen words’, is to be 
secured. Additionally, the website includes an essay which recounts Lane’s life and views 
and includes an interview with Lane (Mourning the Ancient 2003) and, although the website 
davidlane1488.org is the primary internet resource for Lane’s writing, it is worth noting that 
the Wikipedia entry for David Lane’s interpretation of Wotanism links to an article by Lane 
posted at Mourning the Ancient and not davidlane1488. org (Lane n.d.a). In addition to 
Lane’s writing and links to websites sympathetic to him, Mourning the Ancient also features, 
amidst interviews with heavy metal groups of a variety of political leanings, interviews with 
the webmaster of racist Wotanist website, W.O.T.A.N. and with the current editor of the 
works of the Nazi mystic Savitri Devi. The romanticised ancient past that is being mourned is 
clearly a racially distinct one. 
As stated, the images featured in the gallery pages of Mourning the Ancient are varied but 
thematically linked; visual tropes suggestive of mythic archetypes abound and, whilst neo-
fascist belief is never overtly referred to in the images, the context of the website’s political 
leanings frames the interpretative strategies open to the viewer. Typifying the tropic 
repetition is the ninety-seventh image from gallery forty-one (‘Satori in Red’). In the centre 
of the image stands a blonde woman in a red micro bikini, a few strands of her fringe are 
dyed red, her face is made up in kabuki style, around her neck is an Iron Cross. Painted in red 
on a white backdrop, a series of runes frame the model. Eihwaz dominates the backdrop, five 
others encircle it and the model’s crotch obscures the position that the spatial logic of the 




runes and suggests a pseudo-connotative chain (Eco 1995) which sets sexual desire and 
spiritual iconography in relation to each other, but not dependent upon each other, for 
meaning. Thus the viewer can drift (ibid.) between sexual and spiritual readings of the image, 
all the time contextualised by the white supremicism that underlines the rationale of 
Mourning the Ancient. The central rune, Eihwaz, is also known as Wolfsangel and associated 
with Berserker werewolves and, pertinently, a number of Nazi divisions including the late 
and post-war Werwolf guerrilla groups (Biddiscombe 1998). Boyd Rice, of Death in June, 
has made frequent use of the symbol and it is in this context that it is most well known in 
popular culture, although it is also an actively used sigil within the Church of Satan. These 
two currents converge in an online forum called ‘(The Satanic Network’s) Undercroft’. In a 
thread dating from 2006, a Magister of the Church of Satan advertises the sale of a limited 
edition silver ‘Wolfshook/ Wolfangle’ ring. On the fourth page of replies and responses, the 
original poster makes a further post which includes an attached jpeg graphic file showing 
Boyd Rice wearing the Wolfsangel ring (Magister Lang 2007). 
 
Conclusion 
It is in this fertile co-mingling of popular culture and the cultic milieu that Mourning The 
Ancient operates. At once drawing upon the national-spiritual resonances of appropriated 
Scando-Germanic heathenism, whilst resetting them within a sexualised subcultural context, 
Mourning the Ancient satisfies both post-pubescent fantasies of available and objectified 
women and the imagery of the subculture. Fecund and flirtatious, the spirit queen that 
Taussig identifies in a Venezuelan barrio is here transtemporal, emerging from a long lost 
(read: newly invented) past, shrouded in myth and magic and bearing an ancient knowledge. 
It is in this nexus of myth, longing and desire that the neo-fascist nation is imagined and it is 
heavily charged with a spirituality that becomes embodied in the warrior-woman imagery of 
Mourning the Ancient. The valkyries ride out to heavy metal in neo-fascist corners of the 
world wide web. 
The imagery of Mourning the Ancient lends weight to the neo-fascist appropriation of 
Northern European heathenism. It recasts the runes, already much abused by Nazism past and 
present, in a self-mythologising setting of sexualised spirit queen and subcultural alterity. 




sometimes be associated with subcultures. Mourning the Ancient’s sympathies with David 
Lane are evident and Lane is in no doubt of his ‘destiny’ in shaping a modern day racial 
heathenism: 
To that end I began teaching an updated form of our most common indigenous 
religion about 20 years ago. Its major deity is called Wotan, or Odin or Woden. 
Updated to be racial rather than tribal, and to remove any conflict with modern 
science. The Gods, Goddesses and myths of Wotanism represent the forces of Nature. 
[...] History shows that a religion must have a founder, often called a “prophet.” Since 
no one else assumed that role, I have done so. (Lane c.2002, §4) 
Through an association with Lane’s messianic atavistic racism, Mourning the Ancient 
becomes a virtual safehouse for racist ideas as well as a cultural resource for dreaming the 
Wotanist nation into being. The webzine section co-mingles relatively well known heavy 
metal bands, such as Deicide and Carcass, with more obscure ones, many of the latter, such 
as Pagan Hellfire and Capricornus/ Thor’s Hammer, being identified with far-right politics. 
The bleak outlook shared by many heavy metal artists, intensified in the lyrics and imagery of 
what Keith Kahn-Harris describes as ‘extreme metal’, is here used to provide an apparent 
coincidence of perspective between the better known acts and the obscure nationalist groups. 
Whilst a band such as Deicide, described by Kahn-Harris as typifying extreme metal’s 
‘discursive transgression’ (Kahn-Harris 2007, 34–43) are certainly bleak, if not apocalyptic, 
in their lyrics they could not be characterised as subscribing to the kind of racial apocalypse 
that David Lane espoused. Nonetheless, bassist and vocalist Glen Benton’s 1998 interview 
with Mourning the Ancient touches upon his wish to limit immigration to the U.S., on 
excessive taxation, surveillance and the kind of anti-federalist conservatism that would now 
be associated with the Tea Party (Benton 1998). His political views are conservative, 
certainly, however it is only in the context of interviews with avowed fascists such as 
Sturmfuhrer that the reader’s interpretation becomes framed within a neo-fascist register. 
Although there is no concrete connection between Southgate and Mourning the Ancient, this 
interweaving of subcultural texts and spiritual belief with racial nationalism on the Mourning 
the Ancient website intertextually insinuates neofascist values into broader cultural 
consumption. This then is the cultural tactic proposed by Southgate and described by George 
Macklin as an attempt to ‘forge the ‘political space’ necessary for political and racial 




attempt by ‘elements of the organized far right who are trying to use a “metapolitical” 
strategy of intervention to fight their fascist kulturkampf’(Fringeli 2011). The recent motion 
picture Thor (2011), itself an adaption of the popular Marvel Comics strip, further 
sedimented a germinal idea of the Norse pantheon in the popular imagination but the neo-
fascist right has been active in digging over the ground within which these seeds can grow. 
Here, at the heart of the neofascist project, is an attempt to colonise the past and to reinvent 
the religion and myths of a people long dead. David Lane reinvented and recontextualised 
those beliefs within a violent racism whilst projects such as Mourning the Ancient have 
promulgated Lane’s modern myths of ‘Wotan’. In doing so, the waters of what constitutes 
Northern European paganism become increasingly muddied by the neo-fascist jackboot. For 
instance, the well-established Danish neo-pagan community Forn Siðr has been forced to 
make a statement distancing itself from neo-fascist use of its symbols.4 The building of a 
deterritorialized neo-fascist nation is a project that draws upon and colonises existing cultural 
constructs, forcing them to be re-read within the terms set by the virtual nationalists. It is thus 
that a set of beliefs which are recognisable but poorly understood slowly become eclipsed by 
the black sun and neo-fascist groupuscules are able to build myths of their own. It is clear 
here, then, that myth is always an ongoing project, it is re-visited, reworked, and revised and, 
crucially, must be contested and rewon when attempts are made to appropriate it in ways that 
would crush its polysemous pleasures into a solitary, bleak, vision. 
This, then, is the dilemma faced by a resurgent Celtic nationalism. On the one hand there is 
the call to redeem marginalised and silenced cultures and yet, on the other, is the dangers of 
tarrying with an embittered rhetoric which intersects with the exclusionary outlook of 
extremist nationalism. The stakes are clear: for those national communities, be they existing 
nation-states or ‘nations without a state’, whose past is being pilfered by extremist nationalist 
projects, there is a need to consolidate their cultural history in terms which reduce the 
polyvalency of the symbols drawn upon extremists. For nations supported by the institutions 
of a state have at their disposal the means to shore up the parameters of their cultural vision 
through galleries, museums and educational curricula which narrate the national concerns but 
for nations-without-a-state, there are diminished opportunities to do so. In some cases, they 
must negotiate with institutions that reflect colonial cultural and linguistic dominance. Thus 
the importance of works such as the present one become much clearer: in revisiting and 
revitalising the spirit of the Celtic nation in ways which illuminate its richly diverse and, at 




of cultural tropes which might otherwise provide nationalist extremists with the basis from 
which to fashion their myths of nation. 
 
Notes 
1. Synthesis has been taken offline and Southgate’s efforts appear to now be focussed 
upon ‘National Anarchism’. 
2. I have placed magick in inverted commas here to denote that whilst the website uses 
iconography associated with magickal systems, it does not do so within a framework 
which could be identified as belonging to any one magickal system and, as such, can 
be seen as a generalised ‘populist magick’. 
3. Since this chapter was written the website has modified a number of its images but the 
symbolic paradigm is maintained. 
4. The English language homepage of Forn Siðr states explicitly, ‘We wish to make it 
clear that Nazi activity, or misuse of pagan symbols for Nazi purposes IS NOT 
compatible with membership of Forn Siðr.’ Available from HTTP: <http://www. 
fornsidr.dk/dk/17> (accessed 5 July 2011). 
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Chapter 16. From Mushrooms to the Stars: 2012 and the Apocalyptic Milieu 
Andrew Fergus Wilson 
  
2012 and the Beginnings of the End Date?  
The ‘2012 industry’ continues apace and variations on the 2012 theme proliferate but they do 
so within the context of an existing field of prophetic activity. Despite a number of core texts 
which, in general terms, shape the scope of 2012 apocalyptic prophecy it is notable that a 
selection of narratival effects associated with earlier apocalyptic discourse formation are 
present within 2012 apocalyptic prophecy. This chapter, then, is an attempt to demonstrate 
the embeddedness of 2012 discourse within existing currents of apocalyptic prophecy and 
also argues the case for an ‘apocalyptic milieu’ which intersects a variety of North American 
and European Christian beliefs, popular culture and emerging religious formations.  
In 1971, still enraptured with the hippie ideals of 1960s California, Terence McKenna, his 
brother Dennis and a small band of fellow travellers, embarked on a journey into fresh fields 
of physical and mental space. Travelling to La Chorerra in Amazonian Columbia in search of 
new psychedelic experiences they, ‘were involved, [Terence McKenna] imagined, in a deep 
jungle search for … plants containing the orally active drug di-methyltryptamine (or DMT) 
and the psychedelic brew ayahuasca … the patterns of their use, which were unique to the 
Amazon jungles, had not been fully studied’ (McKenna 1993: 2–3). With a desire to produce 
a visionary anthropology which McKenna termed ‘ethnobotany’, they sought innovative 
perspectives on the relationship between humans, consciousness, worship and psychoactive 
natural substances. In the midst of this journey, they experienced a series of revelations which 
they believed afforded them new understandings of history and its progress.  
After their return, Terence revealed his theory of the zero time wave (McKenna and 
McKenna 1975), a cyclical conception of history which described the presence of ‘novelty’ in 




or density of connectedness versus disorder’ (McKenna and McKenna 1993: 171). Upon 
returning to California he became transported by a series of revelatory theories based on his 
jungle experiences, his brother Dennis’ mathematical knowledge and contemplation of the I 
Ching. McKenna describes a conception of history in which progress is spurred by 
successive, regular waves of ‘novelty’; ‘These waves are discrete periods of change … I 
came to realize that the internal logic of the timewaves strongly implied a termination of 
normal time and an end to ordinary history’ (1993: 161). He suggested that at a number of 
rare but predictable points in history a heightened intensification of the flow of novelty would 
produce a dramatic alteration of human consciousness. This would usher in a new phase in 
human history, new forms of thought would emerge and humanity would be transformed; 
writing in the second half of the twentieth century he understood human history to be 
involved in, ‘a long cascade into greater and greater novelty that reaches its culmination early 
in the twenty-first century’ (1993: 161).  
These revelations of the time wave concept are at the heart of one strand of the 2012 
phenomenon and McKenna also provided inspiration to the author of the other central strand, 
José Argüelles’ interpretation of the Mayan calendar: ‘My meeting with Terence McKenna 
… contributed greatly to this understanding of the Mayan factor … So it was that I threw 
myself with renewed abandon into the Mayan Factor’ (Argüelles 1996: 39). Although 
initially McKenna did not identify a clear date beyond the vague allusion to a point ‘early in 
the twenty-first century’, according to the second edition of The Invisible Landscape, and 
also in popular belief, Friday 21 December 2012 is one of those points and humanity is 
rushing towards a dramatic transformation. In its most basic structure this account fits a 
recognisable pattern of millenarian prophecy: a visionary or seer returns from a spiritualised 
space (whether it be a ‘holy place’ or mental construct) with a message of a soon-to-come 
moment in which humanity will experience profound and irreversible change in material and 
mental life. This transformative journey and redemptive promise is a familiar refrain and one 
which is used to offer hope to disparate communities of believers from across the spectrum of 
faiths, from the mainstream and diverse splinters and schisms of the world religions to small-
scale groups of believers awaiting a variety of hidden masters, redeemers and/or paradisiacal 
living.1 Although associated with religious belief it should be noted that secular beliefs can 
 
1 Continuum’s three-volume set The Encyclopedia of Apocalypticism gives some indication of the global range 
and diversity of apocalyptic beliefs whilst also demonstrating the continuities and discontinuities between 




also be understood within this apocalyptic framework. For instance, the inherent promise of 
Marxism is founded upon a teleology that has a strong whiff of the eschatological about it: a 
paradise on Earth (the dictatorship of the proletariat) will follow a period of cataclysmic 
change (revolution) brought about by selected ‘messengers’ (the vanguard party). So, for 
example, Hall (2009), Zimdars-Swartz and ZimdarsSwartz (2000) and Baumgartner (1999) 
consider the millenarian aspects of Marx whilst other writers also look at the manner in 
which, say, environmentalism can be understood as an apocalyptic belief (Lee 1995) or the 
widespread fear of nuclear war during the 1970s and 1980s (Beres 1980, Wojcik 1997). With 
the exception of Marxist utopian hopes, secular apocalyptic prophecy tends to be dystopian 
whereas faith-based prophecies of the end tend to have utopian outcomes for ‘the faithful’.  
2012 prophecy is rooted within ideas, attitudes and beliefs that tend to be associated with 
New Age belief and tends towards a utopian outcome with human consciousness having 
evolved and with this providing the basis for a coming golden age. The two primary sources 
of 2012 prophecy – Terence McKenna’s time wave zero date and José Argüelles’ reading of 
the Mayan calendar – are rooted in New Age tendencies and beliefs. Both suggest the kind of 
radical transformation that is implicit in what Paul Heelas (1996) describes as the spiritually 
purist and the counter-cultural tendencies within New Age belief. Being primarily syncretic 
in nature the New Age absorbs elements of faith traditions and secular beliefs and 
knowledge.  
In general terms, the threads which form the weft and weave of the New Age can be 
characterised as ‘stigmatised knowledge’, to use Michael Barkun’s formulation (Barkun 
2003), that is to say beliefs and insights that are seen to have been suppressed, ignored or 
rejected by conventional wisdom. Whilst Barkun developed this idea to build upon Colin 
Campbell’s (1972) earlier concept of the ‘cultic milieu’ it should be considered that the cultic 
milieu still has relevance to emergent forms of non-traditional religiosity in general and to 
2012 prophecy in particular (see also Jean-François Mayer, Chapter 19, this volume). The 
cultic milieu describes the sharing and spread of new, or re-discovered, forms of stigmatised 
knowledge amongst an ever-shifting body of ‘spiritual seekers’ who consume, syncretise and 
constantly renew and disseminate the ideas they encounter. Whilst their origins can be traced 
to the cultic milieu, it is argued here that the 2012 prophecies are not wholly distinct from 





In the Soil of American Apocalyptic Millennialism  
The Western world has seen its history shaped, to a large extent, by Judeo-Christian beliefs 
and values. Until relatively recently the expectation of the fulfilment of biblical prophecy was 
a prevailing motif within culture and belief across Europe and beyond. Norman Cohn (1957) 
inspired academic work looking at populist apocalyptic belief with his detailed study of 
millennial prophecy and chiliastic uprisings in Europe during the Middle Ages. Such beliefs 
were not limited to the dispossessed of the European Middle Ages; amidst the early stirrings 
of modernity and towards the end of the Middle Ages, the New World was encountered by 
European explorers partially inspired by the hope of discovering allies with whom to defeat 
an Ottoman empire that was identified with the Antichrist of Revelation (Baumgartner 1999). 
Christopher Columbus was a collector of millennial prophecies and believed he was engaged 
in God’s work, fulfilling prophecy as, ‘the messenger of the new heaven and the new earth of 
which [God] spoke in the Apocalypse of St. John … and he showed me the spot where to find 
it’ (Baumgartner 1999: 120).  
A century and a half later, Puritan settlers fleeing persecution in England brought radical 
millennial visions to the northern territories of the American continent. In seeking to escape 
the perceived tyranny of a Europe which they condemned for its intolerance towards their 
beliefs, their faith-based exile provided the inspiration from which a strong, geographically 
rooted, millennial desire could be drawn. Following an initial wave of apocalyptic preachers 
such as the Mather family and Samuel Danforth in New England, millennial discourse 
expanded along the Atlantic coast of North America during the eighteenth century and has 
ebbed and flowed within and across the US thereafter (see, for instance, Boyer 1992, Wojcik 
1997).  
With a post-aboriginal origin myth into which millennial prophecy is woven, the US has 
shown itself to be particularly prone to a continued susceptibility to belief in the impending 
immanentisation of the Christian eschaton. Although the recent doomsday prophet Harold 
Camping provides an example of the way in which Christian prophecy has, to some extent, 
fallen onto a less than fully accepting public ear it should be remembered that relatively 
recent US presidents such as John F. Kennedy and Ronald Reagan have drawn upon the 
symbolism of John Winthrop’s 1630 ‘City on the Hill’ speech. In each instance the America 
described is one to which other nations look for example just as the New Jerusalem of 




are saved shall walk in the light of it’ (Revelation 21:24). Indeed, it has been argued by Philip 
Jenkins that the American religious mainstream, ‘remains what it has been since colonial 
times: a fundamentalist evangelicism with powerful millenarian strands’ (Jenkins 2000: 5).  
Just as Kennedy’s Catholicism was not immune to the millenarian pull at the heart of 
American spiritual life, it is possible to see the extent to which an apocalyptic outlook has 
shaded numerous cultural expressions within the US. Whilst there is a very strong tradition of 
writing the apocalypse and the millennium into overtly Christian literature, film and other 
cultural forms it is also the case that secular popular culture has adopted apocalyptic tropes 
which proceed from and transform the Christian millennial tradition whilst retaining much of 
the imagery and structure of apocalyptic prophecy. This is a commonplace stance within 
much academic literature and rightly so for the fictional depiction of a wide variety of 
utopian and dystopian pre-, post- and mid-apocalyptic scenarios has been the basis of many 
popular culture texts (Forbes and Kilde 2004, Gribben 2009). The flow of ideas is not 
straightforwardly unidirectional and secular themes can feed back into religious visions of the 
end just as secular texts may produce worldly variations on religious end time stories.  
Conrad Ostwalt (1998) makes a strong case for the extent to which popular culture reflects an 
ongoing fascination with apocalyptic narratives but in a form that is more suited to a culture 
in which secularisation plays an increasingly powerful role, ‘[S]ecularization has not done 
away with the apocalyptic consciousness. Rather it has assisted in creating a new apocalyptic 
myth, one that is more palatable to contemporary, popular culture’ (Oswalt 1998: §19). 
Secular and religious fictions both spin around the apocalyptic centrifugal centre, their paths 
crossing endlessly. The receptivity to apocalyptic prophecy in, and of, the US is one of the 
currents in which 2012 prophecy emerges. Both genuinely held beliefs regarding a fast 
approaching end times and works of the imagination constitute an ‘apocalyptic milieu’ which 
permeates American cultural and spiritual life. The apocalyptic milieu is one that is well 
established and provides the intertextual framework in which the 2012 prophecies are 
rendered meaningful.  
 




Christian prophecy is an on-going feature of American culture in general but there has also 
been a flourishing of prophecies which have emerged from the so-called New Age or ‘cultic 
milieu’ which has prospered in post-Second World War America, Europe and as the 
twentieth century closed, amongst cosmopolitan populations worldwide. Although indebted 
to nineteenth-century precedents such as Theosophy and currents of Victorian esotericism, 
the New Age flourished during the latter half of the twentieth century. It is deeply syncretic 
in nature and borrows from and blends a range of religious and spiritual beliefs. This constant 
absorption of diverse beliefs means that it is peculiarly open to new developments but it also 
remains, in essence, concerned with the development of a deep inner spirituality although, as 
Heelas suggests, this is manifest across a broad spectrum from world rejecting to world 
affirming (Heelas 1996, see also Sutcliffe 2003 on the limitations of the term ‘New Age’). 
Whilst the 2012 prophecies are generally recognised to have their basis in the writing of 
Terrence McKenna and José Argüelles, their substance has undergone numerous reinventions 
as they have been embraced and resituated in a variety of spiritual frameworks within the 
broad, loose church of the New Age.  
The manner in which Dorothy Martin’s failed prophecies of the 1950s and her subsequent 
spiritual journey have been incorporated into several New Age understandings of the 2012 
prophecies is typical of the manner in which ideas dormant within the cultic milieu can be re-
invented and re-absorbed into dominant currents within the milieu. Over half a century prior 
to the current predictions of global cataclysm, Dorothy Martin (later Sister Thedra of the 
Association of Sananda and Samat Kumara) found fame of sorts as the source of a failed 
prophecy of the world’s end on 21 December 1954. The prophecy was received in a series of 
psychic contacts between enlightened beings (‘the Guardians’) from the planet Clarion and 
Dorothy Martin during August 1954. It was claimed the world would be ‘purified’ by 
flooding before the formation of new land masses and the re-emergence of the lost continent 
of Mu. Humans who accepted and were responsive to the Clarion call would be saved by 
Guardians in UFOs. Two years later, in When Prophecy Fails, Leon Festinger, Henry 
Riecken and Stanley Schachter renamed Dorothy Martin as Marian Keech and recounted the 
development of Martin’s prophecy and the moment of its failure (Festinger et al. [1956] 
2008). Framing the experience of Martin and her small group of followers in Festinger’s idea 
of ‘cognitive dissonance’ they provided an influential study of apocalyptic belief and, 
importantly here, the circulatory discursive currents of the milieus from which those beliefs 




movement, post-Adamski UFO contact groups, psychic abilities and Theosophy, Dorothy 
Martin typifies many members of what was to become the New Age movement.  
Whilst New Age syncretic tendencies are apparent in the mix of beliefs that formed the fertile 
ground from which her own grew, it is interesting to note that Dorothy Martin’s principle 
contact amongst the Clarion Guardians, Sananda, was understood to be an ascended form of 
Jesus. Whilst this view of Jesus as an initiate of esoteric knowledge is present in Theosophy 
(Blavatsky [1938] 1952), the figure of Jesus-Sananda grew increasingly key to Martin as her 
channelling of messages from him developed; after her initial failed prophecy she published a 
pamphlet of messages from him which underlined not only her dedication to him but also 
Jesus-Sananda and the Guardians’ continued concern for humanity (Martin 1962). The 
syncretic nature of the cultic milieu is apparent in the varied sources which contributed to 
Martin’s beliefs and this is further underlined by the subsequent use of the messages that she 
channelled from Jesus-Sananda.  
In turn Martin’s messages resonated with others in this milieu; her messages are featured in 
Mark Amaru Pinkham’s (2002) The Truth Behind the Christ Myth: The Redemption of the 
Peacock Angel as support for his thesis that the figure known as Jesus Christ (and Jesus-
Sananda) is, in fact, Sanat Kumara, a Venusian master, and central figure in Theosophy and 
related spiritual movements. This link between Jesus-Sananda and Sanat Kumara is 
frequently cited as evidence of spiritually enlightened benign aliens with a protective and 
interventionist interest in humanity with a number of sources referring to Martin’s claim that 
Jesus-Sananda introduced himself to her with the following words, ‘My name is Esu Sananda 
Kumara.’2 Amongst them is Alexandriah Stahr’s, Star Essenia – 2012 and Beyond which 
claims to represent Ashtar Command Healing Division and to be ‘sponsored by the 
Collective Christ: Lord Sananda, Commander Ashtar, The Ashtar – Solar Star Command 
(formerly known as The Ashtar Command, The Galactic Command and The Intergalactic 
Command), The Ascended Masters of Light and The Angels of Light’ (Stahr 2009). Sananda 
is central here and it is Martin’s version of Sananda that shapes the vision of work which is 
dedicated to ‘preparation for Return of the Christ Vibration on Earth and the 2012 Planetary 
 
2 For instance, the Wolf Lodge – Golden Braid native American ministry (http://www.wolflodge.org/), ‘Joseph 
Almighty’s Site – Firstborn Son of Almighty God’ (http://josephalmighty.multiply.com/journal/item/642) and  
‘Amethyst’s Garden’s blog [sic]’ (http://www.myspace.com/amethystsgarden/blog/308231975) (all accessed: 22 




Ascension, now known as 13.13.13 Solar New Earth Reality Timeline’ (Stahr 2009) and is 
authored by Rev. Alexandriah Stahr of the Star-Essence Temple. This short journey from 
Dorothy Martin’s prophecy for 21 December 1954 to the set of prophecies converging on 21 
December 2012 is illustrative of the circuitous, shared narratives of the cultic milieu and the 
tendency for this milieu to self-hybridise to such an extent that seminal texts can rapidly 
become secondary to emergent themes. This tendency is as true of the central works in 2012 
prophecy as it is of other, less well known texts.  
The link between the cultic milieu and the counterculture is strong. Both Partridge (2004) and 
Tramacchi (2000) describe the popularity of McKenna’s shamanic anthropology with 
psychedelically spiritual ravers during the 1990s. With his roots in the psychedelic 
awakening of the 1960s but an active interest in ideas prevalent amongst later echoes of this 
moment, McKenna’s appeal was crossgenerational. He had a resonance with both the first 
wave of baby boomer ‘spiritual seekers’ (see, for example, Roof 1993) and to their children, 
both literal and spiritual. His idea of ‘time wave zero’ and the significance of 21 December 
2012 found a twofold audience within the New Age milieu and what Christopher Partridge 
(2004) terms ‘occulture’, the complex tapestry woven by the warp and weft of occult themes 
through the serried texts of popular culture. As has been mentioned, McKenna’s idea of time 
wave zero emerged from a period of intense experimentation with psilocybin mushrooms in 
the upper reaches of the Amazon rainforest and this has given his work a counter-cultural 
audience of the type described by Partridge.  
Like McKenna, José Argüelles has significant connections to the late 1960s counterculture. A 
professor of art history at University of California, Davis in the early 1970s, Argüelles was a 
key figure behind the Whole Earth Festival and engaged in and drew inspiration from the 
same milieu as McKenna. The evidence that Argüelles draws on borrows from similar strands 
of ‘stigmatised knowledge’ to those employed by McKenna: the I Ching and UFO lore, in 
addition to the Book of Revelation and the source for which he is best known: the Mayan 
calendar (Argüelles 1987). The syncretic weave of Argüelles’ text typifies a New Age 
approach to spiritual enlightenment and demonstrates the textual richness of the socalled 
Mayan prophecies. ‘So-called’ because although the Mayan Long Count calendar reaches the 
end of a significant cycle on the 21 December 2012 and although Argüelles has done a great 




in which the prophecy has been interpreted is too broad for the 2012 prophecy simply to be 
referred to as a ‘Mayan’ prophecy.  
Certainly, Sitler (2006) is ready to point out that whilst a generalised apocalyptic current is 
present within a very few traditionalist Mayan communities, on the whole, currently living 
Mayans are being exposed to the 2012 date more by visiting New Age activists, celebrants, 
researchers and seekers than via tradition. As an inherited tradition, the current speculation 
fails to be definitively Mayan. The few academic treatments to consider the 2012 prophecy 
acknowledge the potential for archaeological evidence to point to the veracity of the 2012 
date being the end of the 5,126 year Long Count (Sitler 2006: 25, 35, n. 4) but situate the 
current fascination with 21 December 2012 not with the Mayans, or even Mayanists such as 
Argüelles, but with the I Ching and hallucinogen-inspired Terence McKenna (Hannegraaff 
2010), or with 1970s countercultural psychonauts in general: Hoopes rather dismissively 
wrote, ‘If some assertions about 2012 sound as if they were imagined by people on drugs, it 
is because they were’ (Hoopes 2011: 243). Hoopes also compares adherents of the 2012 
prophecy with Creationists and cites a parallel, ‘rejection of the “official” narratives … and 
with them the rejection of academic authority’ (Hoopes 2011: 246). This is certainly so and 
Hoopes is also right to suggest that, ‘the 2012 phenomenon may be far more interesting as a 
window into our contemporary culture … than for anything it reveals about the ancient 
Maya’ (Hoopes 2011: 246). Unfortunately, he does not explore the relationship between these 
two statements and the extent to which the milieu from which 2012 prophetic discourse 
emerges is typified by rapidly hybridising and interwoven forms of ‘stigmatised knowledge.’  
Despite the central role in popularising and framing 2012 prophecy played by McKenna’s 
zero timeline and Argüelles’ popularisation of the Mayan calendrical cycles, the 2012 
prophecies have developed beyond the concerns (if not outcomes) that McKenna and 
Argüelles describe. To a certain extent this was always an inevitable consequence of the 
adoption of their work within the New Age milieu. The narratival drift of 2012 prophecies 
away from the McKenna-Argüelles axis around which the core prophecies orbit is, in some 
instances quite marked with other prophecies being combined with their work to produce 
entirely novel combinations. A strong example would be the way in which Zecharia Sitchin’s 
(1976) pseudo-astronomical prediction of the discovery of a lost planet, Nibiru, became 
combined with messages channelled from the binary star system Zeta Reticula by Nancy 




an elliptical orbit which brings it into the inner Solar System every 3,500 years or so. With it 
come an advanced race of space beings, the Anunnaki, who visited Earth during the last close 
pass of their home planet Nibiru and inspired early human civilisation in Sumeria. Nancy 
Lieder identified Nibiru with Planet X, a planet that Zeta Reticulans (‘the Zetas’) warned 
would pass close enough to Earth to bring cataclysm and an end to current civilisations. 
Lieder initially suggested that this would happen in May 2003 but has subsequently stated 
that this was a, ‘White Lie’, designed to, ‘fool the establishment’ (Lieder 2010). Although 
Lieder still suggests that the event will occur during the early years of the twenty-first century 
she distances herself from the 2012 prophecy and sees it as part of an ‘establishment’ plot; 
‘When the 2012 craze first began, years ago, this was far into the future and thus considered 
safe by the establishment, who want first and foremost for their slave classes to tend to their 
jobs and not rush away from coastal cities’ (Lieder 2011). Nonetheless, this has not prevented 
the Sitchin-Lieder hybrid narrative from being appropriated by believers in a 2012 
cataclysm.3  
 
The Proliferation of Endings in Apocalyptic Discourse  
What is also fascinating is the way in which this astronomical anomaly has been co-opted by 
traditional faith groups in the US. The Christian-New Age hybrid has been mentioned above 
in reference to the cultural ‘prophetic readiness’ of US culture but here we see a reversal of 
the indebtedness of New Age prophecy to Christian eschatology in the adoption of New Age 
themes by Christian preachers and churches. For the most part these preachers are dismissive 
of non-Christian hermeneutical endeavours and seek to warn Christians against false 
prophets, particularly New Age ones (more of this shortly when would-be Christian prophets 
warn of a New Age/New World Order Antichrist conspiracy) but, for some, the New Age 
prophecy provides an opportunity to reveal the potential for the fulfilment of Christian 
prophecy. Unaffiliated Christian author Tim McHyde projects Revelation’s ‘Wormwood’ 
onto Planet X/Nibiru and thus is able to develop an eschatological reading of the 2012 
prophecy which reinterprets the New Age date as a potential point for the return of Jesus. He 
 
3 See, for instance, ‘The Church of Critical Thinking’ (http://churchofcriticalthinking.org/planetx.html) and 




is, however, sceptical and in 2008 wrote that he was unconvinced that sufficient signal events 
had occurred to confirm that the end times were upon us. For instance we are yet to see,  
[T]he coming Middle East nuclear war predicted by an abundance of prophetic 
chapters, including Psalm 83. This particular event has to happen before Wormwood 
comes, for reasons I won’t go into here. To make a long story short, since this war has 
not materialized, we can rule out 2012 as a year of any type of prophetic fulfilment 
(McHyde 2008: 16).  
Instead his key dates are set later in the decade with Wormwood/Planet X passing the Earth 
between Pentecost and early summer of 2019 (McHyde 2009: 90–91). Whilst McHyde is able 
to incorporate Planet X into Revelation, the prophecy website The 2012 Warning is keen to 
warn its viewers, ‘Don’t trust the Maya – Trust the Messiah!’ The website is clearly intended 
to appeal to casual ‘web seekers’ searching for information relating to 2012 prophecy. The 
title of the site is vague and could be interpreted as being written from any one of the many 
perspectives that are offered on ‘2012’; it is certainly not immediately apparent that the site is 
owned, and presumably authored, by Pastor Dan Kaighen of the Lighthouse Baptist Church. 
The Christian content of the website’s ‘warning’ is, however, quite apparent to even the most 
casual browser; the warning is a warning not to turn away from Christ: the site pits ‘Eternal 
Bible truths’ against ‘Mayan myths’ and wittily warns, ‘Everybody is talking about 
December 2012. They ought to worry about Revelation 20:12!’ (Kaighen 2008: 1).  
Although The 2012 Warning website is clearly using a popular interest in 2012 prophecy to 
attract potential converts to its prophecy-based beliefs it also contains content that sits closely 
aligned to the conspiracy theories which have incorporated the 2012 motif into their paranoid 
worldview. The 2012 Warning not only warns against the acceptance of false prophecy but it 
also warns against the origin of that false prophecy, namely what it refers to as the ‘New Age 
Movement’; this refrain is repeated by polarshift2012.net which warns in an article entitled, 
‘Nibiru 2012 Planet X Barack Obama Evolution’ that US President Barack Obama is, ‘the 
next antichrists [sic]’ (Jones 2009: 3).4 And thus the 2012 prophecy is recontextualised within 
the contemporary nexus between conspiracy theory and millennialism described by Michael 
Barkun as ‘improvisational millennialism’ (Barkun 2003). Still further from McKenna and 
 
4 This site appears to exist in order to provide links to the home page for Contact 2012 a self-published 2012 




Argüelles but within the field of improvisational millennialism, David Icke (2011) recasts the 
2012 prophecy as part of an incursive and nested conspiracy designed to distract the general 
population from the machinations of the hidden elite. Whilst elsewhere Grailcode.net 
purports to reveal Prince William as the antichrist and 2012 as the year of reckoning for both 
him and humanity as a whole (Ortiz 2008).  
In such dark prophecies, and in other similar uses of 2012, McKenna, Argüelles, the Mayans 
and I Ching are long forgotten, if they were ever considered. In this discursive drift from 
novelty or ancient calendrical reckoning to antichrists and conspiracy, the field of our 
contemporary apocalyptic milieu is revealed. The Mayan element is a partial feature of 2012 
prophecies; whilst it provides a mobilising element of the most well-known form of 2012 
prophecy, it is not a defining feature of all 2012 prophecies. Hybrid prophecies in which 
Christianised New Age tropes and ancient astronauts constantly combine and recombine to 
become renewed abound and in this the Ancient Maya provide a jumping off point for fresh 
interpretations of Revelation, messages from the stars or offer clues of the plots of hidden 
elites. It is tempting to consider 2012 prophecies as emblematic of a moment in which ‘New 
Age’ beliefs have reached the cultural mainstream but to do so would be to overlook the 
extent to which the uses (and misuses) of ‘karma’ or ‘the power of positive thinking’ have 
passed into popular discourse. No, instead 2012 should be considered as evidence of the 
surprising vitality of the apocalyptic milieu; of the readiness for significant sections of the 
Western population to hope for profound, indeed cataclysmic, change. The promise of 
transformation, of the dawning of a new era and the waning of old influences and tyrannies of 
evil is deeply embedded in the cultural fabric of the West and whilst the content and detail of 
prophecies will be constantly renewed and recontextualised the pull of an impossible promise 
delivered from beyond the mundane world will always resonate across divided communities 
and with disconsolate individuals.  
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Postcards from the Cosmos: Cosmic Spaces in Alternative Religion and Conspiracy 
Theories 
Andrew Fergus Wilson 
 
Abstract 
If conspiracy theory is the narration of fears of existential dread, of a potentially 
apocalyptical plot against ‘us’, then we can understand alien conspiracies as a dread of the 
coming of ‘cosmological humanity’ and the end of ‘geostationary man’. In escaping gravity’s 
hold a terminal velocity is achieved by a species ready to mythologize, even sacralise, its 
achievements and to enchant the Heavens once again in terms more suited to the 
technological age. Virgiliu Pop’s astrosociology will provide a means for framing the 
uniqueness of post-Gagarin conspiracist spiritualities within the particular religious cultures 
of cosmic humanity whilst Raymond Williams’ concept of structures of feeling will be drawn 
upon to understand the cultural significance of these spiritualities. 
Keywords: Alien, conspiracy, Gagarin, conspirituality, religion, space 
 
Introduction 
This article will provide a commentary on the 'cosmic turn' taken by marginal beliefs 
following humanity's discovery of space flight. Yuri Gagarin's successful orbit of the Earth in 
1961 will be used for its symbolic value as moment in which the possibility of the 'space age' 
was realised through the presence human life beyond Earth's atmosphere. There is no claim 
as to it being a direct inspiration for the movements discussed here but rather that its 
connotative resonances provide a means for understanding the context that has given rise to 
these religious constructs. Certainly, the founding of the Aetherius Society predates Gagarin's 




Dianetics movement, and subsequently, Scientology; or Dorothy Martin's Chicago believers 
group (made famous in Leon Festinger's study When Prophecy Fails) are two well-known 
examples. From Joseph Smith's time onwards, various forms of Mormonism have made 
claims that life was created on other planets and this has led to speculation within the church 
about the concept of a populated multiverse.1 Additionally, there are many antecedents of a 
supranormal meaning being attached to material cosmic incursion into the human sensory 
range. For instance, since at least Aristotle's time, Halley's Comet has been associated with 
signs and divination2. During the last century, post WWII UFO 'scares' have mobilized 
diverse public responses and the most notable have left an enduring cultural legacy.  George 
Adamski’s claims to have encountered alien ‘Space Brothers’ began in the late 1940s, 
predating the well-known story of the alleged crashed UFO at Roswell, New Mexico during 
July, 1947. In some ways, the Roswell account might have served as an alternative to 
Gagarin’s flight as a powerful symbolic moment in the proliferation of cosmic new religious 
movements given its influence on the UFO flap of the late 1940s and 1950s.3 Nonetheless, 
Gagarin is used here because, as shall be argued, his flight represents the breaching of a 
barrier that no human had previously physically crossed and ushered in a new relationship 
with the cosmos. 
Yuri Gagarin’s spaceflight of 1961 extended the range of humanity in a way that profoundly 
rewrote our relationship with the heavens. Pioneering sociologist Emile Durkheim wrote, 
regarding the incommensurability of the sacred and the profane, that “[t]he sacred thing is, 
par excellence, that which the profane must not and cannot touch with impunity. This 
prohibition surely makes all communication impossible between the two worlds; for if the 
profane could enter into relations with the sacred, the sacred would serve no purpose.”4 
Whilst Durkheim’s observation is more honoured in the breach, it provides a spatial 
understanding of sacrality that helps to convey the religious implications of Gagarin’s flight. 
First Sputnik and then, most profoundly, Yuri Gagarin took humans into Heaven and 
revealed it to be vast and apparently indifferent to humanity. His voyage revealed the fragility 
 
1 Kirk D. Hagen, "Eternal Progression in a Multiverse: An Explorative Mormon Cosmology", Dialogue: A 
Journal of Mormon Thought, vol. 39, no. 2 (Summer 2006) pp. 1–45. 
2 For an excellent overview see Sara J. Schechner (1999) Comets, Popular Culture, and the Birth of Modern 
Cosmology. Princeton: Princeton University Press 
3 David Clarke & Andy Roberts (2007) Flying Saucers: A Social History of UFOlogy. Loughborough: Heart of 
Albion Press 
4 Émile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, trans. Carol Cosman.(Oxford: Oxford University 




of the divide between the sacred and the profane; Earth and the heavens were materially in 
reach of one another. Prior to Gagarin's flight human journeys into 'the Heavens' had been out 
of body, in spirit form alone, but his flight took humanity – in body – into the realm of the 
Gods. In this paper, Gagarin’s voyage is used as a highly-charged symbolic moment that 
demarcates between man-beneath-the-heavens and man-in-space. Clearly, it is part of a 
longer history of space flight and human exploration but the drama of the moment carries a 
semiotic ripeness that provides a focus for a key period of human expansion. 
It is argued here that humanity has, since then, failed to reconcile itself to the idea of being a 
cosmic species, that the capacity to incorporate this expanded awareness of humanity’s 
‘place’ into human cultures – and beliefs – is yet to become fully manifest. Virgiliu Pop5 and 
Carol Mersch6 both chart attempts to transport human efforts to export Earthly religions to 
space: to fill the Heavens with Earthly religions, the Russian and American space 
programmes contained within their scientific practices the seeds of earlier forms of belief. 
Mersch concludes that this was reflective of NASA astronauts as explorers, wishing to take 
the old world into the new, of a “spiritual expression that is intrinsic to human beings in the 
act of exploration;”7 whilst Pop described cosmonauts decorating the walls of the Mir space 
station (and, later, the ISS) with icons in the wake of the post-Communist revival of Russian 
Orthodoxy. Compellingly, Pop weaves Gagarin into the fabric of Russian cosmism8 and, 
particularly, the cultural vacillation of the figure of Gagarin between Communist atheism and 
Russian Orthodoxy. With its roots in the technological utopia in space imagined by Nikolai 
Fedorov and the spaceward trajectory of human evolution predicted by Konstantin 
Tsiolkovsky, cosmism represents an early sacralization of ‘secular space’. In his concluding 
comments Pop describes the duality of Gagarin’s legacy in a way that points to the manner in 
which Gagarin can be understood to have simultaneously demystified but yet re-enchanted 
the cosmos: 
Aboard the ISS, close to the Orthodox Icons, lays the photograph of Gagarin. He 
deserves to be there, not as a demigod of the atheist faith, but as the first human being 
 
5
 Virgiliu Pop, “Viewpoint: Space and Religion in Russia: Cosmonaut Worship to Orthodox Revival,” 
Astropolitics: The International Journal of Space Politics & Policy 7, no. 2 (2009): 150-163 
6
 Carol Mersch, “Religion, Space Exploration, and Secular Society,” Astropolitics: The International Journal of 
Space Politics & Policy 11, no.1-2 (2013): 65-78. 
7
 Mersch, “Religion, Space Exploration, and Secular Society,” 76 




having stepped upon the celestial path. His picture may be an icon for the cosmists 
and for the atheists, yet for those believing Christian Orthodox, Gagarin holds a 
special place. The human being, made according to the image of God, is himself a 
“living icon of God.” Unaware of this, by sending Gagarin to outer space, the godless 
communists were the first to launch an Orthodox icon aboard a spaceship.9  
Pop captures the paradoxical multivalency of Gagarin as a symbol of space exploration. A 
living icon on the ‘celestial path’, his flight into the Beyond was achieved through the efforts 
of the ‘godless communists’. In a moment of transcendence, Gagarin revealed humanity’s 
material basis and longing for something beyond the material. Elsewhere Pop articulates the 
unpreparedness of the bulk of humanity to expand their conceptual range in order to 
accommodate this moment.10 He characterises this as humanity being caught between ‘future 
shock’ (Alvin Toffler) and ‘cultural lag’ (William Ogburn). Pop’s account sketches  a pattern 
of responses within folk cultures around the world in which ‘cosmological humanity’ is 
blamed for crop failure, natural disasters and a damaged ecosystem: 
“Because of what you have done”—said Richard Nixon to the Apollo astronauts— 
“the heavens have become a part of man’s world.” to those who deemed the Moon as 
the realm of divinity, the human conquest of outer space and of the Moon meant their 
literal desecration, their passage from sacred to the profane. Such an act of taking into 
human possession what was before heaven, of depriving the Moon of its sacred 
character, could not go unpunished.11 
Durkheim provides a useful conceptual metaphor here: the profaning of the sacred in a 
moment of transcendence. The evolution of humanity into a space-faring species, then, is the 
source of both and fear and wonder – of living icons and cataclysmic threats. And it is the 
human world, of culture and belief, in which this is played out. Here then, in this article, the 
context of the journey from the profane into the sacred provides the context in which 
spiritualized UFO conspiracies can be understood. 
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Moshe Barasch’s consideration of the role of space and location in Western apocalyptic 
discourse identifies the importance of the vertical plane in depictions of apocalyptic space 
and it is this verticality that Gagarin traversed.12 Barasch provides a powerful summary of the 
complexity of this vertical dimension,  
[T]he ascension to heaven is the manifestation of celestial origin [and yet] carries 
soteriological connotations. The ascension to heaven is a formula for salvation […] 
The narration of a dramatic descent into hell leading to a struggle between the 
“superior” and the “inferior” forces and ending with the victory of salvation, is of 
course a typical apocalyptical motif.13 
In that flight, humanity broke free of gravity’s fetters but also re-enacted this bi-directional 
motif that Barasch also describes as “an essential component of the [apocalyptic] theme.”14 
Gagarin’s flight is thus symbolically charged with the cataclysmic dimension that Pop 
identified among global folkloric cultures. Further, it precipitated an outpouring of 
cosmically oriented new religious movements (NRMs) and spiritualities and these space age 
religions retain the eschatological verticality, that is to say the possibity of thinking about the 
unravelling of collective destiny in spatial terms, that Barasch identifies. The figure of 
spiritualised space is contradictory; to journey into it is simultaneously heretical and 
transcendent. Barasch delineates the topology of apocalyptic space and we can map 
Gagarin’s flight within it.  
Gagarin’s flight is apocalyptic: revelatory and cataclysmic, it profanes the Heavens and 
reveals the end of one history of humanity and the initiation of a new, unbounded humanity. 
The pre-Gagarin heavenly spaces are brought closer and the traditions with which Barasch is 
primarily concerned still shape post-Gagarin reappraisals. Space continues to be the source of 
both judgment on humanity and also its subsequent punishment; accordingly, the Judaic 
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motif of a powerful entity punishing those lacking commitment to the faith continues to shape 
a number of post-Gagarin NRMs. 
The motif was present in the beliefs of Heaven’s Gate. The Heaven’s Gate group was a small 
new religious movement based in California. The group was co-founded by Marshall 
Applewhite and Bonnie Nettles in their native Texas and grew as they spread their hybrid 
message of a UFO-enabled Christian millennialism. Following Nettles’ death in 1985, the 
group became increasingly focused on the charismatic leadership of Applewhite. Leaving one 
member to maintain their website, 38 members (‘the crew’) and Applewhite took their own 
lives during the third week of March, 1997 in the belief that they were ready to evolve to a 
higher level of consciousness. They claimed that they were ready to attain ‘The Evolutionary 
Level Above Human’ and would be reconstituted on an alien spacecraft hidden in the tail of 
the Hale-Bopp comet as it passed close to Earth. They would remain there whilst the Earth 
was ‘recycled’. This transit to an imagined spacecraft behind the Hale-Bopp comet was, at 
once, a transcendence to a new level of consciousness and also – through this quasi-Rapture – 
an escape from a cataclysmic judgment on Earth. Benjamin Zeller’s account of the 
awkwardness of the New Age Biblical hermeneutic, the interpretative framework, driving 
Heaven’s Gate points to the difficulty of negotiating the culture shock and cultural lag 
described above.15 The premillennial dispensationalism that shaped the structure of Heaven’s 
Gate eschatology16 represents the old world of Christian discourse, whilst the environmental 
factors and the UFO technologies behind the translated rapture event reflect the shockwaves 
of the culture shock described by Pop. ‘Avenging space’ in new religious cosmologies is a 
place of fear but also redemption. Heaven’s Gate were a product of the cultic milieu but, 
nonetheless, shared structural similarities with Judeo-Christian eschatology and the 
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Alongside this structurally familiar depiction of destructive deistic space entities there are 
contemporaneous forms of sacralized near and outer space that describe space as the source 
of life on earth and the physical and spiritual location of the ‘truth’ of existence. In these 
accounts, Earth’s fragility is still evident but so too is its integration into the ‘cosmic whole’. 
It is in these that post-Gagarin spiritual forms are most clearly articulated. NRMs of the 
enchanted cosmos vary widely but are unified by situating Earth within a narrative of an 
inhabited universe in which terrestrial life is at an uninformed and undeveloped stage. 
Typically, cosmic truth is ‘out there’ and revealed to chosen ones via direct visitation or 
psychic revelation. Raëlianism and the Aetherius Society typify both revelatory traditions. 
On Thursday, 13 December 1973, Raël (b. Claude Vorilhon, 1946) claims to have been 
visited by an ‘alien’ on a dormant volcano top in the Clermont-Ferrand region of France. 
During this and subsequent evenings the humanoid aliens (‘Elohim’) allegedly recounted the 
truth of humanity’s creation to Raël and then, on Tuesday, 7 October 1975, he claims to have 
received another visitation. On this occasion he believes he was taken to the home planet of 
his otherworldly contacts. In Raël’s account, he makes the claim that the Elohim are 
advanced scientists from another world who had used Earth as a laboratory; the details of 
their experiments were recorded in Genesis and other books of the Old Testament. The 
Raëlian philosophy is presented as if it were a true account of life on Earth’s material, extra-
terrestrial origin. Whilst Susan Palmer (2004) straightforwardly describes Raëlianism as a 
religion,17 George Chryssides describes themas ‘scientific creationists'.18 This is, perhaps, a 
more representative appellation as it combines the scientism that Raël directly makes claim to 
whilst connoting the theological resonances of his creation story. Raël’s philosophy is 
certainly atheist and eschews occult forces; the Raëlians describe themselves as an, “atheist 
religion,” stressing the role of their movement in creating a link between humanity and ‘the 
Creators’.19 Raëlian space is infinite, so too is life in the universe: “The universe being 
infinite, there is an infinite number of inhabited planets and an infinite number of Elohim and 
creations.”20 The ambiguity of Raël’s position is made evident in his continued use of the 
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Hebrew term for Gods or gods, Elohim. Although he is keen to stress the secular materiality 
of his universe, his ongoing use of the term charges it with a connotated divinity. The Raëlian 
universe is also multiple with a series of infinitely recursive nested realities: the cells of our 
bodies are, themselves, separate universes.21 Here, then, the enchanted cosmos has entered 
the fibre of our being; we are not just revealed to be part of the greater Cosmos but contain 
the Cosmos within us. 
 
Esoteric Aliens 
The Aetherius Society typifies a world-accommodating NRM and also one that has 
successfully sustained its membership after the death of its founder. With an indebtedness to 
Theosophy, Aetherian belief provides continuity between pre- and post-Gagarin NRMs and 
develops a vastly enlarged iteration of Blavatsky’s system. The Aetherius Society were 
founded in 1955 by Dr. George King (1919-1997). King claims to have received a 
psychically transmitted auditory message from Master Aetherius, an advanced extraterrestrial 
intelligence who first contacted King in 1954. In King's account, Aetherius was the Venusian 
representative of a cosmic organisation called the Interplanetary Parliament, a non-political 
advisory council made up of representatives from within and beyond our solar system and 
which convened on Saturn.. In King's account, Aetherius contacted King to name him as the 
voice of the Interplanetary Parliament on Earth and to spread its spiritual and technological 
messages.22. Where Raëlianism is idiosyncratic, Aetherianism is typical of post-WWII UFO 
religion in its indebtedness to Theosophy; it developed Theosophy’s ‘cosmic evolution’ and 
exported the hidden masters to other worlds. Like Raëlianism, a populist understanding of 
science is a key element of Aetherian philosophy and King espoused a ‘fuller’ version of 
science and religion that fused both. In Aetherian belief, each of the solar planets are 
inhabited but at different levels of vibration. These cannot be perceived by humans as our 
senses are only attuned to ‘level 1’ vibrations. Cosmic Masters are capable of perceiving 
multiple frequency vibrations “because of their highly sensitised or psychic senses as well as 
advanced instruments. Because of their advancement they are able to move through one 
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realm of existence on to another frequency both on this Earth and outside of it with great 
ease.”23 ‘Ordinary’ souls (‘lifestreams’) can evolve up, or devolve, to other planetary 
existences with each planet in the solar system being characterised by distinct forms of 
intelligence that souls acquire through experience. The lifestreams on Earth were made 
homeless by their destruction of their home planet, Maldek – now the asteroid belt between 
Mars and Jupiter. ‘Mother Earth’ took pity on the lowly lifestreams and provided them with a 
home. Here, again, it is possible to discern the spatial reckoning of cataclysm and salvation as 
described by Barasch. The apocalyptic spatiality that he describes is reiterated in a new, 
cosmic setting. Like Raëlians, Aetherians are unthreatened by scientific advances seeing 
them as confirmation of prior revelations: 
[W]e welcome such discoveries. We have been told that if we are to really advance in 
such discoveries, more than we have done to date, we have to change our motives and 
become more spiritual. [...] Discoveries outside of this planet are important but what 
is more important is to put right conditions on this planet.24 
 
Intrusive Aliens 
On their own terms, the beliefs of Raëlism and Aetherianism   render space knowable, acting 
as a bridge between human perception and cosmic truth; the spiritualization of space is a 
projection of human narratives onto the inhuman. Alien NRMs reflect a changing relationship 
with space. Where heaven was a distant endpoint, sacred space is proximate, dynamic and 
prone to intersect with terrestrial experiences. Following Auguste Comte, Durkheim provided 
a useful framework for understanding religion as the deification of society by its subjects; 
from this understanding it can be suggested that as the extent of the social comes to 
incorporate the cosmos we deify and worship our own capacity to inhabit and to ‘know’ 
space.  
For Jodi Dean, UFO abduction narratives hold a similar effect; whilst not disputing the 
perceived reality that the abduction events have for the abductees, Dean delineates the source 
of the fascination that the abduction narrative has within wider culture. She describes a 
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particular modern sense of diminished agency and an unrepresentative politics in which 
power is always outside of the body politic but always operative within it.25 The abductee 
thus encapsulates this feeling of powerlessness. They are taken against their will, 
manipulated, experimented upon, vital fluids extracted, alien objects inserted. Their bodies 
and minds are familiar and yet not wholly their own. She writes,  
In abduction, the alien takes away our agency, and the sense of security and certainty 
upon which our agency was predicated. This theft of agency is manifest not just in the 
power of the alien to paralyze us and abduct us at will, but also in its technological 
superiority.26  
In Dean, alien abduction narratives encapsulate the anxiety of an age in which agency and the 
boundaries between once accepted norms of belief, self, identity are under continuous 
assessment and negotiation. Further to this, not only does alien abduction spatially dislocate 
us and rob us of our capacity to be self-determining but it also intervenes in and reformulates 
our bodies. For Dean, the consistency we invest in our place in the world is undermined as is 
the blueprint of our identity; our sense of belonging in what were ‘our’ exterior and interior 
worlds is no longer guaranteed. Barbara Brown makes a similar point. Her concerns are 
similar to Dean’s and she recounts the symbolic qualities of Betty and Barney Hills’ 
archetypal abduction experience.27 In 1963, whilst under hypnosis, the Hills ‘recovered’ 
memories of being abducted by aliens two years earlier. During their time on the alien craft 
the Hills claim to have been made the subjects of medical experimentation with Betty 
recounting having a range of samples taken and the insertion of a large needle into her naval 
and Barney being anally probed and his semen being extracted.28 Brown interprets the Hills’ 
experience in a similar way to Dean’s treatment of alien abductions in general: she sees the 
abduction and examinations as a powerful articulation of the limited nature of agency in late 
modernity.29 Brown explicitly links the emergence of alien abduction narratives to advances 
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in medical technologies, particularly technologies of reproduction. She describes, “The 
collective anxiety expressed by these abductees about the encroachment of technology into 
“natural” human functions;” an encroachment which is simultaneously, “alienating and 
awesome,” but which reveals the disconnectedness of medical subjects from the processes 
enacted upon them, sharing with abductees a subjectivity characterized by feelings of being 
“confused and powerless non-experts.”30 The spatiality of abduction is vertical but 
unstructured: the trajectory is the same but the journey here has little of the willed coherence 
of Gagarin’s and also fails to contain any salvific promise. Instead it offers lost memories, a 
loss of autonomy and a sense of diminished agency in light of an overwhelming and distant 
power.  
 
The role of conspiracy theory 
The loss of agency that alien abduction is treated as a cypher for is also a theme in academic 
treatments of conspiracy theory. Fredric Jameson, for example, suggests that conspiracy 
theories mark a populist mapping out of the experiences of powerlessness and a desire to 
confront and comprehend the totality of a global system that is otherwise impossible to 
understand.31 In the face of the complexity of an ever-expanding global capitalism, Jameson 
argues, there is little by way of a popularly available critical stance or culturally common 
systems of representation that are able to render current global realities meaningful. Jameson 
suggests that it is only in war and colossal natural disasters that we are able to consider our 
globality; all other representative systems are otherwise geared to the national-local. Jameson 
suggests in Postmodernism that our systems of representation have broken down and the very 
possibility of referentiality has become undermined.32  
Conspiracy theory is therefore, crucially, an attempt at representing the ‘total logic of late 
capital,' where no other means are available. This situates conspiracy as a narrative – a 
representational mode – essentially a story, by means of which the excess of signifiers which 
proliferate in postmodernity can be tied to a small and manageable number of signifieds. So it 
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is, then, that for Jameson accounts which narrativize and provide coherency to an otherwise 
incomprehensible situation provide the opportunity for meaning regardless of how limited 
and apparently irrational that meaning may be. The seven feet tall shapeshifting lizards of 
David Icke’s cosmic conspiracy are easier to grasp than the intangible, overwhelming and 
evershifting movement of global capital. In other words conspiracy forces all complexities 
and contradictions to resolve themselves within the hermeneutic framework established by 
the terms of the conspiracists’ narratives. In this sense we can understand the usefulness 
which Jameson saw in the figure of ‘mapping’ as the conspiracists draw a map of the 
conditions of life in postmodernity. In Jameson’s understanding this is not the universal 
agency loss found in Dean and Brown but particular and class-based: “Conspiracy is the poor 
person's cognitive mapping in the postmodern age; it is a degraded figure of the total logic of 
late capital, a desperate attempt to represent the latter's system,”33 (Jameson 1988, 356). 
Degraded it may be but despite this and in spite of the total system of alienating domination, 
Jameson still recognises a utopian impulse in conspiracy. Mark Fenster confirms Jameson’s 
approach and recognises the political structuration of the conspiracy narrative’s organisation 
of a totalised and fully integrated economic, cultural, social, political totality.34 Because of 
the importance that conspiracy theorists allot to revealing to the alienated ‘sheeple’ the 
conspiracy orchestrating this totality, there is a claim to agency, of the reinsertion of the 
individual subject into history: 
[I]n its attempt to reveal a hidden truth that challenges the alienated social 
conceptualized within classical liberal thought, the conspiracy represents a utopian 
desire to reflect upon and confront the contradictions and conflicts of the 
contemporary democratic state and capitalism.35 (Fenster 2008, 128) 
Conspiracy betokens a lack of understanding and a naïve utopian impulse in Jameson’s 
reading, however, here Fenster extends this to consider conspiracy as an enabler of agency. 
Just as in Dean’s assessment of alien abductions, Fenster draws out the crucial element of 
narrative building that conspiracy theory provides whilst also being cognizant of its capacity 
to insert the conspiracy theorist as an active agent of resistance, at least within the terms set 
out by the conspiracy theorist. Fran Mason counters Jameson’s take on conspiracy theory by 
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suggesting that there is considerable room to doubt the plausibility of a means of accurately 
representing the postmodern: to accurately produce a cognitive map, the Jamesonian subject 
must be able to escape the impoverished position that produces the conspiracy theory.36 
Essentially, Mason asks, if the totality of the conspiracy is a product of the working of the 
political unconscious, a projection of the felt but unrepresentable inter-relatedness of 
globalised postmodernity, then to what extent can an enriched, whole, cognitive map be 
produced? Mason’s depiction of conspiracy is clearly concerned with the same questions of 
agency as Jameson, Fenster, Dean and Brown but where they describe a crisis she suggests 
that conspiracy typifies an increasingly normative position: 
The conspiratorial subject represents a postmodern self incapable of critical distance, 
the result of which is a self-reflexive subjectivity that is itself a reproduction of 
postmodern culture. […] Conspiratorial subjectivity is a paradigm of a scattered 
postmodern and global subjectivity.37   
Paradigmatic of an epoch characterised by shifting boundaries, inequitable balances of power 
and subjectivities that are simultaneously radically expanded but which experience a 
diminishment of agency, conspiracy theory is, for Mason, a narrative form that exemplifies a 
discursive tendency away from traditional markers of subjectivity. We might consider here 
the literary theorist Raymond Williams’ observations on ‘structures of feeling’: patterns of 
textual activity – tropes, figures, genres – that signal protean responses to shifts in patterns of 
social experience; in other words, they delimit emerging social forms that are yet to coalesce 
into more formal and overt structures.38 So, where Mason describes the narrativization of an 
emergent social, cultural and political paradigm, it is possible to consider this in the form 
suggested by Williams.  
 
From conspiracy theory to conspirituality 
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The context of post-Gagarin religiosity described above provides a useful starting point for 
understanding the paradigmatic uncertainty – future shocked and culture lagged – of recent 
conspiracy theories. The interweaving of narratives concerned with bodies, limits, science, 
domination, loss of representation, political cynicism, hidden elites, secret knowledge, 
concealed technologies, alien agendas and a crisis of subjectivity and agency are the tropes 
and ‘semantic figures’ that characterize the conspiratorial milieu but they are also present in 
an increasing number of emergent spiritualities. Ward and Voas have characterised this 
convergence of conspiracy theory and spirituality as ‘conspirituality’.39 (Ward and Voas 
2011). 
Conspirituality is a fitting descriptor of the spiritualised post-2002 online communities that 
Ward and Voas describe. The defining characteristics reflect the two discursive tendencies: 
from conspiracy theory comes a belief in a malevolent “shadow government” that 
manipulates mass populations for hidden, and frequently apocalyptic, ends; and from new age 
spirituality is the belief that personal transformation has the capacity to transform the world 
and a critical mass of transformed individuals have the collective power to overcome the 
negativity of the evil machinations of the shadow government.40 In this context they refer to 
the centrality of the idea of ‘paradigm shift’ in the rhetoric of conspirituality and the 
behaviors and values that typify it: 
We [Ward and Voas] argue that conspirituality is a politico-spiritual philosophy based 
on two core convictions, the first traditional to conspiracy theory, the second rooted in 
the New Age: 
(1) A secret group covertly controls, or is trying to control, the political and social 
order (Fenster). 
(2) Humanity is undergoing a ‘paradigm shift’ in consciousness, or awareness, so 
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Again, Williams’ figure of a structure of feeling is fitting here and the repeated refrain of a 
new paradigm, or structure of experience, underlines the purposive attempt to reimagine 
social relations in a way that reinserts the subject into history with purpose and the agency to 
realise that purpose. Moreover, in the context under discussion here – emergent post-Gagarin 
UFO NRMs – these two “core convictions” are consistent elements in conspiritual beliefs 
that incorporate alien lifeforms and alien worlds. Ward and Voas are attendant to the inchoate 
and nebulous variety of standpoints incorporated in conspirituality. The groups being 
described here as 'post-Garagarin NRMs' are diverse and their beliefs are contradictory but 
those beliefs share certain key themes; not least amongst those themes is an attempt to 
provide a space from which a technologically-informed spirituality can confront the 
complexities of being human in an age of space travel. In so doing they produce an aggregate 
of exploratory statements, that attempt to re-orient humanity in a spaceward direction. It is an 
aggregation of fear and hope and, markedly, an attempt to reconcile a sense of a 
discontinuous narrative in which the boundaries of ‘the human’ are undermined. In other 
contexts, Donna Haraway delineated a similarly fatal trajectory for ‘the human’: “It is 
certainly true that postmodernist strategies, like my cyborg myth, subvert myriad organic 
wholes. In short, the certainty of what counts as nature is undermined, probably fatally.”42 
The certainty of what constitutes the human – and religious – subject is the basis of the 
continual reflexive assessment and reappraisal; a reappraisal that continually vacillates 
between the natural and the technological, the Earthbound and the space-age. Again, the twin 
poles of the salvific and cataclysmic are replicated in these oppositions. Lee Quinby 
recognises this bifurcation and the liberatory heart of this dialectic - it is the Utopian impulse 
discerned by Jameson, Brown and Mason, Barasch’s upward apocalyptic trajectory: 
Whether salvific or catastrophic, apocalyptic rhetoric about technology is exhilarating 
and persuasive because it triggers deeply entrenched desires for the millennialist 
dream: transcendence of human limitations.43 
The conspiritualist desire for spiritual transformation encapsulates the exhilarating 
transcendence amidst a fear of the future as described by Quinby. At once the cultural lag and 
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future shock described by Pop is incorporated into a meaningful narrative44 (Pop, 2011) and it 
is this narrativization of an unmapped social territory that locates conspirituality in the 
politicised sphere described by Jameson, Fenster, Mason and Brown.  
 
The Galactic Conspiracy 
Typical of this second wave of conspiritualism is Laura Magdalene Eisenhower. Much like, 
say, David Icke, she speaks at public events within the cultic milieu whilst also giving solo 
lectures across much of the English speaking world. Her website describes her as an 
Intuitive Astrologist, Global Alchemist, Cosmic Mythologist and is the great-
granddaughter of Dwight David Eisenhower. She is on a profound mission to reveal 
our true origins connected with the 'Magdalene' and 'Gaia-Sophia' energies of love and 
wisdom and works to liberate us from the Military Industrial Complex, the Archonic 
systems and false power structures.45  
She is emblematic of this spiritualized, spaceward looking conspiracy theory in which 
Barasch’s vertical movement is simultaneously upward (Salvation), outward (of the world) 
but down (cataclysmic) and inward (the spiritual domain of self-transformation). Whilst 
sharing the interior quest for enlightenment with earlier New Age inflected UFO NRMs such 
as the Aetherians, what was a quest to ascend the hidden dimensions of being becomes here a 
battle for survival and self-determination against the totalizing and dehumanizing efforts of 
machinic aliens and to define and characterize enchanted space whilst saving the Earth. The 
relocation of this conflict away from the material to the spiritual represents a shifting terrain 
of agency confirming Eisenhower’s narrative as conspiritual rather than straightforwardly 
conspiratorial. Typical of the epistemic nebulosity identified by Ward and Voas, Eisenhower 
is highly syncretic in the elements from which she combines her belief system. Illustrative is 
the following conceptually-loaded paragraph from an autobiographical position statement 
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entitled, ‘2012 and the Ancient Game: Venus–Sophia and Recruitment to Mars’.46 Here alone 
she refers to:  
Post-Gagarin readings of the Nag Hammadi Gnostic scriptures; feminist spirituality; 
ecologically aligned spirituality; millennialism; conspiracy by a global elite; the 
current and ongoing colonization of Mars; multi-dimensional being; “global 
transformation”; secret technologies; psychic readings; 2012 as a, “shift date”; a 
shared human destiny as, “galactic voyagers,” in touch with currently hidden 
potential; “the false-matrix”; stargates; Goddess archetypes “Hathor, Isis, Inanna, 
Kali, Persephone, Magdalene, Guinevere, Morgaine, Ariadne”; alien abduction; 
predestination; the secret colonization of Mars; Templars; hybrid alien-human 
lifeforms; the Anunnaki and the planet Niburu. 
This list is indicative rather than exhaustive. The battlegrounds and symbolic structures are 
multiple and complex but the “negative agenda” she alludes to as the enemy of awareness 
and human fulfilment is repeatedly characterised as patriarchal, aligned with the Archonic 
entities, and responsible for the destruction of the environment and a forced colonization of 
Mars. The destruction of the Earth is a planned event designed to eradicate the creativity and 
female oriented energies of the divine feminine. The incorporation of a feminist agenda here 
is novel but not original (one might think of Zsuzsanna Budapest’s Dianic Wicca or 
Starhawk’s ecological feminist paganism) but the threatening space technologies conform to 
post-Gagarin UFO conspirituality.  
Again, attention is focused on the threat and danger of technologically enabled journeys 
along the ‘celestial path’ whilst the redemptive possibility of spiritual transcendence is 
offered as a counter-measure. These spiritualities seem to revolve around science and 
technology but are never quite able to escape their orbit. Writing about Heaven’s Gate in 
Prophets and Protons: New Religious Movements and Science in Late Twentieth-Century 
America, Benjamin Zeller draws attention to the central role that technology played in their 
development.47 He finds in Heaven’s Gate a tendency common to UFO religions – for the 
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groups to characterize their beliefs as either non-religious or to see themselves as being a new 
stage in the development of human thought that transcends what is for them the false 
dichotomy between science and religion. What is of relevance here is the emergence of 
religious expressions that not only look beyond the Earth but which also have a strongly 
materialist orientation – those that would seek to place science and religion on the same 
continuum. I argue that it is here, in the commingling of religious and secular thought 
primarily focused on transformation of humanity in the context of an enchanted and populous 
cosmos, that the potential for these religions to overlap with conspiracy theory becomes most 
profoundly fecund. The post-Gagarin religions become embroiled with the conspiratorial 
elements of the cultic milieu at the point at which there is the attempt to construct an account 
of reality that can – within the terms stipulated by the beliefs themselves – be tested as 
opposed to being a question of faith. Certainly, this changes the terms of the debate around 
any such religion’s veracity; where they are disproven by science the response is that the 
failure to detect, say, the presence of alternate levels of existence on planets within the solar 
system is a limitation of our current equipment, as the Aetherians would have it. Or, more 
pertinently, in the case of Laura Eisenhower it can be suggested that evidence of the planned 
evacuation of Earth by the ‘Global Elite’ is being suppressed and that its revelation would 
amount to eschatological fulfilment – the whole syncretic melange of beliefs would be 
confirmed by this affirmation of this keystone. Thus the status of knowledge has become a 
vital part of the conspiratualist world picture. Rather than science being an opposing form of 
knowledge it can be an ally that is waiting to fully realize its potential. It is in this 
contestation over objective reality that situates the UFO religions within a shared discursive 
space with conspiracy theorists. To borrow from Barkun’s schema, the UFO religions derive 
their discursive status in relation to, and tandem with, other forms of stigmatized knowledge, 
namely suppressed knowledge and rejected knowledge (Barkun 2006).48 Indeed, Barkun uses 
examples of UFO conspiracy theories to illustrate these two sub-categories. The more 
organised and structured UFO religions provide narratives that are sufficiently internally 
consistent for them to eschew external sources for further support or proof (Rael, for instance, 
dismisses other claims of human-alien contact: “there is [sic] no other Messengers and any 
group claiming such  things are just imposters.”49 In contrast, highly syncretic emergent 
religious forms which lack the structured beliefs that foundational texts provide will often 
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align themselves with well-established truth-claims from within the conspiratorial milieu. For 
both structured and unstructured UFO religions the stakes are the same: the stigmatization of 
their epistemic foundations calls into question their belief system as a whole. 
 
Conclusion 
Nonetheless, the treatment of this stigmatized knowledge is not consistently the ridicule and 
rejection that Barkun’s position would suggest. Recent coverage of both Laura Eisenhower 
and the Raelian movement has been largely sympathetic. Both have been covered by news 
outlets: The Examiner (US, Eisenhower) and The Daily Mail (UK, Raelians). Neither are 
looked to as mainstream, news sources but both tend toward a normative, culturally 
conservative line, so it is perhaps surprising that they both show little hostility toward 
Eisenhower and the Raelians. The Daily Mail ran a predictably sensationalist headline 
(“We're creating an embassy to welcome the Elohim back to Earth!' Inside the wacky world 
of the Raëlians - a cult who think humans are descended from ALIENS”) but provided a 
relatively open platform to Glenn Carter, head of UK Raëlian operations.50 The Daily Mail 
has since drawn on Raëlian spokespeople to comment on stories reporting purported UFO 
sightings.51 The Examiner was even more sympathetic to Laura Eisenhower and ran a story 
titled, ‘Whistleblower Laura Magdalene Eisenhower, Ike's great-granddaughter, outs secret 
Mars colony project’ which interviewed Eisenhower and provided links to recorded web 
radio broadcasts and her webpages.52 Although of little consequence in the wider public 
sphere these stories show a greater tolerance for UFO spiritualities within the cultural 
mainstream than might be otherwise expected. The mass media is here not generative of 
stigma in the way that Barkun suggests. Whilst the publications do not embrace Eisenhower’s 
position, nor that of the Raëlians, they are provided space amidst celebrity gossip and 
reactionary editorials. They are presented as part of the fabric of current cultural expression 
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and so it is argued here that this is because of the inherent tendency for new semantic figures 
– be they evidenced or fantasy – to convey the protean fears and hopes of an age: typifying 
Williams’ structures of feeling and  Jameson’s impoverished cognitive maps. UFO centred 
conspiritualities are part of a discursive field that incorporates the New Age and its 
antecedents, Gagarin and conspiracy theories; indeed, UFO conspiritualities are vital to 
providing the shade and nuance through which perceptions of the impact on human subjects 
and agency by our first, faltering steps along the celestial path can be explored and integrated 
into a hesitant culture overwhelmed by the cosmic scale of our emergent space age 
subjectivities. Certainly, these perspectives described are not general or mainstream. These 
are minority beliefs. The following table shows web traffic to the homepages of Laura 
Eisenhower, the Aetherius Society and the Raëlian Movement. Superficially, the 83,000 
visitors to the Aetherius  represent a considerable number of visitors  but, by the same 
measures, the most popular religious websites reveal these to be relatively low visitor 
numbers with the visitors staying for less time and viewing fewer pages.53  
 Visits per month 
(September 2016) 
Length of visit Pages viewed Origin of visitors 
Cosmic Gaia 
(Eisenhower) 
3900 1:57 1.54  US (35%), New Zealand 
(23%) Canada (17%) +7 
Aetherius 
Society 
83200 1:14 1.58 US (49%), UK (9%), India 
(7%) +36 
Rael 46700 1:47 2.38 France (13%), US (11%), 
Turkey (9%) +35 
By comparison, the most frequently visited religious websites, the official Jehovah’s 
Witnesses website, received 73.9 million monthly visitors in the same period with visitors 
looking at, on average, six pages for just over a seven minutes. Other popular religious 
websites reporting similar figures. Not only do the cosmic NRMs not attract comparable 
numbers but they do not achieve the same level of engagement. Nonetheless, these groups 
represent an emerging tendency within Western religious life. They also demonstrate a 
notable resilience. The Aetherius Society is unusual among NRMs for surviving, and 
thriving, following it’s the death of its founder, George King. Laura Magdalene Eisenhower’s 
number of web visitors is notably lower than the more established, institutionally grounded 
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religious movements but she has been discussed as an exemplar of the multitudinous ‘light 
workers’ who incorporate conspiritual motifs in their practice and public statements. Her 
exposure in the mainstream news media in addition to her familial status in the US makes 
Eisenhower notable but her beliefs are not unusual within the milieu in which she operates. A 
list of comparable figures might include (but should not be limited to) Steve and Barbara 
Rother, Ivo A. Benda/Universe People, Ascension Research Center, Church of the Cosmos, 
Sandy Stevenson, Cameron Day, Greg Prescott and the in5D media initiative. The examples 
discussed in this articles exemplify an aggregated inclination toward a cosmically-informed 
spiritual outlook. The key point is that whilst this article does not purport to identify a general 
trend within human religious thought and recognizes the limited spread of the ‘cosmic 
NRMs’ it is intended to demonstrate that the space age has effected change within human 
religious thought. It must be acknowledged, then, that this phenomenon is marginal but this is 
a change that is sufficiently resonant with current sensibilities to attract believers around the 
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The Bitter End: Apocalypse and conspiracy in white nationalist responses to Islamic 
State terrorism 
Andrew Fergus Wilson 
 
Abstract 
This paper will examine how apocalyptic thinking converges with the use of conspiracy 
theory in white nationalist worldviews at a time of crisis. Apocalyptic thinking is, typically, a 
religious response to secular threats to the faith community prophesising, or attendant on, ‘the 
End’; these millenarian outlooks provide communities in crisis a promise of confirmation of 
the object of their faith, the vanquishing of enemies, and, crucially, continuity for the 
community in a better world to come. In the latter half of the twentieth century and the early 
years of the twenty-first, apocalypticism and conspiracy theory have tended to coincide. The 
tendency toward a binary distinction between terms of absolute good and absolute evil and 
the revelation of secrets relating to human destiny through prophesy or ‘truth-seeking’ 
provide a broad transposability between the two interpretative strategies. An increasing 
amalgamation of political paranoia and eschatology have given rise to what has been termed 
‘conspirituality’. Much recent white nationalist rhetoric can be understood to be produced 
from this discursive position and this analysis will demonstrate how one white nationalist we 
community drew on conspiratorial apocalypticism in its response to the multiple IS attacks in 
Paris on 13-14th November 2015. 







The apocalyptic is a milieu informed and shaped by a teleological understanding of human 
societies: all things will pass. In rare instances (some deep ecology) the non-human is 
positioned at the heart of the ‘end’ but, primarily, the concern expressed is one with the end 
of human history, or, in certain instances, a section of humanity. What constitutes the end is 
moot but, with few, again largely ecological, exceptions, the source of events is generally 
extrinsic and prophesised from within a community of believers. With the exception of 
secular accounts of environmental or cosmological disaster (global warming, asteroid impact) 
a small proportion of humanity will typically survive; these are invariably cast as fulfilling 
the principles, characteristics or zeal of the community from which prophecy emerges. This 
survival, in most cases, provides the surviving remnant of humanity a new chance of creating 
a society reflecting the values of the chosen community or, more usually, a prophesised 
paradise on Earth. This general structure of apocalyptic prophecy is fluid and adaptive, drawn 
upon primarily, but not exclusively, by religious communities. Importantly, though, it is 
crucial here to retain the idea that apocalypticism is not the preserve of religious thought, so, 
for instance, there is a literature that points to the millenarian structures of Marxist teleology1 
(Hall 2009; Zimdars-Swartz & Zimdars-Swartz 2000; Baumgartner 1999). As this paper will 
seek to show, the apocalyptic outlook of current white nationalist thinking demonstrates the 
potential threat implicit in the seriousness with which the extreme far right consider their 
position. Here, then, the religious and political potential within apocalyptic thinking will be 
shown to merge and amplify the potency of each position.  
The following identifies trends within the messages posted to the white nationalist web forum 
Stormfront in the wake of the Islamic State (IS) attacks on Paris during the night of 13th 
November and early morning of 14th November 2015 and frames an analysis of the messages 
in millenarian terms. The November attacks were the culmination of a wave of IS violence in 
France during 2015 that began with a fatal attack on the offices of satirical magazine Charlie 
Hebdo in January. On the evening of November 13, three groups of terrorists launched a 
series of attacks on public spaces in Paris including a football match between France and 
Germany at the Stade de Paris, a music concert at the Bataclan, and streets known for their 
nightlife. 130 victims were killed and over 350 injured with the majority of deaths coming at 
 
1 Fredric J. Baumgartner, Longing for the End: A History of Millennialism in Western Civilization (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 1999); John R. Hall, Apocalypse: From Antiquity to the Empire of Modernity (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2009); Sandra L. Zimdars-Swartz and Paul F. Zimdars-Swartz, “Apocalypticism in Modern Western 
Europe,” in The Encyclopedia of Apocalypticism, Volume 3: Apocalypticism in the Modern Period and the 




an Eagles of Death Metal concert during a siege and mass shooting of the assembled crowd. 
The IS statement claiming responsibility for the attacks was clear in its framing of the attack 
as part of an ongoing attack on secular, ‘Western values’. It described Paris as the, “capital of 
prostitution and obscenity,” and the French and German football teams as representing, 
“Crusader,” countries.2 In doing so it revealed a dichotomous staging of religious values and 
cultural exclusivity that depends upon the same binary logic of identity drawn upon within 
white nationalism. This reductionist view of identity was evident in the responses to the 
attack by white nationalists.  
Stormfront was chosen as it provided an opportunity to observe a community responding to a 
period of crisis in which culture and race (intrinsically, in racist discourse) are used as the 
loci through which the community mobilise their shared identification as a defence against a 
perceived external threat. It is in moments such as these that politically paranoid groups are at 
the greatest likelihood to perceive the immanence of 'their' apocalypse and so they are most 
likely to be most rigorous in determining the boundaries of their identity. Given the inchoate 
nature of an international community of 'nationalists' negotiating a shared understanding of 
'whiteness' it is in this perceived time of crisis in which, for them, ‘the end' is coming soon 
that we are most immediately able to map the current dominant forms of belligerent 
nationalism and the cultural worlds they operate within. 
 
Social Context and the End of the World 
It is common to much of the literature on apocalyptica that the social context of prophecies of 
‘the end’ is a primary influence on the formation of an apocalyptic outlook. So, for instance, 
the seminal Norman Cohn, in The Pursuit of the Millennium (1970) suggested that the Jewish 
and Christian apocalyptica served a social function, ‘[A]ll these prophecies were devices by 
which religious groups, at first, Jewish and then Christian, consoled, fortified and asserted 
themselves when confronted by the threat or reality of oppression.’3 He identifies Daniel’s 
dream in the Book of Daniel (c.165 B.C.) as ‘the earliest apocalypse,’4 (Ibid, 20). For Cohn, 
it was composed in response to a time of oppression and strife for the Jews of Palestine 
 
2 Rukmini Callimachi, ‘ISIS Claims Responsibility, Calling Paris Attacks ‘First of the Storm”, New York Times, 
14 November, 2015 
3 Norman Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), 19. 




following the attempted outlawing of Judaism during the Seleucid takeover of Palestine (175-
163BC) and offered the oppressed community a promise of hope in the form of divinely 
ordained improved circumstances. Nonetheless, Daniel’s vision is not straightforwardly of a 
life paradisiacal but instead only offers paradise following a period of intense and violent 
strife in which a ‘false prince of peace’ brings suffering for the powerful and to the faithful 
whilst revelling in his own pride: 
23. And in the latter time of their kingdom, when their transgressors are come to the 
full, a king of fierce countenance, and understanding dark sentences, shall stand up. 
24. And his power shall be mighty, but not by his own power: and he shall destroy 
wonderfully, and shall prosper, and practise, and shall destroy the mighty and the holy 
people. 
25. And through his policy also he shall cause craft to prosper in his hand; and he 
shall magnify himself in his heart, and by peace shall destroy many: he shall also 
stand up against the Prince of princes; but he shall be broken without hand. 
Daniel 8:23-25 (KJV) 
Despite allowing his pride to set himself against God, the false Prince’s death is preordained; 
the historical context would suggest, then, that the Jews who kept their faith and resisted the 
Hellenization of Palestine under Antiochus IV Epiphanes will see their oppressor struck 
down by the will of their God. And so, in the primary Apocalypse the cast is set: after a time 
of suffering, the chosen people will be freed from their suffering. Following the book of 
Daniel, the Tanakh/Old Testament of the Christian Bible incorporates a number of other 
apocalyptic prophecies. At times of persecution or of worldly challenges to the faith there is, 
typically, an apocalyptic prophecy promising the return of a vengeful form of God who saves 
or assures the continuation of the people of the faith. These themes can be found in Isaiah, 
Ezekiel (in which we find the Gog and Magog of Revelation 38-39) and Zechariah. In The 
Method and Message of the Jewish Apocalyptic (1964), D.S. Russell points to passages in 
Ezekiel that refer to earlier OT texts and demonstrates, although not in these terms, the 
intertextual borrowings of the Jewish apocalyptic traditions5. 
 





If we are to follow Russell, the apocalyptic, before the time of Christ, was developing into a 
resource of ideas, motifs and promises that were drawn upon and recontextualised according 
to the demands of the moment. Russell is clear on this point and argues for a well-established 
apocalyptic tradition before the time of Christ, 
The apocalyptic books constitute a record of [the inter-testamental] years, not in terms 
of historical event, but in terms of the response of faith which the nation was called to 
make. They cannot be understood apart from the religious, political, and economic 
circumstances of the times, nor can the times themselves be understood apart from 
these books whose hopes and fears echo and re-echo the faith of God’s chosen 
people.6  
Although certainly the products of an imaginary archive of hope, what is crucial here is the 
idea of the apocalyptic as a response to worldly conditions; prophets should not be considered 
as the bearers of a sanctified pathology but as faithful representatives of a community of 
believers seeking the means to galvanise or renew their communities. The rich symbology of 
the early Jewish apocalyptica did not fade away with the rise of Christianity, far from it.  
As will be discussed, the Jewish prophetic canon is still used today as a prophecy resource 
but was also a key informant of the structure and content of early Christian apocalyptic 
prophecy. The influence of Jewish apocalyptica is evident throughout the Revelation of St. 
John. Again, from Russell, ‘[F]amiliar features of Jewish apocalyptic are evident throughout 
the whole book – fantastic imagery, symbolic language, angelic powers of evil, the 
resurrection, the judgment, the messianic kingdom, the world to come.’7 Despite the 
flamboyance of the language and the dramatic imagery the tendency is to interpret it as being 
primarily of its age and this tendency in academic responses has been in evidence for some 
time, as this following observation from Martin Kiddle’s (1949) The Revelation of St John is 
testament to, 
John has baffled his later commentators, it seems, much more than his original 
readers. Of one thing we may be quite certain; John had not the slightest intention of 
including in his book curious apocalyptic material with no bearing on the central 
problem of contemporary affairs. His first and last concern was with the churches; 
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Revelation was a life and death message to the faithful [...] John was writing to those 
about to die for their faith.8  (Kiddle 1949, 193)  
Since its (disputed) composition by John of Patmos during the mid-90s CE, Revelation has 
been the object of a ceaseless proliferation of interpretations and applications. In almost every 
instance, the unifying tendency has been to see the unfolding of the prophecy as immanent 
and real. Similarly, in addition to speaking to a community suffering a crisis during a time of 
persecution, Baumgartner emphasises the role of John’s Revelation as an evangelical tool, 
calling upon the faithful to be steadfast in their faith, 
The primary millennial work in Christianity, the Revelation of John of Patmos, also 
was a product of persecution in the form of exile, to which he refers in his 
introduction. Far from dampening millennial expectations as Paul sought to do, John 
was clearly intent on inflaming them.9 
Eugen Weber describes Christianity’s first couple of centuries as being rife with chiliastic 
movements full of fervour for Christ’s return but points to the growing conservativism of the 
early Church as a foil to this fervour10. For Weber, it is Origen’s 3rd Century intervention that 
diminishes the importance of Revelation in the canon with Origen painting the dangers of 
taking it literally as evidence of ‘Jewish tendencies’. This diminished status has been long 
lasting but whilst the Church has reduced its apocalyptic tendencies for this – and other 
ecumenical reasons – Revelation has continued to be used by popular movements and a 
variety of sects and schisms from the violence of John of Leyden’s Anabaptists in Münster to 
the Great Disappointment of the Millerites. More than this, though, it is not just Revelation 
that inspired Christian radicals but also the Jewish books of prophecy. As Wojcik points out 
many of these prophecies from the Jewish canon are still being cited today as descriptions of 
current or coming events11. For example, he points to ‘prophecy believers [who] searched the 
bible for possible allusions to nuclear conflagration,’12 and found evidence in Zechariah 
(14:12), Malachi (3:19) as well as New Testament sources. The search for signs of prophecy 
is not something that belongs to the past and has by no means been usurped by reason. More 
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recently than Wojcik’s examples, Ed Kalnins, pastor of the Wasilla Assembly of God 
Church, cites conflict in the Middle East, America’s dependence on foreign oil and the 
depletion of energy reserves as evidence that ‘storm clouds are gathering’. He told The Times 
in 2008, ‘Scripture specifically mentions oil instability as a sign of the Rapture. We’re seeing 
more and more oil wars. The contractions of the fulfilment of prophecies are getting tighter 
and tighter.’13 Kalnin’s significance and a spur to his exposure in The Times is that his church 
congregation once included Sarah Palin, the 2008 vice-presidential candidate of the U.S. 
Republican party and current pro-Donald Trump political commentator.  
 
The Politics of the Right and the Endtimes 
The American political right wing has had a long-standing relationship with conservative 
Christianity. The indebtedness to the ‘silent majority’ of politically and theologically 
conservative Protestantism of the New Right project of the 1970s and 1980s is well 
documented and does not need rehearsing here. Instead, a few salient points regarding the 
nature of the congregations whose beliefs find representation the outlook of the Republican 
party should be noted. Kalnin’s reference to ‘the Rapture’ is not figurative but reflects a 
Rapture readiness amongst US evangelical congregations. The majority of these are 
dispensational premillennialists – dispensationalism indicating a belief in history being 
composed of a series of dispensations, or tests, of the chosen people and premillennial 
referring to a belief in the physical return of Christ in advance of a thousand years of 
Christian dominion on Earth. Postmillennialism (Christ’s Second Coming occurring 
following a thousand years of perfected living) had dominated for much of the early history 
of the US Postmillennialism but from roughly mid-nineteenth century onwards 
premillennialism has come to dominate U.S. Protestantism. A hermeneutic imperative drives 
much DP (Dispensationalist Premillennialism) and underpins the highly rationalized 
approach to Bible study undertaken by Dispensationalists. There is a consistently applied 
interpretation of the world as it unfolds around them guiding the outlook and lives of DPs. As 
has been stated, DP is based upon a literal reading of the Bible and, more particularly, a 
reading of Revelation which seeks to locate the events which will develop into the Seventh 
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Dispensation in current History. Thus, world events are woven into the fabric of Biblical 
prophecy and ‘signs of the End Times’ are frequently perceived in the world around us. 
Cohn warns against this commingling of apocalyptic prophecy and politics; indeed, he saw in 
the model of a society removed of all inner contradictions and ‘agents of corruption,’ a means 
by which the Utopian social violence of Lenin and Hitler could be understood14. And it is in 
the impression of an achievable fulfilment of prophecy that the promise of the apocalyptic is 
at its most potent and dangerous. This danger is evident in Dan Cohn-Sherbok’s (2006) The 
Politics of Apocalypse: The History and Influence of Christian Zionism15. In this, he 
demonstrates the complex relationship between dispensational premillennialism and Judaism. 
For DP readings of prophecy to be fulfilled the Temple on the Mount must be rebuilt in 
Jerusalem. The site is currently occupied by the Al Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock - 
both significant sites within Islam. The dispensational eschatological necessity thus has a 
profound and potentially dangerous political dimension. Cohn-Sherbrook notes the influential 
and powerful networks in which the Christian Zionist movement circulates, 
Christian Zionist organizations and the pro-Israel lobby are among the special interest 
groups whose concerns have converged since Bush was first elected president. These 
interest groups include the right wing of the Republican Party; neo-Conservatives; 
multinational construction firms; the petroleum industry and the arms industry; the 
pro-Israel lobby and think tanks; and fundamentalist Christian Zionists.16 
Christian Zionism is not the only tendency within DP believers and it should be noted that not 
all are as prepared to immanentize the eschaton to the extent that Christian Zionism appears 
prepared to. Wojcik usefully points out that within dispensational Christianity there are 
arguments against direct intervention in worldly matters - and thus politics17. Part of the 
rationale is developed from a position of a deep distrust toward politics and statecraft. This 
distrust is due, in no small part, to Hal Lindsay’s 1970 work of populist eschatology, The 
Late Great Planet Earth.  In this, Lindsay interprets Biblical texts and draws from them the 
suggestion that an expanded European Economic Community – the forerunner to the EU – 
would, as a revived Roman Empire, be the grounds from which the Antichrist of Revelation 
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would emerge. Notably, The Late, Great Planet Earth was a huge commercial and 
evangelical success; it was, according to the New York Times, the bestselling non-fiction 
book of the 1970s whilst inspiring a hugely successful industry in populist premillennial 
speculation18 (Shuck 2004). Lindsay’s powerful rhetoric and willingness to map Biblical 
prophecy revitalised the US evangelical movement and bred within it an interest in but 
distrust of political life. So, for instance, Wojcik points to the fatalism that spread within 
dispensationalism, 
[There is a] widespread dispensationalist belief that international peace efforts are the 
work of satanic forces, with organizations such as the European Community and the 
United Nations, as well as various governmental and church institutions, considered to 
be part of a worldwide, evil conspiracy. Human efforts to improve the world are 
considered not only useless but possibly satanic, and believers are freed from moral 
obligations to save it from annihilation because the world's problems and ultimate 
destruction are part of the divine plan.19 
Here, in raising the spectre of an evil conspiracy guiding world events, it becomes evident 
that the populist apocalypticism of premillennial dispensationalism lends itself readily to the 
rhetoric of conspiracy theory. Each relies upon the figure of a vast, hidden network of ‘evil’: 
in DP it is the work of the Antichrist, in conspiracy it is invariably a secret cabal working 
toward (global) domination and the downfall of the community to whom the conspiracy 
theorists belong. The more typically political outlook of conspiracy might not, on the surface 
of things, appear to lend itself 
Although Lindsey does not advocate political activism there is clearly a political dimension 
to his analysis, indeed, his support for the Reagan White House would seem to belie his 
apparent fatalism. Lindsay’s influence in the White House during the Reagan presidency was 
extensive; his consultancy was hired to by the US Congress and the Pentagon whilst Lindsay 
was invited by Reagan to speak at the Pentagon20 (New 2002). Whilst impatient believers in 
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the coming apocalypse may have seen their influence wane in US politics, they remain a 
significant proportion of the US population.  
 
Apocalypse and Conspiracy 
Mark Fenster notes the complex and contradictory position that Lindsey and other Christian 
conservatives take; it is constantly renegotiated as circumstances and fortunes change21. 
Satanic forces are ever ready in the world of DP but the extent to which the faithful engage 
with the world can change – as can the guise the Antichrist takes. So, after the fall of the 
Soviet Union, it could no longer take on the role of ‘Gog’ as it ‘traditionally’ has within the 
modern prophetic tradition. The fluidity of prophecy and the dualistic nature of the final 
reckoning mirrors the simplistic reflexive work done to reconfigure conspiracy theory as 
events overtake theory. Fenster suggests that Millennialism and conspiracy theory relying on 
a dualistic division of the world into 'good' and 'evil' establishes the portability of narratives 
from one milieu to another, 
One of the most important aspects of popular eschatology that works within many of 
the teachings and political views of conservative Christianity is the tendency to view 
historical and current events in terms of vast conspiracies led by knowing and 
unwitting agents of Satan. The tendency to divide reality into antitheses of good and 
evil, and to place such antitheses within a historical narrative that seeks to understand 
the natural through the supernatural, leads to a specific type of cognitive 
understanding and mapping that structures the interpretation and understanding of 
events.22  
Clearly drawing on Jameson’s description of conspiracy theory as, ‘the poor person's 
cognitive mapping in the postmodern age; it is a degraded figure of the total logic of late 
capital, a desperate attempt to represent the latter's system,’23.  In borrowing from Jameson, 
Fenster is making the case that millennialism draws upon an interpretative strategy which is 
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not uncommon amongst dispossessed and threatened communities. And Jameson’s 
observations on conspiracy theory are worth dwelling on: Here, conspiracy theory is an 
attempt at representing the ‘total logic of late capital,' where no other means are available. 
This situates conspiracy as a narrative – a representational mode – essentially a story, by 
means of which the excess of signifiers that proliferate in postmodernity can be tied to a 
small and manageable number of signifieds. So it is, then, that for Jameson accounts which 
narrativize and provide coherency to an otherwise incomprehensible situation provide the 
opportunity for meaning regardless of how limited and apparently irrational that meaning 
may be. The forces of the Antichrist stirring in a federal Europe are easier to grasp than the 
intangible, overwhelming and evershifting movement of global capital. In other words, 
conspiracy forces all complexities and contradictions to resolve themselves within the 
hermeneutic framework established by the terms of the conspiracists’ narratives. In this 
sense, we can understand the usefulness which Jameson saw in the figure of ‘mapping’ as the 
conspiracists draw a map of the conditions of life in postmodernity. These maps may be 
‘degraded’ but despite this and in spite of the total system of alienating domination, Jameson 
still recognises a utopian impulse in conspiracy. To reiterate, Fenster confirms Jameson’s 
approach and recognises the political structuration of the conspiracy narrative’s organisation 
of a totalised and fully integrated economic, cultural, social, political totality.  Because of the 
importance that conspiracy theorists allot to revealing to the alienated ‘sheeple’ the 
conspiracy orchestrating this totality, there is a claim to agency, of the reinsertion of the 
individual subject into history: 
[I]n its attempt to reveal a hidden truth that challenges the alienated social 
conceptualized within classical liberal thought, the conspiracy represents a utopian 
desire to reflect upon and confront the contradictions and conflicts of the 
contemporary democratic state and capitalism.24 
Conspiracy betokens a lack of understanding and a naïve utopian impulse in Jameson’s 
reading, however, here Fenster extends this to consider conspiracy as an enabler of agency or, 
at least, as a source of meaning. More than, though, Fenster identifies conspiracy theory as a 
means by which communities might reassert agency; there is something progressive about the 
way he describes it as demonstrative of the manner in which, ‘religious, racial, ethnic, gender 
and sexual minorities and dominated groups must continually attempt to articulate their 
 




histories and versions of the historical process against the dominant, "consensus" history.’25 
The inclusiveness of the examples here point to a liberating role for conspiracy theory but it 
should be noted that conspiracy theories, whilst not exclusively stemming from reactionary 
sources, have tended to reflect conservative values; hence the appeal to the conservative 
Christianity of dispensational premillennialists. In his early study of conspiracy theory, ‘The 
Paranoid Style in American Politics’, Richard Hofstadter cast conspiracy as a style of 
political rhetoric characterised by a tendency to an exaggerated suspicion that unseen forces 
are secretly working against a particular group within society. He was careful to delineate 
between his use of the term ‘paranoid’ and its use as a pathology; in the following passage it 
is also clear that he sought to demonstrate the political paranoid style relied upon a sense of 
communal threat, 
[T]here is a vital difference between the paranoid spokesman in politics and the 
clinical paranoiac: although they both tend to be overheated, oversuspicious, 
overaggressive, grandiose, and apocalyptic in expression, the clinical paranoid sees 
the hostile and conspiratorial world as necessarily directed against him; whereas the 
spokesman of the paranoid style finds it directed against a nation, a culture and a way 
of life whose fate affects not himself alone but millions of others.26 
In so doing, Hofstadter had identified a further path to the convergence of apocalyptic 
thought and conspiracy theory that has also been identified in the work of both Wojcik and 
Fenster. It is in this that the figure of the conspiracy theorist takes on a heroic cast and, in 
their position of ‘heightened understanding’, they position themselves at the heart of a vast 
historical struggle, ‘The paranoid spokesman sees the fate of this conspiracy in apocalyptic 
terms--he traffics in the birth and death of whole worlds, whole political orders, whole 
systems of human values. He is always manning the barricades of civilization.’27 For 
Hofstadter, the conspiracist deals only in absolutes (good versus evil, survival versus 
destruction) so that defeat by the ‘forces of evil’ is also absolute and would mean the end for 
the conspiracist and his or her beleaguered ‘nation’. Michael Barkun’s (2003) more recent 
survey of conspiracy theory delineates a graduated typology of conspiracy28. Although all 
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conspiracies share similar qualities Barkun is keen to make clear the differing forms of 
conspiracy theory; he identifies these as: 
Event Conspiracies. These are limited in scope and relate to a single event or a limited 
series of events with no general implications beyond those caused by the objective of 
the conspiracy. Barkun cites the Kennedy assassination and the plot to target African-
Americans with the AIDS virus 
Systematic conspiracies. These are widespread conspiracies that have broader 
objectives than event conspiracies but are mobilised from within a single source: 
communists, Masons, Jews, the Catholic Church and so forth 
Superconspiracies. These are ‘nested’ global conspiracies that feature complex, multi-
layered plots with conspiracies within conspiracies but ultimately controlled by a 
hidden group of evil conspirators.  
This latter type has become increasingly pervasive over the past 30-40 years with an 
increasing complexity that seeks to contain the otherwise delimited plots of event and 
systematic conspiracies. The superconspiracy incorporates all other plots and fulfils the 
totalising resolution of contradictions that Jameson described. Barkun identifies in the fluidity 
and slippery exegetical elusiveness of superconspiracies a tendency toward bricolage that is 
also shared by what is, for him, an emerging form of millennialism: improvisational 
millennialism. A developed form of syncretism, improvisational millennialism draws 
disparate elements together into a contingent but holistic ordering of meaning within an 
apocalyptic framework. It transcends and incorporates the discrete worlds of religious and 
secular apocalypses. Barkun suggests that improvisational millennialism has emerged due to 
the simultaneous coincidence of two factors: (i) a wide range of resources in circulation from 
which the improvisations can be fashioned and (ii) weakened authoritative accounts of social, 
theological or scientific reality permitting the ready circulation of alternative explanations. In 
addition to a proliferation of other media, the internet has, in the absence of gatekeepers, 
permitted the sharing of extensive variations on what Barkun describes as ‘stigmatized 
knowledge’ and thus fulfilling this first criterion whilst no general system of knowledge is 
untroubled by challenges to its validity or ethics. It is in this space that competing 
millennialisms compete, each formation attracting, and sometimes sharing, its own audience. 




ubiquity of ‘information’ offered through it, to also exacerbate the erosion of dependence of 
trust in what were previously held to be reliable sources; further, the capacity to disseminate 
information without prejudice similarly holds an allure for the ‘truther’ or the would-be 
prophet, ‘one effect of the Internet is to obscure the distinction between mainstream and 
fringe sources, another is to bind together individuals who hold fringe views. The validation 
that comes from seeing one’s beliefs echoed by others provides a sense of connection for 
otherwise isolated individuals.’29 The first point is crucial to attracting new or potential 
converts and the second is crucial to the negotiation and maintenance of group and individual 
identities.  
 
Apocalypse, Conspiracy and the Far Right 
Barkun’s study builds on these themes to explore the presence of anti-Semitism within UFO   
theory and cosmic apocalypticism. In this, he was delineating the field of conspiracy-
informed spiritualities made up, in equal parts, of conspiracy theory, New Age UFOlogy, and 
improvisational millennialism that Charlotte Ward and David Voas would come to term, 
‘conspirituality’30. In the face of these outré bricolage beliefs, the imaginary of white 
nationalists might seem prosaic and dated. Barkun brackets nationalism in the archaic form of 
secular millennialism, seeing it as one of the,  
[I]slands of secular millennialism [that] appear in the resurgence of ethnic nationalism 
[…] in the racist and xenophobic movements that are prominent in Western and 
Central Europe and, to a lesser extent, in North America […] they emerge in some 
antiglobalization rhetoric, with its implied nostalgia for a lost golden age of self-
sufficient communities.31 
Certainly, the nationalism of the far right can be considered in these terms and, for instance, 
Kaplan’s consideration of the Christian Identity movement with its ‘commingling of text and 
current events – the Bible and CNN’32 reflects this but even prior to the widespread adoption 
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of the internet and the conspiracy year zero event of 9/11, Christian Identity was somewhat 
dated and definitely of the ‘old world.’ Kaplan sees Christian Identity believers as being 
strongly reminiscent of earlier millennialists; although they reject the Jewish influence upon 
Christianity they still, nonetheless, and perhaps naively, embrace its embedded patterns of 
prophecy and redemption. But even in its archaic millennialism, the Christian Identity had 
combined secular and religious millennialisms and in so doing had problematized the 
distinctions. So, whilst it is understandable that Barkun would seek to maintain the integrity 
of these earlier forms of millennialism by casting racist nationalisms within the secular 
millennialist tradition to do so would be to overlook the extent to which it is rapidly 
becoming characterized by the flexibility (within the terms of belligerent racist discourse) 
associated with improvisational millennialism. The presumed dichotomy that separates 
religious and secular millennialisms is increasingly undone by the extent to which the divide 
has been undermined by Barkun’s synthesising third term. Much recent white nationalism has 
been composed of the range of stigmatized knowledge Barkun describes as typifying 
improvisational millennialism. The hollow Earth, extra-terrestrial spiritual dimension escape 
route employed by Hitler coupled with yoga cosmic conflict and conspiracy theory that is 
described in the Nazi millennialism of Miguel Serrano33 coincides with many of the 
touchstones mentioned by Barkun. Similarly, the blending of strands of white nationalism 
with new religions, especially neo-paganisms.34 The blending of the secular with the religious 
and commingling of faith, nation and conspiracy has yielded a particular iteration of white 
nationalism that eschews traditional markers of national identity for a wider sense of 
belonging to, and apocalyptic fears for, an ethnonationalist ‘spiritual homeland’. In 
Millennium Rage, Philip Lamy situates this kind of fear of communal disappearance in the 
context of white supremacist survivalists, 
To white supremacist survivalists, the new world order is viewed in terms of 
multiculturalism, cultural relativism, political correctness, and "polyglot mud people" 
- immigrants and minorities despised by the Aryan Nations and other white 
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supremacists and viewed as henchmen to the Jews. They point to the Protocols of the 
Learned Elders of Zion and to the belief in the mythical Jewish-led conspiracy to take 
over the world, a truly apocalyptic event.35 (Lamy 1996, 249) 
Stripped of the overt racism, this echoes much of paranoid rhetoric that characterises some 
threads in the general warp and weft of premillennial dispensationalism whilst also mirroring 
the content of much recent conspiracy theory. Nonetheless, it was an overtly racialist 
interpretation of Biblical sources by the Christian Identity movement that demarcated them 
from other Christian millennialists. So, typically, Montana Freemen, a sect within Christian 
Identity, described by Catherine Wessinger in How the Millennium Comes Violently held that 
their racial separatism was divinely inspired, that Europeans were the true Israelites and that 
other ‘races’ were ‘the children of Cain’.36 It is precisely in this admixture of racialism and 
religion that Barkun’s improvisational millennialism is made manifest and, most pertinently 
here, with the heroic surety of the defenders of (a) civilization, a potentially lethal ‘cognitive 
map’ is drawn up by adherents. It is here that the all-or-nothing stakes of paranoid 
apocalypticism are at their most apparent. The violence of The Order (Brüder 
Schweigen/Silent Brotherhood), Frazier Glenn Miller, Jr. (Overland Park Jewish Community 
Center shooting), or Anders Breivik is rooted in the discursive fields that are still tended to by 
many nationalists and, as will be shown, these distinct manifestations of white nationalist 
violence and those described above retain a currency among internet active white nationalists. 
 
White Nationalist Response to the Paris Attacks of 2015 
Stormfront is one of the busiest WN websites and attracts an international audience. In the 90 
days between 28th August 2015 and 25th November 2015, it attracted over two and a quarter 
million unique visitors and these visitors viewed just under eighteen and a half million pages. 
The majority of visitors were from the US (78%), the UK (14%), Canada (9%), Australia 
(5%), the Netherlands (4%), Serbia (3%), Brazil (3%), Spain (3%) with tens of thousands of 
visitors from a number of other nations including India, Sweden, Croatia, Mexico, South 
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Africa, Argentina, Belgium, Finland, Poland and France37. It keeps the majority of the forum 
open without registration necessary to access it; there are multiple sub-forums covering a 
variety of topics and sub-fora dedicated to geographically specific nationalist scenes. The 
disparate locations and varied nationalisms in evidence on stormfront.org underline Barkun’s 
observations regarding the echoing back to lonely individuals of their otherwise stigmatised 
viewpoints. There is a solidarity borne of a mutual awareness of their outsider status. 
Stormfront regulates statements of religious belief within its fora with the subforum dedicated 
to formal religious discussion accessible only to signed-up members and even then only by 
application and vetting. Members are restricted to invoking their deities for rhetorical 
emphasis only. Nonetheless, a palpable sense of apocalyptic longing is in evidence and the 
curbing of religious expression effectively forces forum members to express these 
apocalyptic perspectives in secular terms. However, these secular expressions of apocalyptic 
belief are invariably phrased in terms of superconspiracies that situate the white nationalist 
community in the heroic role of countering the civilization-threatening plots of the 
conspirators.   
The Paris attacks yielded a dedicated thread, 'BREAKING NEWS: 18 dead in Paris terror 
attack' in the 'News/Newslinks and Articles' sub-forum; the title was sporadically updated as 
new information about the attacks became available. Within a week, it had attracted over 
100,000 views and more than 1700 separate posts. It was evident that the majority of posters 
betrayed a conspiracist mindset. By the seventh post on the thread, the figure of a Jewish 
conspiracy had been invoked by a poster with the forum name, Varietas Caucasia, 
Shooting is said to be continuing. 
Will whites wake up? If they blew up the stadium, I'd wager.... 
The Ancient Regime were paragons of virtue and beneficence and the tribune of the 
French compared to the traitors in France today. 
 





And on the topic of Jews, for guests, remember, just because some Jews died in 
Charlie Hebdo doesn't mean the Jews don't want this to happen and aren't 
participating. Information on Jews helping to destroy Europe RIGHT NOW: 
This is followed by a series of links to websites claiming to unmask a Jewish conspiracy to 
undermine Europe. The idea that Jews manipulated the IS terrorists is popular throughout the 
thread, post #238 typifying this, 
False flag doesn't mean "holograms and laser beams" Remember that ISIS is Israel, 
so they could be the masterminds behind this attack, or maybe they gave some 
mentally unstable muslim a klashnikov and grenades and hoped for the best. And 
either way we know who is importing all these Muslims so it's still technically a 
conspiracy whether the Jews and their dumb goyim leaders planned this or not. 
In this post, Barkun’s model of the superconspiracy is clearly evident with IS having acquired 
a managed autonomy within the nested conspiracies of the Jewish superconspiracy. This is a 
recurring and characteristic motif within responses. Thus, #494 
It's disgusting listening to these leftist British newscasters shunting public 
understanding away from the true cause: 
The jewish government's and the jewish EU's opening the gates of Europe (and, in 
this case, France) to the brown and black and muslim invaders -- and probably 
arming them as well. 
Again, in the active ‘shunting’ of the public away from the ‘truth’ by British news media a 
perceived organised effort to silence this ‘truth’ is discerned. Typifying the conspiracy 
theorist’s privileged vantage point, the poster simultaneously expresses their position whilst 
demarcating himself from the ‘sheeple’. White nationalist intertextuality is drawn on at 
various points throughout the thread with external links incorporated into posts. So, post #549 
incorporates an embedded Youtube video entitled, ‘Europa Erwache! Europe Awaken! 
Европа вставай!’38. The video incorporates images of central European pastoral scenes, neo-
classical and art deco architecture, and brief clips of Nazi propaganda with a soundtrack of 
martial industrial music featuring 'Europa' by Triarii. The lyrics are pompous and fanciful, 
 




painting Europe as, “my kingdom; This is my silver sun; This is my mother; Of ascension 
and decline.” Posted on the day of the Paris attack, the Youtube video description features 
more anti-Semitic rhetoric, 
This is Europa, this is our ancestral home. Rise up my comrades, the time is NOW. 
Jews wont stop flooding us with non-Europeans until we are a tiny minority, so they 
can rule and enslave us without limit, as they do in other countries, like South Africa. 
We must fight the Jews, not the other non-Europeans, which don’t form part of the 
ruling families. JEWS are the cause, massive immigration is only a symptom. Don’t 
lose your time confronting Blacks, Pakis or Asians, that’s what the Jews want (Divide 
& Conquer). We must flood the streets and point out the JEWS every damn day. Stop 
White Genocide. 
The final phrase, ‘Stop White Genocide’, is a constant refrain in white nationalist web 
presences. In the Stormfront Paris thread, there are calls for its use as part of a social media 
strategy, as is evident in post #113 
Get on Twitter people spread the #WHITEGENOCIDE message to copy paste this 
#Paris #ParisAttacks #ParisShooting #Whitegenocide 
Now. 
The apocalyptic terms of the perceived Jewish conspiracy is made starkly here. If the posters 
are to be taken at face value there is a generalised sense that race war is unfolding and that it 
is mobilised by Jewish conspirators. In this conspiracy it appears that Jews control Muslims, 
people of African descent, Western governments, mass media, the ‘international banking 
community’, and so on. Teenagers on Twitter expressing concern for refugees are seemingly 
also under the sway of Jewish media for the poster of #905 who is here responding to an 
earlier, quoted, post: 
[Quote]Looked on Twitter. These teenage libturds are more sympathetic towards 
muslims than the actual victims. [/Quote] 
You are hearing the echo created by the jew voice. The jew voice is present in large 
numbers across all the internet. They control print and television media. The are 




the dam has burst, and the awakening is pouring out. Their jew voice will be drowned 
out. 
Like a number of posters, the poster above sees the Paris shooting as a catalyst for change. 
Borrowing from the terminology of new age improvisational millennialism the poster 
describes ‘an awakening’ through which ‘the truth’ shall be revealed; further confirming 
Barkun’s analysis, the poster clearly believes that the potential for spreading ‘stigmatized 
knowledge’ via internet communication lies at the heart of this awakening. Further 
underscoring the presence of the syncretic tendency of new age religions within the white 
nationalist imaginary, the following post (#843) combines conspiracy with cosmological 
struggle, Judaeo-Christian apocalyptic language and imagery, and the self-development 
motifs of new age personal development, 
Probably the sheeple will never wake up -- and what would they do about things they 
don't understand even if they did wake up? 
[Lengthy call to arms and the destruction of Israel] 
A world endlessly controlled by the satanic jews is best destroyed -- for the sake of the 
upward evolutionary path of the universe -- no matter the cost to planet earth and its 
inhabitants. 
Given the epistemological confusion in evidence here, it is tempting to dismiss this kind of 
muddled mélange out of hand but to do so would be to confirm the persecuted (‘stigmatized’) 
status of the knowledge claims being made. Wessinger39 makes evident the benefits of taking 
conspiracist apocalypticism seriously in her account of her involvement in the defusing of the 
stand-off between the FBI and the Christian Identity sect, the Montana Freemen. That is not 
to say that there is a concrete threat emerging from with white nationalist apocalypticism but 
there is certainly a widely held belief within the community that they are at a significant and 
potentially cataclysmic moment: 







#143 Time to deal with Islam once and for all. And at the same opportunity deal with 
Jews and blacks by deporting them all 
#172 The plague of Islam has festered yet again! This is what's coming to ALL white 
nations, and thus why all of us must become able to fight the Mohammedans with any 
and all means at our disposal. 
#301 RISE UP, EUROPA! [posted above a map of Europe dominated by a 
Reichsadler] 
#362 I have chills running down my spine. You can feel it happening, a great 
awakening. I think our enemies will regret this day for years to come. 
#400 I expect to see much more refugee housing centers burned down. Europeans 
cannot wait to just "vote" out the muslims; THE MUSLIMS HAVE DECLARED WAR. 
Stop letting the "moderate muslims" be their shield, kick them all out. 
And so it continues. The danger posed here is an active apocalypticism that clearly draws on 
an adaptive improvisational Nazism (posts asking if Europe ‘missed Hitler yet?’ abound) and 
which feels that its ‘time has come’. It is instructive here to recall the ‘manifesto’ of racially-
motivated mass murderer, Dylann Roof. In this, he wrote that he felt, 
I have no choice. I am not in the position to, alone, go into the ghetto and fight. I 
chose Charleston because it is most historic city in my state, and at one time had the 
highest ratio of blacks to Whites in the country. We have no skinheads, no real KKK, 
no one doing anything but talking on the internet. Well someone has to have the 
bravery to take it to the real world, and I guess that has to be me.40 
An LA Times articles dated June 22nd, 2015 found that passages from the manifesto had 
earlier been posted by user, ‘AryanBlood1488’, in comments on news stories posted at The 
Daily Stormer, a racist news website. There are clearly psychological factors to take into 
account in such cases but the similarity in tenor, content and neo-Nazi symbolism in the 
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Thankfully, the literature provides multiple instances in which an apocalyptic faithful is let 
down by fate and the longed-for end and its promise of a better world to come never arrives. 
Festinger et al’s When Prophecy Fails is the seminal example.41 What should be recalled, 
though, is that Dorothy Martin never abandoned her beliefs nor did many of her followers. 
The fervour on show amongst the white nationalist community is almost certainly temporary. 
Differences in value, religious belief and between national cultures ensure that the white 
nationalist communities remain inchoate; their shared apocalyptic ardour is insufficient to 
overcome more established differences within the community. However, what also is 
apparent is the manner in which the event provided an arena for the community to rehearse 
and determine the boundaries of the belief that incorporate members of the ‘white nation’. 
One lone voice suggested that Jews had nothing to do with the Paris attacks; the community 
quickly rounded on this poster and ridiculed their suggestion. This is an apocalyptic 
community that is currently delineating its core beliefs. It is inchoate and lacks a foundational 
text through which to organise communal values more fully. That these values are 
retrogressive, irrational and couched in the overwhelmed and anxious fears of apocalyptic 
conspiracism are no barrier to their longevity. What requires further scrutiny is the ease with 
which these values and beliefs are capable of extending into the more populist and less 
marginal aspects of apocalyptic belief. Racist improvisational  millennialists with social 
media strategies and a degraded but partially familiar map of the current situation pose a 
threat to domestic and international order; IS have demonstrated the value of social media to 
belligerent millennialists and whilst white nationalism does not have the resources of IS it has 
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#whitegenocide, the Alt-right and Conspiracy Theory: How Secrecy and Suspicion 
Contributed to the Mainstreaming of Hate 
Andrew Fergus Wilson 
Abstract 
This article considers the relationship between ‘hashtag activism’ as it is currently being used 
by the alt-right and the tendency to draw on conspiracy theory that Richard Hofstadter 
identified as being prevalent among what he termed ‘pseudo-conservatives’ half a century 
earlier. Both the alt-right and Hofstadter’s ‘pseudo-conservatives’ can be characterized by a 
pronounced populist nationalism that understands its aims as protecting a particular way of 
life whilst drawing on an aggrieved sense of injustice at being conspired against by an unseen 
enemy. That this “enemy” is typically foreign in actuality or in spirit confirms the cultural 
dimension on which their politics is played out. It is argued here that this paranoid populist 
nationalism has been figuratively drawn upon in the rhetoric of Donald Trump and that this 
apparent openness to the “pseudo-conservative” discourse on nationalism has provided a 
bridging effect via which far right elements are seeking to normalize extremist viewpoints. 
Keywords: alt-right, conspiracy theories, hashtag activism, pseudo-conservatives, Richard 
Hofstadter, Donald J. Trump, white nationalism 
 
Kellyanne Conway’s phrase “alternative facts” has already passed into notoriety; the 
Counsellor to the President used the phrase when defending statements relating to the size of 
President Donald Trump’s inauguration crowd made by the President’s Press Secretary, Sean 
Spicer (Blake 2017). Whilst the phrase was largely ridiculed by the “mainstream media” 
(MSM) their scorn is unlikely to have had much impact on significant sections of Trump’s 
support. Not only is the MSM trusted by less than a third of U.S. citizens (Swift 2016), but 




as it was described by Richard Hofstadter during the 1960s. In his essay, published in 
Harpers, Hofstadter described the “dispossessed” feeling that characterized the right wing of 
American politics in 1964. Half a century later and Alex Jones, founder and frontman of the 
conspiracy clearing house Infowars.com, claimed that he was one of the first people that 
Donald Trump spoke to in his capacity as President (Haberman 2016) is indicative of the 
state of political discourse at the current time. Trump has ridden a wave of populist dissent 
into the White House and has done so using rhetoric that was drawn from recent conspiracy 
theory. The conspiracy theories publicly embraced by Trump include the idea that climate 
change is “a Chinese hoax” (Trump 2012), that Barack Obama was not a U.S. citizen (Krieg 
2016), Barack Obama as the founder of ISIS (Siddiqui 2016), that vaccines cause autism 
(Trump 2014), and that Muslims celebrated the 9/11 attacks en masse in New Jersey (Kessler 
2016).1  This latter convergence of conspiracy, ethnicity and populist politics encapsulates the 
scope of this article.  
This article will also examine the shared conceptual spaces of populist politics, conspiracy 
theory and the role of the Internet in facilitating the mainstreaming of the paranoid style. By 
looking at far right communications strategies within the conspiracy milieu it will be shown 
that the presence of conspiracy theories in the public sphere has allowed white nationalist 
discourse to gain increased exposure. It should be noted that the primary concern here is to 
concentrate on the effect on public discourse of demonstrably untrue conspiracy theories. 
That these currently proliferate and determine much of the discussion concerning 
conspiracies should not deflect from efforts to uncover the very real conspiracies that often 
accompany statecraft and political maneuvering; Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. 
presidential election is testament to that. Rather, the focus here is on those conspiracy 
theories that were formerly marginal and stigmatized due to their lack of verifiability. 
 
Theories of Conspiracy Theories 
Conspiracy theory thrives in an environment of secrecy and necessarily so. Without the 
possibility of there being a mechanism by which any plot might be hidden there would be no 
 





opportunity to postulate the kind of hidden malevolent plots that fuel conspiracy theories. So, 
secrecy and conspiracy theories are not unrelated phenomena. Certainly, this is not the only 
causal factor in the production of conspiracy theory but, in general terms, a poverty of 
information can be understood to be productive of a tendency to ‘fill in the gaps’ in a 
simplistic and reductive manner. This is, in essence, the motive behind Fredric Jameson’s 
(1988, 356) well-known description of conspiracy theory as ‘the poor person's cognitive 
mapping in the postmodern age; it is a degraded figure of the total logic of late capital.’ In 
Jameson’s reading, class-based barriers to opportunity for knowledge acquisition and the 
development of critical reason are the limiting factors that reproduce information poverty. 
More typically, the extension of state mechanisms for the production, classification, and 
suppression of information are understood to be the primary factors in the development of the 
current conspiracy milieu. Whilst this atmosphere of secrecy contributes to a conspiracist 
tendency, as will be seen, status insecurity, fragile economic wellbeing, and global economic 
developments also contribute.  
Secrecy does not automatically produce conspiracy theories, or, indeed, entail actual 
conspiracies. Daniel Hellinger (2003) quite rightly describes a number of scenarios in which 
the use of secrecy by the state or special interest groups may be required operationally, to 
facilitate frank discussion, or to protect national interests. All of these may be pursued 
legitimately in secret. However, they become conspiratorial when they operate outside of 
agreed frameworks or subvert the democratic process (Hellinger 2003). It should be noted 
here that conspiracy theorists can perform a valuable role; their investigative skepticism 
offers a vital challenge to the concealment or reduced circulation of information whilst also 
challenging the assumptions that contribute to the definition of ‘the national interest’. As 
such, they can provide a means for redressing the asymmetrical balance of power that state 
secrecy contributes to (Maret 2016). Conspiracies do happen and are facilitated by an 
opaqueness in corporate and state business. It is easy enough to identify any number and 
discussion of conspiracies in the field of U.S. politics would only be controversial in selecting 
a single example over other possibilities: the Tuskegee syphilis experiment, Project 
MKULTRA, the assassination of JFK, Watergate, or the Iran–Contra affair might all merit 
consideration and bring to light distinct forms of information control. In an environment in 
which secrecy abounds and in which conspiracies are shown to occur after the fact it should 
be unsurprising that the public is ready to speculate about current conspiracies. However, as 




and likelihood of their claims makes it difficult to assess the veracity of conspiracy claims. 
This, in turn, allows conspiracy theory to serve multiple political ends as a result of this 
indeterminacy; the hidden enemy is always secretly at work to undermine and destroy ‘our’ 
way of life and that ‘we’ must stand together to oppose ‘them.’ Oliver and Wood’s (2014, 
964) study of conspiracy theory belief found that within the U.S. adult population: 
Not only does half of the American population agree with at least one conspiracy 
from a short list of conspiracy theories offered, but also large portions of the 
population exhibit a strong dispositional inclination toward believing that unseen, 
intentional forces exist and that history is driven by a Manichean struggle between 
good and evil.  
The readiness to believe in a hidden, Manichean battle as a hidden hand in the passage of 
history indicates a susceptibility to the kind of manipulation via conspiracy narratives 
outlined by Fenster. Nonetheless, Fenster situates conspiracy theory as a response to the 
development of a monopoly on information and the production of ‘truth’ and he is, 
ultimately, a celebrant of the kind of agency that the production of conspiracy theory offers. 
In this analysis, it is a way out of Jameson’s information poverty motivated by a suspicion of 
the secret state. Fenster concludes his book with a narrative voice that is an unclear 
convergence of his own and the narrator of the 9/11 ‘truther’ documentary Loose Change, a 
move he suggests is empowering to viewers bereft of their own, clear voices, ‘gives the 
viewer meaning and agency, and offers a sense of adventure and fun as she attacks the 
stodgy, conspiratorial state with the latest information technology and Web portals. And the 
conspiracy community is the collective response that can rally the people and restore the 
nation. The truth movement, composed of great scholars and regular kids with laptops, can 
overcome’ (Fenster 2008, 278). Fenster is capturing the seductive power of contemporary 
conspiracy theory and leaves open the possibility of a politically mobilized community of 
‘web researchers’ enriching their cognitive maps and breaking down barriers to ‘true’ 
knowledge. As if in recognition of the lack of criticality this ending suggests, an afterword 
recognizes the limited opportunity for conspiracy theory to grow into a structured and 
productive politics that can, ‘organize and respect people in the complex, diverse world that it 
simplifies’ (Fenster 2008, 289).  
Fenster makes an attempt to understand conspiracy theory as a search for agency in an 




be extended and challenged by the communicative strategies of the Internet. Fenster’s work, 
in its first edition (1999), was an important intervention that captured a moment characterized 
by an organic upswell of political awareness. Barkun (2003) offers a useful summary of the 
value of the Internet to the conspiracy theorist. He highlights the value of an open medium of 
communication that is free from gatekeepers to conspiracy theorists. Unlike the MSM’s 
capacity to regulate and assess the quality of knowledge production, the Internet offers 
conspiracy theorists the opportunity to circulate their ideas freely without fear of their 
theories being dismissed as spurious, ‘stigmatized knowledge subcultures are at a distinct 
disadvantage as far as mass media are concerned […] Consequently, those whose worldview 
is built around conspiracy ideas find in the Internet virtual communities of the like-minded’ 
(Barkun 2003, 13). Nonetheless, that does not diminish widespread tastes for MSM 
treatments of conspiracy theory and within the cultural sphere the entertainment industry has 
exploited a generalized atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust. The most significant recent 
works on conspiracy theory bear witness to this and Knight (2000), Goldberg (2001), Barkun 
(2003), and Fenster (2008) all point to the influence of the television series The X-Files 
(1993-) in expanding public knowledge of conspiracy theory whilst drawing its popularity 
from an environment of distrust. The stuff of The X-Files is standard conspiracy fare. It 
depicts a complex and hidden world in which a shadow government operated behind the 
scenes and conspired against its citizens and, in its most dramatic sweep, humanity as a 
whole. The programme’s slogan ‘The Truth is Out There,’ featured in the title sequence 
epitomizes the troubled relationship with ‘the truth’ that is currently experienced by the 
subject in late modernity. The truth is ‘out there’ in the sense that it is always somewhere 
else, hidden in the general welter of the information, concealed behind disinformation (one 
episode was tellingly titled, “All Lies Lead to the Truth”) or hidden, restricted from the 
public. For Goldberg (2001, 256), this outlook typifies a historical moment in which an 
actively maintained veil of secrecy separates state and citizenry. He describes ‘a cult of 
secrecy [that] has dominated the bureaucracy in Washington and distanced federal authorities 
from those beyond the beltway,’ and that this commitment to secrecy-in-the-name-of-security 
has proliferated and accelerated in the post-WWII period so that its maintenance has now 
become more ‘reflex’ than ‘necessity’ (Goldberg 2001, 256).  Moreover, this culture of 
secrecy has proven fertile ground for the genesis and growth of conspiracy theory. In 




Concealed information denied accountability and enabled the arrogant both to ignore 
public opinion and to manipulate it. Behind this veil, laws were broken and 
democratic values subverted […] Even without the taint of malevolence, suppression 
of information aroused concern […] Drawing sustenance from America’s resilient 
fear of centralized authority, perceptions of sinister design became truth. 
This phenomenological correspondence between conspiracy and innuendo is key here, 
especially where it is coupled with a population increasingly disconnected from a central 
authority and experiencing perceptions of social and economic disempowerment. Knight 
(2000) also depicts a labyrinthine architecture of secrecy characterizing the American state as 
it developed during the Cold War. He describes a ‘sprawling intelligence community’ 
comprised of ‘the CIA, the National Security Council, the Defence Intelligence Agency, the 
National Security Agency, Army Intelligence, Navy Intelligence, Air Force Intelligence, the 
State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the Atomic Energy Commission and 
the FBI’ (Knight 2000, 28). Knight’s (2000, 29) reading of this proliferation of the secrecy-
oriented state is similar to Goldberg’s and he finds that this ‘official obsession with secrecy, 
in effect, helped fuel the popular fixation on conspiratorial secrets at the heart of 
government.’ Knight’s analysis suggests that contemporary America is experiencing a 
‘culture of conspiracy’ in which the widespread intelligence community is generative of a 
dispersed and generalized fascination with secrecy and occulted machinations. As will be 
noted below, it is from this position that he dismisses Hofstadter’s narrow focus on 
conspiracy as being the purview of extremists. Knight is right to draw attention to the extent 
that this culture of conspiracy can be the groundswell from which a healthy critical 
mindedness emerges. However, it should also be acknowledged that there is an increased 
acceptance of a politics that was once considered to be extreme but which, concurrently with 
conspiracy theory, is becoming increasingly mainstream. As this article will suggest, this 
concurrence is beyond coincidence and is a consequence of the extent to which far right 
usage of conspiracy theory has become so thoroughly interwoven in the conspiracy milieu as 
to ensure that an articulation of current conspiracy theories is to evoke political positions on 
the extreme right, wittingly or not. 
 




The coincidence of belief in conspiracy theory and extremist politics is widely noted in the 
literature (e.g., Dobratz & Shanks-Meile 2000, Gardell 2002, Goodrick-Clarke 2003, Durham 
2007). Both tend to share an apocalyptic structure in which communal ontologies are 
threatened by external forces; typically, in both instances, these forces are hidden and their 
threat to the extremist/conspiracy theorist’s community is realized through secondary agents 
and secret plots. Richard Hofstadter’s scene-setting and frequently maligned essay “The 
Paranoid Style in American Politics” paints a picture of the conspiracy theorist’s self-
appointed role as a protector of a world threatened by the machinations of hidden 
conspirators. Whilst there are conspiracy theories that can be seen to be written from a left-
wing perspective it is the political right wing that has come to be more readily associated with 
the production and belief in conspiracy theories. This is not surprising. The political right are, 
generally speaking, socially and culturally conservative with an ongoing association with 
‘traditional values’ so the belief of a secret adversary – be it Satan, communism, the 
Illuminati, the New World Order or whomever – that is plotting to radically transform 
society’s values is a clear threat to a conservative mindset. Here, then, conspiracy is 
understood as Barkun’s recursive ‘super conspiracy’ implemented to bring about an 
apocalyptic endtime. This paper will contend that the political extremity of white nationalism 
is seeking to play on this fear of an adversarial ‘hidden hand’ in order to provide a platform 
from which to normalize their politics of hate. In this, the continued value of aspects of 
Richard Hofstadter’s work will be shown to be of continuing value in the analysis of far right 
discourse and the mainstreaming of their conspiratorial outlook. This will be done in the 
context of the use of ‘#whitegenocide’ hashtag on Twitter. 
Hofstadter’s work continues to provide explanatory models for understanding the political 
right in the US. In 2011, Gary Kamiya wrote a piece titled, “The Infantile Style in American 
Politics” for Salon. In it, Kamiya argued that Hofstadter’s essays “The Pseudo-Conservative 
Revolt – 1955” and “Pseudo-Conservatism Revisited – 1965” provided a way of 
understanding the Tea Party movement within the Republican party. A year earlier the left-
leaning conservative blogger Andrew Sullivan wrote a similar but shorter piece titled “Trying 
To Understand The Tea Party II” for his blog. Both writers drew on Hofstadter’s distinction 
between ‘pseudo-conservatives’ and ‘genuine conservatives’ and this distinction will be 
useful to the current examination of the right-wing populism evident in Donald Trump’s 




Not without controversy, Hofstadter’s two essays concerning the ‘pseudo-conservative’ 
political tendency in the US give an account of the nationalism and prejudice present within 
US populism from the late Nineteenth Century onwards. Foreshadowing current populist 
formations, he identified a conspiratorial outlook within these populist movements. The 
origin of the conspiracy was, typically, European bankers and, on occasion, Jewish bankers 
working with foreign powers or for themselves. Hofstadter identified jingoistic and anti-
Semitic tendencies in the populist US People's Party of the 1890s. His portrayal of them is 
complex but he was generally well-disposed toward them, seeing them as ‘mild radicals’ who 
targeted the monied elites of their day. Although there was contestation over the extent to 
which status anxiety was a motivating factor for the Populists (Collins 1989), in Hofstadter's 
analysis the primary motivation was economic anxiety with status anxiety a secondary factor 
as is made clear in the correspondence cited by Collins. Nonetheless, status anxiety is 
acknowledged as being a contributory factor and Hofstadter expands upon the contribution of 
status anxiety to populist anti-intellectualism in the 1950s in the essay “The Pseudo-
Conservative Revolt” (1955, in Bell 1963).  The prejudice described by Hofstadter in this 
essay has value to the current discussion in its depiction of the American political situation of 
the 1950s. The essay starts with Hofstadter reflecting upon the situation of a generation that 
had been forged in the ‘liberal dissent’ of the 1930s that had led to the New Deal. Hofstadter 
suggests that by the time of writing this generation had retained their liberal inclinations but 
had become politically conservative; in a condition of relative affluence, they had a desire to 
retain the advantages that the prevailing order provided them. He contrasts them to the group 
he identified as the dominant radical force of the time, the pseudo-conservatives. He draws on 
Adorno et al’s (1950) study of the authoritarian personality. 
Adorno and his co-researchers initially sought to determine causal factors in an individual’s 
development of anti-Semitic beliefs but broadened their concerns to try and understand the 
formative influences contributing to a generalized susceptibility to an ethnocentric, 
authoritarian outlook. The study is methodologically flawed (something Hofstadter 
acknowledges in the later essay, “Pseudo-Conservatism Revisited – 1965”), but it formulates 
an emerging tendency in post-War US politics that, it is argued here, characterizes the ‘right 
wing identity politics’ of the alt-right and recent formations within white nationalism.  
Adorno distinguishes between ‘genuine conservatism’ and ‘pseudo conservatism’ by 
characterizing the former as a perceived protection of ‘positive’ conservative values and a 




The latter contains elements of that aspirational narrative but they are overshadowed by a 
rigidly hierarchical ethnocentric framing of it. In effect, opportunity is only available to 
certain in-groups. From Adorno (1950, 182), 
The ethnocentric conservative is the pseudo conservative, for he betrays in his 
ethnocentrism a tendency antithetical to democratic values and tradition [...] his 
politico-economic views are based on the same underlying trends—submission to 
authority, unconscious handling of hostility toward authority by means of 
displacement and projection onto outgroups, and so on—as his ethnocentrism [...] 
This is not merely a "modern conservatism." It is, rather, a totally new direction: away 
from individualism and equality of opportunity, and toward a rigidly stratified society 
in which there is a minimum of economic mobility and in which the "right" groups are 
in power, the outgroups subordinate. Perhaps the term "reactionary" fits this ideology 
best. Ultimately it is fascism.  
The level of contestation over Hofstadter’s position on Populism reflects the level of 
disagreement among historians about this movement. Johnston (2007) outlines much of this 
discussion but asserts that Hofstadter was correct to assert the presence of reactionary voices 
in Populism whilst acknowledging that they sat uncomfortably alongside voices that were 
forerunners of the Progressive movement that was to follow. Johnston’s point is simple: that 
U.S. populism incorporates a variety of stances in its criticism of the established order. 
Certainly, these stances include democratic perspectives that seek to promote the realization 
of the aspirations of all Americans but, at the same time, anti-semitism and a belligerent 
nationalism were also present, 
[T]he Populist moment of the 1890s bequeathed to its various populist successors a 
suspicion of elites and a taste for conspiratorial explanations that have at times 
nurtured antisemitism and other forms of bigotry. (Johnston 2007, 133) 
More well-known and equally apposite here is Hofstadter’s study of conspiracy theory “The 
Paranoid Style in American Politics.” Effectively a survey of conspiracy theory in American 
culture and politics and a brief study of the John Birch Society (JBS), it shaped subsequent 
scholarly discussion of conspiracy theory by situating the ‘paranoid’ beliefs of the JBS in a 
long-standing – if inchoate – tradition of alternative explanations for social, political, 




conservatism this essay has had a lasting legacy but has attracted criticism. Typical of recent 
criticism is Fenster’s charge that Hofstadter pathologizes conspiracy thinking. Fenster (2008, 
8) suggests that Hofstadter contrasts conspiracy thinking with a ‘healthy’ approach to 
politics, and ‘he implied that conspiracy theory constitutes a malady or affliction.’ Despite his 
otherwise excellent study, Goldberg (2001) goes further in this reductionist reading of 
Hofstadter; his reading of the paranoid style is wholly grounded in the idea of Hofstadter as a 
diagnostician. He writes, 
Hofstadter donned the white coat of a clinician. Conspiracy theorists were marginal 
men and women whose personality disorders caused them to project their problems, 
status grievances, and wounds into public affairs. (Goldberg 2001, xi) 
Goldberg continues in this vein and uses the language of a ‘clinician’ to emphasizes his 
charge against Hofstadter: ‘cure,’ ‘contagious,’ ‘infect,’ ‘fever.’ This is all hyperbolic and 
this shibboleth needs laying to rest. Hofstadter himself is careful to make clear he is not using 
the term in its full medical sense but rather as an analogy suggestive of a tendency to identify 
otherwise indiscernible threats to the “normal” run of things. It is characterized by the 
conspiracy theorist’s production of fear of hidden agency subverting a way of life. Hofstadter 
(1964, 77) is clear on his avoidance of the medical implications that the term might otherwise 
indicate: 
I am not speaking in a clinical sense, but borrowing a clinical term for other purposes. 
I have neither the competence nor the desire to classify any figures of the past or 
present as certifiable lunatics. In fact, the idea of the paranoid style as a force in 
politics would have little contemporary relevance or historical value if it were applied 
only to men with profoundly disturbed minds.  
Nonetheless, despite this clarity caricatures like Goldberg’s persist. Peter Knight’s (2000, 31) 
discussion of Hofstadter also confines him to the clinical metaphor, insisting that Hofstadter 
produces a ‘diagnosis of a thoroughgoing paranoid delusion,’ and goes on to suggest that 
Hofstadter ‘insisted’ that the paranoid style is ‘a minority phenomenon’ (Knight 2000, 36), 
but again, this needs to be addressed because it undermines the opportunity to draw on 





Hofstadter does describe the ‘spokesman’ [sic] of the paranoid style as being marginal but 
here his ascription of a marginal status does not downplay the seriousness of his discourse. 
This marginality is better understood as being reflective of Daniel Bell’s (1963) suggestion 
that the U.S. radical right represented a ‘dispossessed’ constituency. As has been discussed 
above, Hofstadter contributed essays on the ‘pseudo-conservatives’ to Bell’s collection; he 
also refers to Bell’s own essay in ‘The Paranoid Style in American Politics.’ Here, he is quite 
clear that the right wing tendency in which he identifies a proclivity for the use of the 
paranoid style is subject to social rather than psychological stresses, ‘But the modern right 
wing, as Daniel Bell has put it, feels dispossessed: America has been largely taken away from 
them and their kind, though they are determined to try to repossess it’ (Hofstadter 1964, 81). 
Thus, marginality in this instance reflects a social status.  It is worth quoting at length from 
Hofstadter in order to restore this social dimension to understandings of his work in current 
academic work on conspiracy theory. What is key in the following is that Hofstadter does not 
condemn ‘the paranoid style’ to the marginalia of history but, quite correctly, acknowledges 
its capacity to command influence in periods of generalized anxiety regarding social status or 
economic security. He writes that while a tendency to subscribe to a conspiracy view of 
history may be seen to be, 
[M]ore or less constantly affecting a modest minority of the population. But certain 
religious traditions, certain social structures and national inheritances, certain 
historical catastrophes or frustrations may be conducive to the release of such psychic 
energies, and to situations in which they can more readily be built into mass 
movements or political parties. In American experience ethnic and religious conflict 
have plainly been a major focus for militant and suspicious minds of this sort, but 
class conflicts also can mobilize such energies. (Hofstadter 1964, 86) 
It is clear here that Hofstadter, in his conclusion, is warning of the risk of the spread of 
‘paranoid rhetoric’ from the perennial social margins into the mainstream. In this he is not far 
off the analyses of the more recent commentators who have, generally, sought to dismiss 
Hofstadter. Aupers (2012) takes this tack and, without offering any evidence, introduces a 
suggested Freudian dimension to Hofstadter’s undeserved reputation as a diagnostician of 
aberrant political views. Aupers’ dismissal of Hofstatder’s work typifies the recent tendency 
to attempt an ostensibly more considered approach to conspiracy; similar approaches can be 




little further. Aupers’ argument is that Hofstadter’s diagnostic approach is predicated on an 
assumption that conspiracy theory represents a dangerous challenge to the consensus politics 
preferred by Hofstadter. Aupers (2012, 23) contends that Hofstadter, along with Daniel Pipes 
(1997) and Fredric Jameson (1991) reflect ‘the ideology of modern Enlightenment,’ and 
produce a simplistic and inaccurate division between the rational modern subject and the 
irrational pre-modern alternative, echoing Weber’s disenchantment thesis. Following Peter 
Knight (2000), he sees this as approaching the status of a moral panic about the decline in 
public reason and suggests that, instead, conspiracy theory reflects a more generalised 
suspicion of authority and loci of power, ‘“Paranoia” is no longer simply a diagnostic label 
applied by psychologists and psychiatrists but has become a veritable sociological 
phenomenon’ (Aupers 2012, 23). 
This has become something of a commonplace assumption in academic treatments of 
conspiracy theory. Conspiracy theory is increasingly treated as a commonplace disposition 
that typifies a diminished public capacity to apply reason and a falling away in trust between 
citizens and the state. However, within this, there are variations on this theme. Clarke (2002) 
considers the ‘attributional error’ implicit in conspiracy to have potential value with 
conspiracy theorists’ activities creating pressure on state agencies to operate in a more open 
manner. Indeed, the academy may do well to listen to his suggestion that, ‘The conspiracy 
theorist challenges us to improve our social explanations. If a nonconspiratorial social 
explanation is better articulated as a result of the challenge of a conspiracy theory then that is 
all to the good’ (Clarke 2002, 148). However, he is wrong to diminish the risk that conspiracy 
theories present. Clarke (2002, 148) suggests that ‘few are actually harmful,’ but it needs to 
be acknowledged that a conspiratorial theory of history was a contributor to the spread of 
anti-Semitism in Europe during the early part of the Twentieth Century. Cohn (1966) and 
Bronner (2000) provide a reminder of the influence of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion 
had during the Nazi era. Moreover, in line with other works (Barkun 2003, Wilson 2017) 
Bronner underscores the continued utility to the far right that The Protocols provides.  
Following Michael Rogin’s (1967) earlier work, Fenster (2008) divides academic 
commentaries on conspiracy thinking into two camps, symbolists and realists. The division is 
organized around the idea that academic writing about conspiracy theories generally serves 
two purposes: symbolists reflect centrist countersubversion and realist interest in conspiracy 




Fenster describes Hofstadter as a symbolist and, rightfully, praises his approach for situating 
conspiracy theories in their historical social, economic, and political contexts but, tiresomely, 
does so in the ‘Hofstadter as clinician’ vein. Fenster (2008, 51) criticises realists for their, 
‘too-quick dismissal of conspiracy theory as a popular political practice,’ and that their 
concentration on the instrumental uses of conspiracy theory obscures the initial circumstances 
that led to the politicisation of the advocates of conspiracy theory in the first place. This is 
certainly true but, equally, Fenster is overly hasty to err on the side of caution and extend the 
benefit of the doubt to conspiracy theorists in the name of open-mindedness. Fenster (2008, 
90) writes that 
[C]onspiracy theories may be wrong or overly simplistic, but they may sometimes be 
on to something. Specifically, they may well address real structural inequities, albeit 
ideologically, and they may well constitute a response, albeit in a simplistic and 
decidedly unpragmatic form, to an unjust political order, a barren or dysfunctional 
civil society, and/or an exploitative economic system.  
This is undeniable but by constructing and then writing dismissively of the so-called realist 
approach he diminishes the capacity to recognize that in the overly simplistic forms that 
conspiracy thinking can take there is a danger that the simplification produces potentially 
dangerous divisions within society. Whilst Fenster is right to highlight the capacity for 
conspiracy thinking to bring to light the grievances of a community it does not follow that 
this necessarily legitimizes conspiracy thinking as a reasonable response.  As will be 
demonstrated, the danger in linking populism and conspiracy theory that Hofstadter outlines 
does pose an opportunity for potentially violent extremists to exploit and to radicalize popular 
dissent. Fenster is not alone in seeking to limit the perception of threat associated with 
conspiracy thinking. Similarly, Knight (2000) plays down the adversarial conspiracist outlook 
that Hofstadter delineated in pseudo-conservatives and the John Birch Society. Instead, 
Knight (2000, 75) insists that what was once the domain of the radical is now a mainstream 
reticence to extend trust or belief,  
Paranoia is no longer necessarily the mark of right-wing demonological extremism 
[…] it has become a default attitude for the post-1960s generation, more an 





Knight suggests that the populist, white right-wing forms of conspiracy thinking had become 
dissipated and indistinguishable from those shared by other social groups. He does this in a 
discussion of The Turner Diaries (1978), a race war fantasy novel written by the founder of 
the National Alliance, William Luther Pierce, under the pen name Andrew Macdonald. The 
novel depicts a guerrilla war waged by white nationalists in a future in which whites are 
routinely persecuted in a Jewish-run United States. Knight’s analysis suggests that this is a 
response to the diminished position of the white working class within an economic and 
political context that has made equivalent the lives of all working people by destabilizing 
working class jobs and creating an equality of precariousness. Knight (2000, 42) writes,  
the increasing competition for diminishing social resources amongst so-called 
minority groups leads to mutual suspicions between the disinherited […] even the 
white Anglo male establishment now seeks to redefine itself as an embattled minority 
interest group in the face of a larger conspiracy group.  
Furedi (2005) also embraces this model of an increased mainstreaming of conspiracy theory 
as marking a particular mode of subjectivity. He frames this as a crisis in agency, writing, 
‘No one is as they seem. This normalization of suspicion and mistrust does not possess any 
critical dimension. Agency panic represents the fear that the vulnerable subject bears towards 
an incomprehensible changing world’ (Furedi 2005, 86). What is distinct in Furedi’s (2005, 
86) analysis is that whilst he embraces the generalised position he is still quite clear that 
conspiracy theory represents an analytical failure, describing it as a ‘simplistic worldview,’ 
that, ‘displaces a critical engagement with public life with a destructive search for the hidden 
agenda.’ 
Barkun’s (2003) detailed survey of American conspiracy culture in the new millennium 
recognized this generalized mistrust of traditional institutions and channels of 
communication. Nonetheless, whilst recognizing that a conspiracy view of history is present 
on both the left and right wing he is clear that how this outlook is made manifest is quite 
distinct in each instance. So, for example, in a discussion of the shared aspects of New World 
Order conspiracies he notes that those on the left are fearful of a restriction of rights and 
freedoms whilst those on the right are more likely to frame their conspiracy theories in terms 
of a direct persecution of themselves and their political allies. Barkun (2003, 72) writes, ‘the 




The theme of persecution by a socialist ‘New World Order’ is a well-established one on the 
right. Pat Robertson’s (1991) use of this theme is well-documented and formed the basis of 
his book The New World Order. The book spent weeks in The New York Times non-fiction 
bestsellers list during November and December 1991. This popularity led Michael Barkun 
(1996) to describe it as one of two dominant factors behind the mainstreaming of populist 
nationalist conspiracy theories during the 1990s. The other factor he cited was the active 
presence on the Internet of the Militia movement; in the case of the Militias, he observed the 
commingling of conspiracism with Robertson’s millenarian apocalypticism leading to a 
fervent urgency within their outlook. Thus, the conspiracism that was spread by members and 
sympathizers of the Militia movement was marked by an eschatological right wing outlook 
and it was this that characterized the mainstreaming of conspiracy theory as an actual 
phenomenon as opposed to the more general skepticism characterized by fictional forms such 
as The X-Files. Barkun (1996, 61) observed that ‘Beliefs once consigned to the outermost 
fringes of American political and religious life now seem less isolated and stigmatizing than 
they once did.’ This observation is developed by Nigel James (2001) in a chapter examining 
the Militia/Patriot movement’s use of the Internet. In this, he also draws on Zygmunt 
Bauman’s (1998, 1999, 2001) work on the erosion of prior sureties of identity by the 
dissolution of closed cultural systems brought about via relatively easy access to rapid 
intercontinental travel and global communications networks, particularly the Internet. Like 
Oliver and Wood (2014), James notes the tendency within the conspiracy milieu for 
conspiracy theorists and their followers to exhibit a pronounced Manichaeism in their 
worldviews. Following Bauman, he suggests that this becomes coupled with a retreat into a 
belligerent nationalism as a defense against the unbearable freedom to endlessly recreate the 
self that characterizes postmodern identities. It is, nonetheless, an ambivalent nationalism that 
accentuates loyalty to ‘the nation’ but this is qualified by the mistrustful antagonism toward 
the state found within conspiracism. James (2001, 83) provides a useful reminder that the 
recursive interlinking of websites and Internet-based methods of communication produce a 
virtual proximity in beliefs that are otherwise marginalised: ‘the occultist/UFO/Egyptologist/ 
quasi-religious vortex of belief systems [is] never more than a few clicks away from a neo-
Nazi or Christian Identity website.’ 
 




The Internet has provided an ideal medium for the dissemination of all manner of stigmatized 
knowledge and provided fringe groups and beliefs a potential audience that far exceeds the 
network of self-published magazines, fairs and speaking opportunities that Colin Campbell 
(1972) described as ‘the circuit’ by which the cultic milieu recruited during the 1970s. Whilst 
the content of the message being circulated may be analogous, the reach of fringe voices via 
global communication media exceeds the audiences in town halls and mail order publications 
by several magnitudes. Barkun (1996, 2003) raises this point and returns to it in his 
consideration of the prevalence of conspiracy themes in Donald Trump’s campaigns for 
Republican Presidential candidate and U.S. President (Barkun 2017). In this short essay, 
Barkun reinforces his earlier point regarding the capacity for the Internet to amplify the 
voices of the bearers of stigmatized knowledge. He points to the capacity the web gives for 
republishing the same material on any number of platforms (or spamming as it is more 
usually called), also for the Internet to provide those with a little technical savvy to present 
their ideas in a polished manner that belies their fringe origins, and also the opportunity for 
‘securing pseudo-credibility’ (Barkun 2017, 438) by being linked to be a more credible, 
mainstream source. In particular, though, he pays heed to the capacity for Web the 2.0 
platforms such as Twitter and Facebook to accelerate the process of what he calls ‘the 
mainstreaming of the fringe’ (Barkun 2017, 441). Barkun identifies the Trump’s use of 
Breitbart executive chair, Steve Bannon, as strategist to his campaign and presidency as a 
clear sign of a more generalised acceptance of far right fringe beliefs in the political 
mainstream; he describes Bannon and his connection with the alt-right as providing, ‘a bridge 
to the fringe’ (Barkun 2017, 440). He might equally have mentioned Trump’s conversations 
with Alex Jones.  
The Trump campaign was galvanized by support from the ‘alt-right’. The alt-right is a 
relatively recent political formation within U.S. right wing circles. Whilst sharing some of the 
social conservativism of the religious right, the alt-right is marked by a comparative 
youthfulness and a radicalism in its racial politics. It is also marked by a nebulousness that 
prevents an easy ideological mapping and it is notable that its amorphousness can be at least 
attributed to its origins in the anonymous Internet message boards, 4chan and 8chan. There is 
a willed boundary pushing that tests freedom of speech in a progressive liberal environment; 
‘political correctness’ is one of the alt-right’s bugbears and the ludic nihilism of troll culture 
in 4/8chan has been given some political grounding by the alt-right. In this, #Gamergate is a 




gender roles. Similarly, the exhortations to ‘transgress’ made by Milo Yiannopoulos is clearly 
a targeted attack on the liberal values that have influenced sections of the US mass media and 
national politics for the last decade. Although the rapid ascendency of the alt-right has 
precluded the opportunity for an extended academic literature certain thematic similarities 
have begun to emerge. Barkun (2017, 439) is unequivocal in his description of the alt-right 
and notes that despite being ‘a somewhat ill-defined label comprising white separatists, both 
anti-Semitic and non-anti-Semitic.’  Rosenfeld echoes this but goes further in her 
characterization of the radical nature of the alt-right incursion into the mainstream. She views 
this fringe as proto-fascistic and a danger to the future of the U.S., and writes, ‘Bannon 
regards his revolution - a “global Tea Party movement”—as a quintessentially spiritual 
movement that will return the West to its ancestral (“Judeo-Christian”) culture’ (Rosenfeld 
2017, 13). In doing so she purposefully invokes Mussolini and her essay proliferates with 
justified references to the Fascistic leanings and influences apparent in the alt-right 
movement. Civil rights activists, the Southern Poverty Law Center detailed a number of the 
celebratory statements made by notable figures on the alt-right in the wake of Trump’s 
victory (Piggott 2016). Many of these were expressed in ethno-nationalist terms confirming 
the alt-right’s grounding in diverse white nationalist groups.  
As has been detailed elsewhere one of the unifying cornerstones of white nationalist ethno-
nationalist is a millenarian conspiracism (Wilson 2012, 2017). Wilson (2017) provides 
evidence of the purposeful use of the Twitter tag #whitegenocide by users of the white 
nationalist web forum, stormfront.org. During the multiple ISIL terrorist attacks on Paris on 
the night of November 13, 2015 forum members posted messages encouraging readers to use 
the hashtag in tweets relating to the attacks. The messages provide a clear account of white 
nationalist use of Twitter as a means of amplifying their politics of hate by association with 
trending political events. The phenomenon of hashtag activism has attracted some academic 
attention and most of it has been laudatory in the strategic use of hashtags to counter 
normative narratives of race, ethnicity, and racialized (in)justice, predominantly on Twitter 
(Yang 2016; Bonilla and Rosa 2015; Cumberpatch and Trujillo-Pagán 2016). Yang (2016, 
15) notes the capacity for the shared use of the #BlackLivesMatter to allow a creative 
communality of shared experiences to join together disparate experiences of injustice through 
a shared narrative form and, ‘create a collective story of struggles for racial justice.’ Bonilla 
and Rosa (2015) also note the collective endeavor that links hashtag activists but also draw 




and retweets may have been challenging or critical, they note the capacity for the #Ferguson 
to mobilize attention to ongoing and widespread injustice in America: 
Within this context, social media participation becomes a key site from which to 
contest mainstream media silences […] social media users were able to show that 
“#Ferguson is everywhere”—not only in the sense of a broad public sphere but also in 
the sense of the underlying social and political relationships that haunt the nation as a 
whole. (Bonilla & Rosa 2015, 12) 
Quite rightly, Bonilla and Rose, as with Yang and others, point to the potential for hashtag 
activism to disrupt normatively regulated flows of information and to counter the institutional 
power structures represented by the mainstream media. However, as Barkun (1996, 2003, 
2017) has shown, the open structures that allow the progressive use of the Internet and social 
media also provides an opportunity for reactionary voices to attempt the same. Thus, the 
communal effects of #BLM and the disinterring of concealed racial ‘haunting’ by #Ferguson 
are employed by the alt-right through #whitegenocide and other white power hashtags. 
The following section explores current use of the hashtag and shows how text mining Twitter 
can enhance understanding of the situated use of #whitegenocide hashtag to further 
strengthen the bridge between the fringe and the political mainstream described above. 
Twitter’s popularity clearly offers users a platform from which to address an extensive 
audience with 328 million monthly active users of whom 70m are American, this represents 
just under a quarter (24%) of all online American adults (Statista 2017). Although Twitter 
limits its archival database, text mining is able to make use of resources made available 
through Twitter search APIs (Application Programming Interface). In this instance, the free R 
statistical environment (R Core Team 2017) was used for the analysis. Additional R packages 
were used for Twitter API interaction (Gentry 2015), text mining (Feinerer & Hornik 2017), 
topic modeling (Grün & Hornik 2011), and visualization (Wickham 2009, Fellows 2014). 
10,000 tweets using the #whitegenocide were filtered using text parsing to remove common 
words that added little to the character of the tweets (conjunctions, prepositions, pronouns 
and so forth). A frequency matrix which was used to further filter words used less than 100 
times. From here a wordcloud was generated to provide an at-a-glance reference of the 50 





At the heart of the wordcloud are the two opposing terms in the white nationalist imaginary: 
white(s/ness/people/race) and diversity. The two poles in the white identitarians’ Manichean 
divide between purity and plurality. What is also striking is the presence of a number of 
prominent alt-right Twitter users: @wginfonetorg (White Genocide Info), @ladyaodh (Ann 
Kelly, ‘European rights activist’), @punishedrabbit1 (Jess Lynn, the number ‘1’ is omitted 
from the wordcloud as numbers are not included in the term matrix), @savwhitechildre 
(SaveWhiteChildren). The latter is a clear reference to the ‘14 words’ of mystic white 
supremacist David Lane, ‘We must secure the existence of our people and a future for white 
children’ (cited in Michael 2009, 43). The presence of these usernames among the most 
frequently used terms indicates the capacity for individual users to shape hashtag usage on 
Twitter. The audience reach of these users is also instructive. The following maps indicate the 






Map of followers for user White Genocide Info. Location of user estimated from linked 
website registrar information. 
 







Map of followers for user Save White Children. Location of user estimated from linked 
website registrar information. 
 
Although their locations are varied the three most notable #whitegenocide posters all provide 
a link to a homepage offering white supremacist propaganda. The distribution of their 
audience is broadly comparable with roughly 70% of their followers based in the U.S. and in 
the cases of White Genocide Info and Kelly Ann a European following of roughly 18%. Save 
White Children has a slightly smaller European following (11.8%) and a more pronounced 
South American following. It must also be recognized that only a small percentage of their 
following provide a geographic location and so the maps above are limited in their scope. For 
instance, only 2.2% of Kelly Ann’s c.26.5 thousand followers provide a location that was 
identifiable by the R source code, TwitterMap (Leek 2011). Nonetheless, the broad point is 
that if there is an equal distribution of users providing geographic locations, in all three 
instances their potential audiences are global.  
The word cloud procedure was repeated with the usernames of the individual removed from 
the term matrix. This brings a sharper focus on the variety of terms most frequently 





Three of the five third tier terms (after the Manichean binary, ‘white’ and ‘diversity’) are 
hashtags: #WhiteLivesMatter, #StandUpForEurope, and #MAGA. The first two are alt-right 
activist hashtags whilst the latter is President Trump’s campaign slogan ‘Make America 
Great Again.’ #MAGA is a close tie for the fifth most frequently paired term with 
#whitegenocide. The following chart demonstrates the frequency distribution of terms used in 
more than 200 #whitegenocide posts from the sample. 
 
 Other frequently occurring hashtags include #tcot (Top Conservatives on Twitter) and 




repeatedly used in proximity to more mainstream hashtags as a mechanical means to effect 
the bridging from the fringe to the mainstream outlined above. Trump is a clear conduit and it 
is no great surprise that he features in the 50 terms most frequently associated with 
#whitegenocide. His prevarications on matters of race and his relationship with the alt-right 
have ensured that the bridge to the mainstream continues to be available to the fringes of the 
right wing. A frequency analysis of terms most frequently associated with #maga in the 
dataset of tweets featuring #whitegenocide shows the following to be the most frequently 
associated terms: 
tcot whitepower natsoc ccot trump altright hate pjnet 
.58 .57 .56 .43 .41 .40 .37 .33 
 
There is a clear divide in these between overtly radical rights stances and the more traditional 
conservative right but the location of #maga and Trump vacillate between the two and are 
revealed as the bridges between the mainstream and the fringe described in Barkun. For 
clarity, these can be organized in the following table: 
Traditional Right Bridging Terms 
 
Radical Right 
#tcot (Top Conservatives on Twitter) 
 
#ccot (Conservative Christians on 
Twitter) 
 
#pjnet (Patriot Journalists Network) 
#maga  










Echoing the division between ‘genuine conservatives’ and ‘pseudo-conservatives’ made by 
Hofstadter, Barkun’s fringe increasingly find ways into the mainstream of American politics 




in the conclusion of ‘The Paranoid Style,’ Hofstadter (1964, 86) warned of the susceptibility 
of the capacity for conspiracist rhetoric to be, ‘built into mass movements or political parties.’ 




The compounding and expansion of state secrecy during the Cold War and the War on Terror 
produced an era of mistrust and generalized suspicion described by Fenster, Knight, and 
Aupers. Not unreasonably, they signal conditional approval for the skepticism toward loci of 
power/knowledge within the modern state and globalized corporate entities that conspiracy 
theory represents; although their approval is tempered by the more outré claims of fringe 
conspiracy theories. Nonetheless, the dismissal of Hofstadter’s work as an operation in 
clinical diagnosis has correspondingly resulted in an unpreparedness for the exploitation of 
this ‘culture of conspiracy’ by the radical fringe. It should be noted here that conspiracies do 
exist and that conspiracy theories are not the preserve of the political right. Covert actions 
are, arguably, a necessary part of statecraft but their distinction from conspiracies is 
determined only by the legitimacy of the power that is exerted in their enaction. At the same 
time, fanciful accounts of the secret exertion of power to achieve grand, malevolent ends 
abound. What is of note in our moment is the spread of conspiracy theories into the 
mainstream. In their turn to conspiracy theory, the radical right have conformed to the 
‘diagnosis’ made by Hofstadter. 
To return to Hofstadter’s article on the paranoid style, it is notable that he dedicates a 
subsection to the paranoid spokesman’s habit of ‘Emulating the Enemy.’ Among the Ku Klux 
Klan, anti-Communists, anti-Catholics, and anti-Masons’ reproduction of the tactics or 
organisational structures of their perceived enemies, Hofstadter also describes how ‘the John 
Birch Society emulates Communist cells and quasi-secret operation through ‘front’ groups, 
and preaches a ruthless prosecution of the ideological war along lines very similar to those it 
finds in the Communist enemy’ (Hofstadter 1964, 85). The parallels with the alt-right’s 
reproduction of #BlackLivesMatter in its reversed form as #WhiteLivesMatter is clearly a 
maneuver in this tradition and might be understood to represent a desire to emulate and claim 




mimicry is more redolent of the fragile desperation with which the alt-right seeks a 
consistent, communal ‘white’ identity than it is of a developed political strategy. Nonetheless, 
political progressives would be well advised to dismiss the continued hashtag activism of the 
alt-right at their peril. Whilst this article was being completed President Trump gave a public 
speech to a crowd in Warsaw, Poland ahead of the G20 Summit in Hamburg, Germany. He 
told the crowd, 
The fundamental question of our time is whether the West has the will to survive? 
[…] Do we have the confidence in our values to defend them at any cost? Do we have 
enough respect for our citizens to protect our borders? Do we have the desire and the 
courage to preserve our civilization in the face of those who would subvert and 
destroy it? (Thrush & Davis 2017, §6) 
 
Trump’s association with the alt-right leaves little room to doubt that his ‘West’ is a white 
West. His rhetoric is at once that of the paranoid spokesman trafficking ‘in the birth and 
death of whole worlds, whole political orders, whole systems of human values. He is always 
manning the barricades of civilization’ (Hofstadter 1964, 82). Certainly, Huntington’s (1993, 
1996) clash of civilizations casts a long shadow over this rhetoric but in light of the enmeshed 
hashtags, the proximity of the alt-right to the White House, Steven Bannon’s strategic role, it 
is not unreasonable to suppose that there will be an audience for Trump’s words that hears 
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8. UFO Consciousness and Portals to Cosmic Awareness 
Andrew Wilson 
 
This chapter provides an overview of modes of consciousness experienced by people who 
believe that they have been contacted by extra-terrestrial entities. Although these experiences 
are widely varied there are two primary modes of experience: forced contact (abduction) and 
dialogic contact (channelled messages or physical manifestations). These can range from a 
single isolated event to decades of sustained interaction. Although it is not exclusively the 
case, forced contact tends to take the form of singular events whilst dialogic contact tends to 
be ongoing. Although there are accounts of dialogic contact in which the contactee claims to 
have been physically visited by alien entities1 the prevailing norm is for this kind of contact 
to be a message conveyed by a fully realised alien mind – either that of an individual entity or 
a gestalt consciousness. Each will be discussed with the seminal abductee account provided 
by Betty and Barney Hill providing a focus for discussion of the abduction scenario whilst 
the current work of entity channel Lyssa Royal Holt will provide an extended case study of 
the extent to which states of altered consciousness have relevance to channelling.2 The focus 
of this chapter is the theme of self-transcendence in the experience of UFO channels. In 
Lyssa Royal Holt’s written and spoken material the self-transcendence attained through alien 
contact promises humanity the ‘collective salvation’ that Wessinger attributes to 
millennialism.3  
 
1 Raël (Claude Vorilhon) and George Adamski are notable examples of contactees who engaged in conversation 
with extra-terrestrial visitors to Earth.  
2 Lyssa Royal Holt has added ‘Holt’ to her surname during the 2010s but the majority of her published writing 
to date has been written under the name Lyssa Royal. Her current surname, ‘Holt,’ is used throughout the text to 
refer to her but Royal is used in the notes and bibliography for accuracy. 
3 Catherine Wessinger, ‘Millennialism in Cross-Cultural Perspective’, in The Oxford Handbook of 




It should be made clear that discussion of the experiences of contactees does not imply a 
simple acceptance of the claims that are being made. Whilst, at times, the case studies may be 
related from an emic perspective, my stance is an etic one but in order to enhance the 
readability of this chapter the decision has been made not to qualify every statement of belief 
or experience with the phrase ‘claims to have’ or similar. The contested nature of the 
objectivity of these experiences is referred to from time to time but what is far more 
important is to ensure that the mental worlds, constructs and terms of reference of the 
contactees are treated with an eye for accuracy and fairness. They will be analysed from a 
perspective that seeks to situate their experiences in a framework that links them to the wider 
social and cultural context of their particular historical moment.  
The narrative of humans claiming contact with nonhuman intelligence is long and, arguably, 
begins with the complex and contested history of shamanism and the traditions it has been 
applied to since.4 Nonetheless, I believe a distinction can be made between earlier forms of 
contact and those that have occurred in modern, secularised societies, especially those 
accounts that have come in the wake of the post-World War II ‘space race’ and the objective 
fact of physical human exploration beyond Earth’s atmosphere.5 Certainly, George Adamski 
and Kenneth Arnold6 predate the space race but the idea of space travel was more or less 
culturally embedded by then through science fiction, comic books and film serials, such as 
the Flash Gordon series. Whilst Arnold was a ‘reliable witness’ of unidentified flying objects, 
Adamski presents a more useful and pertinent point of reference in the context of this chapter 
as he encapsulates the coming together of what Geppert characterises as ‘astroculture’ and 
spiritual consciousness.7 Altered states have been the foundation of modern UFO contact for 
most – but not all – experiencers.  
George Adamski’s claim to have experienced a direct, physical encounter with an alien 
provides a seminal instance of physical visitation. Following a series of UFO sightings, he 
claimed to have communicated with a ‘Nordic’ Venusian called Orthon in the Colorado 
 
4 Ronald Hutton, Shamans: Siberian Spirituality and the Western Imagination (London: Hambledon and 
London, 2001). 
5 Andrew Fergus Wilson, ‘Postcards from the Cosmos: Cosmic Spaces in Alternative Religion and Conspiracy 
Theories’, The Journal of Astrosociology 2 (2017). 
6 Arnold is credited with the first sighting of UFOs in 1947. 
7 Alexander C.T. Geppert, ‘Extraterrestrial encounters: UFOs, science and the quest for transcendence, 1947–




Desert in November 1952.8 Orthon’s message was a warning of impending doom should 
humanity continue experimentation with nuclear weapons; the contact is typically benign and 
contactees come away from their encounter with a warning for humanity to mend its ways or 
face catastrophic consequences. These prophetic messages from higher intelligences predate 
the UFO phenomenon and take many forms in religious and esoteric traditions. Adamski was 
not only aware of this but situated his visitation by Orthon in a tradition of spiritual contact 
by ascended masters associated with the Theosophical Society. Christopher Partridge has 
provided a detailed study of the incorporation of ascended masters into post-World War II 
Theosophy and the influence of Theosophy on Adamski’s understanding of his experience.9 
Partridge draws attention to the incorporation of technological themes into the spiritual 
millennium that are accentuated in Adamski’s adaption of Theosophy.10 
Adamski’s prophetic message warned of the risk of nuclear annihilation if humankind failed 
to develop spiritual wisdom at the same rate as its technological development. These 
warnings are, effectively, millennialist and promise utopian joy should humanity achieve the 
required spiritual evolution. This is commonplace in the messages relayed by many 
subsequent contactees and channels, such as Lyssa Royal Holt, and while some have 
threatened apocalypse the majority are concerned with a millennialist awareness of 
humanity’s destiny to become a species at home in the cosmos. In the case of Holt, this is an 
eschatological transformation of consciousness in which individuals progressively surrender 
their unique consciousness to a single, amalgamated consciousness. This is reminiscent of the 
model of the evolution of consciousness described in Theosophy. In Holt, the influence is 
unacknowledged, so embedded is the concept in New Age-influenced spiritual formations, 
but in Adamski’s account the influence is evident. 
Multiple other contactees followed in Adamski’s wake with tales of contact – and travel – 
with the ‘space brothers’. Among these were George King, a taxi driver living in Maida Vale, 
London. He received contact from ‘Mars Sector Six’ in the form of a voice he heard whilst 
washing his dishes at the kitchen sink during 1954. Although King did not receive the same 
kind of physical visitation that Adamski did his message was broadly comparable and owed 
 
8 Don Lago, ‘Messages from Space’, Michigan Quarterly Review 54, no.1 (2015). Available from 
http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.act2080.0054.108. 
9 Christopher Partridge, ‘Understanding UFO religions and abduction spiritualities,’ in UFO Religions, ed. 
Christopher Partridge (London: Routledge, 2003) 




much of its structure and message to the same Theosophical roots.11 Whilst Adamski’s 
daughter and other followers formed the George Adamski Foundation to maintain Adamski’s 
message following his death, King founded a religious organisation based on the messages 
from the cosmic masters who he claimed communicated with him.12 Named after his primary 
contact, the Aetherius Society has survived King’s death and continues to spread King’s work 
and to meet for the purpose of focussing positive energies to counter current challenges. 
Under King’s tutelage, the Aetherius Society developed into a structured and consistent 
religious movement; King was undoubtedly the charismatic leader around which it was 
organised and within its teachings he alone possessed a mind that was sufficiently evolved to 
receive the message of the cosmic masters. His basic message, described by Simon Smith as 
an urgent need for humanity to reach ‘a higher state of evolution as soon as possible’,13 is 
repeated – replete with Theosophical underpinnings – by many current channels but where 
they vary is the diminishment of the necessity for a charismatic leader. Instead, many now 
suggest that the required psychic development necessary to become attuned to the correct 
vibrational frequencies through which to receive contact from alien consciousnesses is 
attainable by any human who follows a spiritual path. Certainly, this development can be 
traced to the individualistic spiritual seekership associated with New Age religious 
sensibilities but that does not mean that aspects of the content of King’s messages do not 
resonate in current beliefs, although this chapter seeks to draw attention to the social and 
cultural context of contactee discourse.  
King appeared on British national television a number of times and both discussed his 
experiences and appeared to receive channelled messages live on air. The first of these 
appearances, on Lifeline in 1959, consisted of King channelling a report from ‘Mars Sector 
Six’ and a discussion between King, a Cambridge astronomer, a Jungian psychologist and the 
host, psychiatrist Dr David Stafford-Clark. In his summing up of the programme, Stafford-
Clark offered the home audience the following guidance: ‘[It] would be easy, foolish in fact, 
to deride Mr King […] but what the Aetherius Society is really doing is expressing in a 
symbolic form the fears and anxieties that divide the world […] The fear that our scientific 
 
11 Simon G. Smith, ‘Opening a channel to the stars: The origins and development of the Aetherius Society’, in 
UFO Religions. 
12 John Gordon Melton, ‘Spiritualist, Psychic, and New Age Family’, in Encyclopedia of American Religions, 
vol. 2, ed. John Gordon Melton, 3rd edn (New York: Triumph Books, 1991).  




advances have outrun our wisdom and our humanity in some respects, and that we are afraid 
it might outrun our very existence.’14 
The argument being made here is not far removed from Stafford-King’s closing remarks. The 
ongoing dislocation between scientific knowledge, its technologies and the 
instrumentalisation of our lifeworlds and our ability to represent and culturally reflect the 
subsequent complex and rapidly changing nature of our social, technological, and cultural 
realities is the basis of differing versions of the crisis of postmodernity. In Lyotard, 
Baudrillard, Jameson, and Virilio our systems of representation are no longer capable of 
reflecting our realities to us – they become either concerned with their own self-referentiality 
or are simply outstripped by new media of communication.15 Thus, the primary mechanism 
through which modern societies had become accustomed to engaging with the cultural realm 
fails to provide a meaningful cultural response to this cultural context. When science, 
technology, culture, the economy, and society appear alien then the attraction of the alien 
motif as a means through which to make sense of one’s position in the new cosmos becomes 
compelling. It is argued here that the cosmic consciousness appealed to and held up as an 
ideal is a socio-spiritual signifier of entry into a technologically transformed relationship with 
ourselves and the now-breached heavens. 
Although much of what follows is concerned with an attempt to uplift human consciousness 
into an evolved form more fully oriented toward a global, technological future, it should be 
noted that there are those for whom such dramatic change comes at a cost. If there is a 
symbolic hope for a techno-utopia in the channelled messages, abductees reflect a fearfulness 
borne out of alienation and confusion. In 1964, whilst under hypnosis, Betty and Barney Hill 
‘recovered’ memories of being abducted by aliens three years earlier. During their time on 
the alien craft the Hills claim to have been made the subjects of medical experimentation. 
This was physically invasive and traumatic. Betty Hill recounted having a range of tissue and 
fluid samples taken via the insertion of a large, needle-like instrument into her naval. Her 
husband, Barney, reported being anally probed and having his semen extracted. Initially they 
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had no memory of their experience beyond a period of ‘lost time’ after having been pursued 
by bright lights whilst driving through the deep woods in the northern reaches of New 
Hampshire late at night on September 19, 1961. Having stopped their car to observe the lights 
first Betty and then Barney came to the conclusion that they were watching a craft of non-
terrestrial origin. According to their account, it approached and they observed several 
uniformed humanoid figures who signalled to them. Fearful, they fled in their car but claimed 
to be unable to account for a period during which they drove over thirty miles save for 
memories of electric buzzing sounds at the start and end of that period.  
In The Interrupted Journey (1966), the journalist John Fuller worked with the Hills and their 
psychotherapist Benjamin Simon to produce a narrative for those missing hours. Barney Hill 
had first visited Simon in December 1963 seeking help for a generalised anxiety disorder and 
the disturbing, repetitive nightmares his wife was suffering from. It is only as their sessions 
continued that the importance to them of the abduction became clear. The relevance of the 
Hills here is not the entry into the hypnotic state. Writing in the preface to The Interrupted 
Journey, Simon is quite clear in his belief that hypnosis does not offer access to thought 
processes or content that would otherwise be unavailable to hypnotherapist or client: ‘Under 
hypnosis, experiences buried in amnesia may be recalled in a much shorter time than in the 
normal course of the psychotherapeutic process. Nevertheless, there is little produced under 
or by hypnosis that is not possible without.’16 What is relevant is the state of mind that the 
Hills describe as being produced in them during their time on board the craft they described. 
According to the account he gave whilst under hypnosis, Barney Hill received telepathic 
communication from the aliens but unlike the dialogic contactees this caused him pain: ‘Just 
stay there, he said. (Now his voice breaks in extreme terror.) It’s pounding in my head!!  (He 
screams again.) I gotta get away! I gotta get away from here!’17 Barney Hill went on to 
recount whilst under hypnosis how he was rendered helpless by the alien abductors, carried 
on to the UFO whilst in a state comparable to the hypnosis he was undergoing as part of his 
therapy. Whilst on board the alien ship he had a memory of being on an operating table with 
something cold cupping his groin. Once released from the flying saucer he recalled being full 
of relief and meeting Betty in the road, also in a state of happiness, ‘Betty and I feel, I feel 
real hilarious, like a feeling of well-being and great relief [...] I am relieved because I feel like 
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I've been in a harrowing situation, and there was nothing damaging or harmful about it’.18 
Their experience became archetypal of the invasive abduction typically recounted by 
abductees. In both forced contact and dialogic contact the state of mind of the contactees is 
other. For the Hills it is repressed and hidden from the waking mind whilst for King and 
Adamski the experience brings spiritual wisdom and is the result of a heightened awareness. 
As was noted in the comments of his contemporaries, King’s beliefs were treated as symbolic 
of an emergent social reality. Jodi Dean suggests that the Hills experiences – no less real for 
them – simultaneously carried a symbolic dimension that referred to a general theme in 
abduction accounts of alienation whilst also expressing the particularity of their experiences 
as an ethnically mixed couple, Barney being African-American and Betty European-
American. In her general account of anomic futurity, Dean points to the diminished sense of 
location, blurred accounts of spaceships and unknown stars, of being whisked off to an 
unknown place by an unknowable technology: ‘Not only is alien technology invasive and 
incomprehensible, but virtually all technology is alien’.19 For the Hills in particular, and 
subsequent narratives of human-alien hybridity, an implicit aspect of their account was the 
ongoing sense of dislocatedness and prejudice experienced primarily by Barney. Dean asks, 
‘Is it possible that his story escaped the confines of ufology because it commented on 
tensions around racial difference and mixed marriage in the United States during the 1960s, 
on the transgression of racial boundaries? Was it a way of thinking the unthinkable? Of using 
a stigmatized discourse to probe stigmatized practices?’20Again, we find the hinterlands of 
accepted experience providing the discursive space in which social practices without 
representation in recorded culture are afforded expression. 
  
Current contact and evolutionary consciousness 
Lyssa Royal Holt and her extensive written and recorded archive provides a valuable means 
of understanding the alien contact experience as both process and belief system. Holt is a 
psychology graduate who grew up in the Northeast of the United States and her psychological 
training may well begin to explain her pragmatic approach to channelling. She does not 
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present herself as the sole recipient of the aliens’ message as did George King. Instead, she 
believes that the capacity to communicate with aliens is inborn in all humans and provides 
workshops that seek to train people to access it. She offers a variety of programs with an 
intensive course taught in Japan being the basis of all other sessions.21 At the time of writing, 
Holt was offering a three-day residential course in the US in September 2018 and a wider 
range of programs in Japan.22 During these sessions students are taught by Holt and two 
extra-terrestrial consciousnesses that she channels, Sasha, a Pleiadian entity and Germane, a 
group consciousness. Although Holt’s training sessions are commercial offerings23 she has 
made publicly available an extensive archive of written materials in multiple translations via 
her website and hours of video teachings and interviews on her Youtube channel.24 These are 
supplemented by three published books outlining her work and the message she claims to be 
channelling from extra-terrestrial entities and a pack of divinatory cards that are intended to 
aid their user in accessing the higher aspect of consciousness that Holt describes as our 
evolutionary destiny. The books are: Prism of Lyra: An Exploration of Human Galactic 
Heritage (1989), Visitors From Within: Extraterrestrial Encounters and Species Evolution 
(1992), and Preparing for Contact: A Metamorphosis of Consciousness (1994); all three have 
been edited and updated with Preparing for Contact having being most recently expanded 
and revised in 2011. The divinatory cards are published under the title of Galactic Heritage 
Cards. They’re based on Prism of Lyra but are intended as a supplementary tool for accessing 
cosmological consciousness. The cards depend upon Holt’s description of the fragmentary 
nature of consciousness for what she claims to be their divinatory capabilities. After the Fall, 
in Holt’s account, all current consciousness across the universe became separated from ‘the 
Whole’ and thus the Whole was fragmented into collective and individual consciousness. 
Nonetheless, all forms of identity – group and self – contain the memory of the Whole and 
thus Holt describes the holographic nature of consciousness. Essentially, she is using 
‘holographic’ in a metaphorical rather than literal sense; she is suggesting that the fragment 
of unified consciousness we experience as our ego contains an untapped model of the 
expanded cosmic awareness that she suggests is the destiny of all sentience. On the basis of 
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this, Holt describes the relationship between the card reader and what is to her the destiny of 
consciousness as unified and integrated with the cosmos: ‘What happens to your connection 
to the hologram when you pick a card? An analogy can explain it. The hologram is spinning. 
When you pick a card, it is like tapping the spinning computer with your finger. A window 
pops out like on a computer. In that window, you see an aspect of yourself that is represented 
on that card.’25 
Certainly, the cards are a commercial endeavour and are one of many such divinatory tools 
available in the ‘spiritual supermarket’ that at once describes the eclecticism of belief and the 
commoditisation of religion that some associate with New Age religions.26 To some 
sociologists of religion this signifies the waning of religion’s affect and the primacy of the 
secular world; notably, Steve Bruce has discussed this in relation to New Age religious 
formations.27 For Bruce, this commercialisation of religious practices devalues it and limits 
the opportunity for individuated consumer-believers to effect change in the world in the 
manner in which, say, Methodists did in nineteenth-century Britain. Nonetheless, as Guy 
Redden has subsequently pointed out, this overlooks the complex ways in which New Age 
beliefs are consumed as well as the evidence that the social, political and civic engagement of 
New Age spiritual seekers is generally greater than their secular counterparts.28 Moreover, as 
Paul Heelas suggests the embracement by believers of a holism that runs counter to the 
instrumentalism of late capitalism continues the ‘romantic trajectory’ of ‘the qualitative 
versus the quantitative, the expansive versus the restrictive, the expressive versus the 
channelled, the priceless versus the philistine, the bloom versus the cage’.29 That is not to say 
that Holt is engaged in any active campaign of resistance to corporate oligarchies, but her 
message of shared humanity and universalism does run counter to rising currents of populism 
and Trumpian calls to ‘build a wall’ – both real and symbolic. Holt’s is a developing work 
and whilst there are other, earlier examples with a similar message she describes her role as a 
channel of alien consciousnesses as part of a (shared) responsibility to bring about an 
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evolution in human consciousness. ‘If we are to truly transform, it will be through the 
infusing of awareness onto our world, not using the awareness to escape from our 
responsibilities as citizens of Earth and the Galactic Family.’30 
Holt’s account of telepathic contact with alien intelligences from the Pleiades star cluster is 
remarkably similar to those of King. In each case the aliens who appear to, or speak through, 
the contactees are benign and seek to aid humanity’s development as cosmic beings. The 
state of mind that allows perception of the aliens is a state of awareness that has integrated 
with the expanded cosmic consciousness that is typically described as humanity’s 
evolutionary destiny – although it is worth considering this to be a spiritual evolution rather 
than a physical one. As in King’s narrative this spiritual evolution fulfils a return to a 
cosmologically holistic state. Where Holt’s differs is that the ‘integrated consciousness’31 she 
describes which, in King’s earlier versions, stemmed from a specialised and particular history 
of esoteric development, is more widespread and available in her version. Indeed, this wider 
consciousness shift is intrinsic to the messages that she claims to channel.  
Although her contact with alien consciousness is benign, Holt recognises continuity between 
her experiences and those of the abductees. As noted in relation to the Hills’ ‘ur-abduction’, 
the abductions were experienced only in retrospect, the shift in consciousness being so 
violent that at the time of abduction the experiencers were reduced to a near-catatonic state. 
Holt dedicated her second book to the abductees in the following way: ‘To all humans who 
have allowed the abduction phenomenon to touch their lives… Thank you for being 
humanity's pioneers on the evolutionary frontier.’32 Essentially, Holt explains the abductions 
as being a mismatch between the abductees’ undeveloped cosmic consciousness and the 
expanded awareness of unified consciousness held by the aliens. In a channelled conversation 
with the Zeta Reticulan Harone, it is suggested that the aliens’ perception of the shared 
consciousness of higher lifeforms provides an implicit consent to abduction. 
 
30 Lyssa Royal and Keith Priest, The Prism of Lyra: An Exploration of Human Galactic Heritage (Scottsdale, 
Arizona: Royal Priest Research Press, 1992), ix. 
31 Lyssa Royal and Keith Priest, Visitors From Within: Extraterrestrial Encounters and Species Evolution, 2nd 
edn (Columbus, NC: Granite Publishing, 1999), 14. 




I'd like to open this conversation with a question. What is the nature of the agreement 
or permission perceived by the Zeta Reticuli that allows them to abduct, detain, and 
experiment with humans? 
Harone: The nature is simple. We view your collective soul as being a part of ours and 
therefore by that unification, permission is granted.33 
Moreover, the abductions are presented as a necessary stage in humanity’s entry into cosmic 
consciousness. Harone continues, ‘Therefore, as a member of the universal races, it is our 
responsibility and also our gift to assist planets in their evolutionary steps’.34 The aliens are, 
in effect, proselytising a literally universal teleology. Following the trauma of the abduction, 
humans adapt to and integrate the alien presence then, by acting on the guidance offered 
through the dialogic contacts, humanity becomes a fully-realised cosmic being.  I have 
written elsewhere about the potential for reading expressions of human spirituality that focus 
on alien life and extra-terrestrial experiences as a response to the culture shock of becoming a 
space-faring species and this theme is continued in the discussion of Holt and her comparable 
channels.35 
Holt’s cosmology follows the Paradise-Fall-Redemption (PFR) narrative structure of 
Christianity and is expressed in terms of seven ‘densities’ of being.36 The densities are post-
Fall states of being whose coming-into-being provide the basis of the Creation myth in Holt’s 
cosmology. In Holt’s account, the Fall is a falling away from a unified consciousness shared 
by all matter in the universe; human selfhood and ego are symptoms of this fall, a stage of 
(re-)ascension toward oneness with ‘the Source’. Although the Source is the state of being to 
which all beings are oriented, Holt refers to the fragment of reality that humanity experiences 
as, ‘the Whole, All That Is, or God’.37 Holt is clear that the splitting of the Whole from the 
Source is analogous to the moment of creation – both in secular and religious constructs. In 
her rendering of the creation myth it is curiosity that stimulates the splitting of reality 
between the Source and the Whole: ‘The Whole's initial curiosity about a fragmented 
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existence actually created the reality itself. It required a shift in perspective, focus, or 
frequency’.38  
In Holt’s account, whilst the potential to access this consciousness is inborn it is seldom 
accessed. The majority of humanity exist in the ‘third density’ and await initiation into fourth 
density consciousness. Although it is an uncomfortable metaphor, consciousness density may 
be understood as the bandwidth of information that a being has available to it by which it 
understands its relation to the Whole.39 Holt expresses this in terms of the rapidity of 
vibrations within a being’s energy field and the higher number of vibrations equates to a 
higher level of ‘density’. Thus humans (and other beings) who exist in the third density are 
conscious of their self and its relationship to a larger reality but perceive themselves as 
distinct from that reality. Each density corresponds to a state of consciousness defined in 
relationship to its degree of separation from the Source and represents a stage of evolution in 
a being’s consciousness. Whilst each stage is a distinct level of consciousness, Holt suggests 
that movement through the densities is experienced as a continuum:  
As a civilization’s consciousness begins to evolve, they begin evolving from a 3rd-
density perspective of […] intense singularity […] into what we call a 4th-density 
reality […] this is a spectrum. So the metaphor there is the anchor that anchors the 
consciousness in singularity in 3rd density begins to get lighter and lighter and 
lighter.40 
The first density is ‘Awareness as a point; Physical matter [...] It provides the matter and 
energy for the creation of atoms and molecules’.41 Leibniz’s monad is called to mind by the 
first density in the absoluteness of each monad’s distinctiveness. The second density energy 
vibration is linear and is a consciousness shared by lower animals and other organic matter 
lacking self-awareness; beings in second density consciousness share a group identity that 
inhibits their connection to the holistic source. As stated, the majority of humans experience 
reality through third-density consciousness, Holt describes this as ‘Volumetric awareness’, 
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characterised by, ‘Ego; Loss of group identity, development of individual identity; Ability to 
remember past and cognize the future while retaining present awareness’.42 The third density 
is therefore a dimension of consciousness defined through difference: self from others, this 
moment from other moments in linear time and so on. In Holt’s system the content of 
conscious thought in third-density consciousness is never a true experience of the integrative 
nature of shared cosmic consciousness; the ego contains the possibility of consciousness of 
the Whole but is constantly deflected from realising that possibility by the logic of difference 
that the ego requires. Like an organic intellectual, Holt builds a meaningful response to the 
condition of consciousness in the early twenty-first century but unlike Gramsci’s figure she 
articulates not a focused, political will (say, hegemony or counter-hegemony) but a diffuse, 
intuited response to ongoing transformation of the pluralistic Geist (mind, spirit, culture). The 
polyvalency of the term in Hegel is useful in capturing the simultaneous realisation of multi-
layered consciousness that Holt suggests is experienced in the fourth density of 
consciousness. 
 
The fourth density and humanity’s evolutionary consciousness 
Holt summarises fourth density consciousness as ‘Superconsciousness; Reintegration of 
group identity without loss of ego identity; As vibration increases, perception of past, present, 
and future become more fluid along with the ability to interface with multidimensional and 
multidensity realities’.43 She describes fourth density consciousness as the final stage in 
embodied consciousness and that humanity and cetaceans are currently experiencing two 
overlapped realities, third and fourth density consciousness. It is Holt’s belief that this marks 
the evolution of humanity (and whales and dolphins) into a higher level awareness of the 
Whole. As will be discussed below, Holt believes it is her mission and that of other channels 
of alien consciousness to encourage this transition from third to fourth density consciousness 
and to pass on the structures of thought that allow this awareness of integration to the cosmic 
Whole. In essence, to train others to open their minds to the higher density realities.  There 
are three further non-corporeal consciousness densities in Holt’s system, the fifth, sixth and 
seventh; Holt suggests that whilst all seven densities are on a continuum the first four levels 
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are distinct due to altering perception of embodied being whereas the final three are much 
less distinct and blend into each other. The fifth density is characterised by wholeness: a 
singular, aggregate identity which is capable of manifesting in multiple moments, 
‘Experiential awareness of “I” as a group identity; Not bound by linear time’.44 It is thus the 
ego transformed from that of the embodied consciousness to that of multiple awarenesses 
across time and space. In the penultimate sixth density, consciousness becomes the medium 
of experience, ‘Awareness as the dimension itself’.45 Holt characterises this as being best 
understood as ‘Christ consciousness’ in which, ‘one begins taking responsibility for the 
Whole rather than the Self. The process of progressing the Self and progressing the Whole 
become one and the same.’46 The continued influence of Theosophy is evident here. 
Theosophy is also, more generally, evident in Holt’s awareness of the holistic being that is 
encountered across the fourth to seventh densities. It is the expanded consciousness realised 
in the fourth density that allows access to that wider, plural sense of self, and this provides a 
gateway to the integrated plurality of the Whole. For Holt, gaining access to an awareness of 
shared consciousness, is the mechanism through which channellers are able to be contacted 
by, and communicate with, alien intelligences. In other words, by reducing the demands of 
the ego and attaining the openness to the fourth dimension’s multiplicity of consciousness the 
evolving being gains access to the expanded evolutionary consciousness that Holt suggests is 
the cosmic destiny of all things.  Holt casts newly aware channels of alien consciousness as 
functioning agents of consciousness evolution: 
One of the reasons so many of us beings are here now, is to help guide you out of that 
hall of mirrors […] where you’re seeing your own polarization and your own 
fragmentation bouncing back at you. We’re here to help guide you back from [the 
reflected fragments] and into the memory of your wholeness. When you go into the 
memory of your wholeness [...] when you experience that wholeness, you then 
experience the dissolution of the distracting energies that bind you to the 3rd density, 
physical, separative reality.47 
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The alien beings are manifest in and through their channels and this shared consciousness is a 
consequence of the dissolution of the ego that Holt encourages as a step toward higher 
density awareness. Although highly organised within its own terms of reference, Holt’s 
cosmology is recognisable in the context of dialogic contact and the theme of spiritual 
evolution as redemption is clearly not new. For Holt, the process is evolutionary with 
humanity growing in its ability to ascend the sevenfold dimensional scale she describes. In 
the PFR narrative structure this is the prelude to redemption and readmission into the extra-
terrestrial universal. In Prism of Lyra, Holt described it thus, ‘All consciousness and energy 
was once fused into an integrated whole. This Whole was aware of aspects of itself, but in a 
different way from individualized consciousness.’48  
Through the redemption of integrated consciousness, the Paradisiacal state of Wholeness is 
realised in the seventh vibrational density state. It is from this level of consciousness that the 
currents dictating connections joining minds transitioning from third to fourth density 
emanate. When a ‘critical mass’ of seventh dimension consciousness is reached then the 
Whole will rejoin the Source and return through the ‘Prism of Lyra’ to engage with a new 
reality. 
Although Holt’s cosmology stresses the usual markers of New Age spirituality – holism 
married to a message of self-improvement – it is significantly distinct in the transcendence of 
ego. For instance, Heelas and also Farias and Lalljee49 point to the greater tendency toward 
individualism in New Age believers but in Holt individuality is an obstacle to achieving 
cosmic awareness. Indeed, the goal of spiritual development is to be re-absorbed into the 
Whole; an undifferentiated amalgamation of evolved consciousnesses akin to the Real in 
Lacan which is, ultimately, a return to a prelapsarian state. Nonetheless, as is common to a 
number of twentieth-century UFO spiritualities, the general themes of spiritual development 
and acquisition of an expanded universal consciousness following the guidance of hidden 
masters follow the structures of belief associated with Theosophy. As stated, the influence of 
Blavatsky's Theosophical Society on the New Age in general is well-documented. What is of 
use here is Theosophy’s intention of integrating not only all world religions but also science 
in its belief system. This is a feature in Adamski’s account and also one of the aims of the 
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Aetherius Society. In Holt, the fate of the Zeta Reticulans, who used science to destroy their 
planet’s ecosystem, is a cautionary tale about the misuses of science. However, science also 
offers redemption; she also recounts the importance of science in preserving their species and 
supporting their evolutionary journey to the Whole: ‘The first priority was to genetically alter 
the brain structures to affect emotional expression. They shunned their past expression of 
passion and chaos; they now wanted order. Their brains were thus altered to output a 
consistent chemical response to external stimuli. They achieved detachment from their ego 
structure. Over generations of neurochemical manipulations, the Apexians became a group 
mind.’50  
Benjamin Zeller suggests that one of the structural factors influencing the development of 
emergent religions is the increased prominence of institutional science: ‘The new religions 
served as harbingers of a dawning conversation on the relation of science to religion […] 
religious groups had several methods of creatively responding to science, and the often-
assumed conflict-based model of “science vs. religion” must be replaced by a more nuanced 
understanding of how religions operate in our modern scientific world.’51 Again, the 
emergent religions are understood as a valuable indicator of developing but otherwise 
unexpressed cultural formations. Holt reflects this observation of Zeller’s but what is central 
to her channelled messages is the theme of integration, of overcoming difference and 
promoting a universal harmony. Certainly, there is nothing unique in this and her 
indebtedness to not only a diluted New Age Theosophy but also the contactee tradition is 
evident. What is notable is that, for Holt and her followers, this message of the need for an 
integrated species-consciousness, the Whole, continues to serve as a universal necessity for 
our collective development. 
 
Conclusion 
Although the comparison to Gramsci above was no more than a suggestive allusion that is not 
to say that a protean politics should not be looked for in Holt’s thought. There is little in 
Holt’s work that can be considered to be conspiracy theory but it belongs to the same order of 
 
50 Royal, The Prism of Lyra, 78. 
51 Benjamin E. Zeller, Prophets and Protons: New Religious Movements and Science in Late Twentieth-Century 




knowledge that conspiracy theory does; Michael Barkun usefully describes the category as 
‘stigmatized knowledge’.52 Although it is a commonplace of the literature that conspiracy 
theory has a political underpinning there is less acknowledgement of the political dimension 
present within New Age religions. Ward and Voas unpick the hybrid conspirato-political-
spiritual form taken by David Icke’s paranoid cosmology,53 whilst Christopher Partridge and 
Andy Letcher both delineate the commingling of spirituality and eco-politics in the British 
occulture of the 1980s and 1990s.54 More typical, though, is the dismissal of New Age 
spirituality as too individualistic to allow it to take a wider political form. As discussed 
above, Steve Bruce is representative of this position but there has been much work that 
suggests a more nuanced complexity in the political and social role of emergent religions. 
Indeed, this dismissiveness overlooks the political tendency present in the foundational 
beliefs that informed the New Age. B.J. Gibbons makes clear that the boundaries between the 
political and the spiritual are porous and frequently poorly defined. He writes: 
The initial attraction of Theosophy for Besant, however, may have been that it 
provided a spirituality which entailed a radical social gospel. Helena Blavatsky herself 
had argued that Christ and the Buddha ‘were ardent philanthropists and political 
altruists – preaching most unmistakably Socialism of the noblest and highest type’. If 
Besant’s conversion to Theosophy led her to be less active in the socialist movement, 
this perhaps involved more a redirection than a diminution of her radical energies. 
After moving to India, Besant became increasingly active in Indian nationalist 
politics.55 
To be clear, Holt is not making any kind of reference to a socialist politics and the closest she 
comes to doing so is to use communism as a measure of repression: ‘Think of [the Orion 
Empire] as 1,000 times more repressive than communism’.56 What has hopefully been shown 
by the preceding argument is that these notes from the cultural fringe offer insight into 
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themes and structures of feeling57 that have yet to come into the widespread vernacular of 
everyday culture. In articulating unresolved tensions within society they provide a semiosis 
of expression to felt but undefined cultural currents; her message is not new but the 
articulation of it in the pseudo-scientific context of holographic alien intelligences 
exemplifies a novel reformulation of it. In Holt’s instance, she is articulating a holistic and 
universal reconciliation of fragmented and disparate races into an integrated whole in 
preparation for a journey into a new universe through ‘the prism of Lyra’. Essentially, her 
paradisiacal future is organised around an evolved consciousness that embraces and 
recognises the Self in Others. It is not necessary to embrace her cosmology to recognise that 
this species goal may be no bad thing in these times. 
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